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Cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet:
iustitiam namque colimus et boni et aequi
notitiam profitemur, aequum ab iniquo
separantes, licitum ab illicito discernentes,
bonos non solum metu poenarum, verum
etiam praemiorum quoque exhortatione
efficere cupientes, veram nisi fallor
philosophiam, non simulatam affectantes. 1

1

DIGEST 1.1.1. “Anyone may properly call us the priests of this art, for we cultivate
justice and profess to know what is good and equitable, dividing right from
wrong, and distinguishing what is lawful from what is unlawful; desiring to make
men good through fear of punishment, but also by the encouragement of reward;
aiming (if I am not mistaken) at a true, and not a pretended philosophy.”
Translated by Samuel P. Scott. 2 THE CIVIL LAW 209 (1932).

ROBERT ANTHONY PASCAL

An Introduction to the
Life and Work of Robert A. Pascal
Olivier Moréteau 
The essays gathered in this volume are the fruit of decades of
reflection by a very unique scholar whose life covered most of the
twentieth century and who is still active in the twenty‐first.
Primarily intended as homage to a Professor who marked
generations of students and tried to preserve the essence of the civil
law of Louisiana, this book has grown into much more. The Editor, in his
capacity of Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies at the Louisiana
State University (LSU) Law Center, feels under the duty to keep alive
anything in the Louisiana civil law tradition that may serve the State’s
legal community and its citizenry in the present and in the future. The
civil law is a living heritage, part of Louisiana’s identity, which keeps on
evolving. Robert Pascal’s publications are part of it. Bringing the best of
it to the eye of the public is a contribution to the present and the future
of the civil law in Louisiana and beyond.

© 2010, by Olivier Moréteau.
Professor of Law, Russell B. Long Eminent Scholars Academic Chair, Director of
the Center of Civil Law Studies, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University; formerly Professor of Law, Université Jean Moulin Lyon 3 and
Director of the Edouard Lambert Institute of Comparative Law.
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In recent years, Robert Pascal had established a list of his
Writings about Law that was published in Volume 1 of the Journal of
Civil Law Studies, in December 2008, with the papers of the Civil Law
Workshop, Robert A. Pascal Series, Revisiting the Distinction Between
Person and Things. 1 Having visited some of these writings, I had the idea
to publish a selection of his best essays. I asked Professor Pascal to
make a selection, which we discussed and amended, until an advanced
stage of the editing process. Though this was a very cooperative project,
at every point of the editing process, Professor Pascal insisted that this
was to be the Editor’s book. As Editor, I assume full responsibility for the
selection, the way articles are arranged, and also for writing the present
Introduction.
All texts are published without any change, “as is,” the way they
appeared at the first publication. I asked Professor Pascal to write a
short headnote for every article, to place it in the context of the time.
Agustín Parise, Research Associate at the Center of Civil Law Studies, is
to be commended for his careful editing. By respect for the author, for
his work and opinions, I refrained from any interference in the
substance of the text. There has been no cut and no addition to the
materials that had been published before.
A Priest of Right Order is more than a collection of the most
representative essays of a great civil law scholar known for the
consistency of his thought. It is the self‐portrait of a man who devoted
most of his life to the teaching and study of the law. He is remembered
fondly by those who were impressed by his uncompromisingly refusing
any foul arrangement that might sacrifice the dignity of man on the
altar of illegitimate profit or the satisfaction of private interests of a
lesser value. Professor Pascal taught his students to be priests of good
order or right order, echoing a sentence that appears in Justinian’s
1

See, Robert Anthony Pascal: Writings About Law, 1937‐2008, 1 JOURNAL OF CIVIL
LAW STUDIES 215 (2008), available at www.law.lsu.edu/jcls.
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Corpus Juris Civilis (Digest 1.1.1.). Coined by Ulpian, the phrase suggests
that lawyers may be described as priests (sacerdotes) for cultivating
justice and professing to know what is good and equitable, dividing right
from wrong and distinguishing what is lawful from what is unlawful. The
full sentence is printed as an epigraph to this book, and the Editor is of
opinion that A Priest of Right Order best describes the man, his
teaching, and his scholarship.
I divided the book into three parts, much like the French or the
Louisiana Civil Code. Part One echoes Civil Code Book One “Of Persons,”
and is entitled “A Man of Principle.” Part Two enshrines beautiful
“Things,” 2 the treasure box of Robert Pascal’s legal thought, in the form
of three essays that reveal his vision of the law, in a triptych entitled “A
Man of Vision.” Part Three parallels the eclectic Book Three “Of the
Different Modes of Acquiring the Ownership of Things,” featuring a
“Man of Diverse Scholarship.”

A Man of Principle
Part One opens with Recollections of a Life Studying and
Teaching Law, which counts for a third of the volume and is the only
piece in the book never published before. Robert Pascal’s personality
transcends every page of it. Like self portraits painted by great masters
such as Rembrandt or Van Gogh, it avoids self‐complacency and depicts
with humility defects and failures as much as positive traits of character,
by clear and precise strokes. At the end of the reading, one is
permeated with the impression of distant intimacy with a master,
revealing his soul and yet keeping under silence everything that would
be too personal or could hurt anyone. A man true to himself and to
2

Book Two of the Louisiana Civil Code is entitled: “Things and the Different
Modifications of Ownership.”
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others, un juste, to put it in French, Robert Pascal’s native language. 3
Recollections reveals how Professor Pascal’s immense legal and
philosophical culture, his mastery of several languages, and the depth
and clarity of his views won him the esteem and admiration of the great
masters of comparative law active around the middle of the twentieth
century: Ernst Rabel, Max Rheinstein, John P. Dawson, and Hessel
Yntema in Ann Arbor; Tulio Ascarelli, Gino Gorla, and Giovanni Pugliese
in Rome; Henri Batiffol, and René David in Paris; and later, Paul A.
Crépeau in Montreal, who offered him a professorship at McGill that he
decided to decline. Robert Pascal never had this touch of vanity that
helps propelling masters into great masters, stars into superstars, at
least in the eye of others.
Professor Emeritus Robert Anthony Pascal started his academic
career at the time of Roscoe Pound, whom he witnessed inaugurating
the LSU Law Building in 1938. He then was a law student at the Loyola
Law School in New Orleans and served during the summer as a Research
Assistant at LSU. Robert Pascal is far too modest to accept being
portrayed as a living legend, but may be referred to as a living memory:
few law schools having passed their centennial, like LSU in 2006, can
claim to have within their walls a faculty member who has been on
Earth nearly as long as the law school. In addition, he started working
with the Louisiana State Law Institute, during the first year of its
creation, on the Compiled Edition of the Louisiana Civil Codes. He later
became a consultant to that Institute on trust law revision, an area of
jurisprudence where his thoughts are at the forefront. He also taught
and, as this book reflects, produced significant writings on conflict of
laws, family law, matrimonial regimes, civil and Anglo‐American legal
science, and philosophy of law.

3

He grew up in New Orleans in a family of French descent, and is a true Créole
in the original sense of the word.
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In 1940, he was the first person ever to be awarded a Master’s
degree in Civil Law at LSU. He practiced law in New Orleans for one
year, and in 1942, added an LL.M. from the University of Michigan Law
School. His academic activity was interrupted briefly by the events of
World War II. At the end of the war, he joined the LSU law faculty. In
spring 1951, he taught trusts law at the University of Chicago. In 1951–
1952 and in 1963–1964, he was a Fulbright lecturer and taught U.S.
private law and comparative law at the University of Rome, in Italian. In
1955, he was made full professor at LSU and never left, even after his
retirement in 1980, keeping offices as a Professor Emeritus. With the
Bicentennial of the Louisiana Civil Code, many remembered his
tournament with a professor from Tulane, Professor Pascal rightly
insisting that the Digest of 1808 was Spanish in substance and French in
form 4 —a “Spanish girl in French dress,” as he later commented in his
Tucker Lecture at LSU, Of the Civil Code and Us, reprinted in Part Two of
the present volume.
The author of this Introduction has the privilege of meeting and
exchanging views with Professor Pascal on a daily basis. He read many
of his works and offers A Summary Reflection on Legal Education,
reprinted in this volume, to his first year law students as a reading to
open the Legal Traditions course. In his Summary Reflection as in other
writings, Professor Pascal makes his vision of the law very clear. He sees
the law as the specification of right order for the common good, and
4

His response to Professor Rodolfo Batiza (Robert A. Pascal, Sources of the
Digest of 1808: A Reply to Professor Batiza, 46 TUL. L. REV. 603 (1972)) is not
reprinted in the present volume. Though citing many excerpts from the Batiza
article (Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and
Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4 (1971)), and also the introduction by the
then Dean of the Tulane Law School (Joseph Modeste Sweeney, Louisiana Civil
Code of 1808: Tournament of Scholars Over the Sources of the Civil Code of
1808, 46 TUL. L. REV. 585 (1972)), it would not be fair to reproduce it without
the reply of Batiza (Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the Civil Code of 1808, Facts and
Speculations: A Rejoinder, 46 TUL. L. REV. 628 (1972)).
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codification as its best formal expression. His comment on the
secularization of law and science in the past five hundred years is
connected to the evolution of philosophical and religious thought and
reflects the findings of philosophers, theologians, and historians of
western societies.
His strong preference for the civil law and its codification comes
from the fact that it gives a comprehensive vision of what the law is and
makes it accessible and predictable to lawyers, judges, and laymen.
Robert Pascal is one who believes that civil codes are a suitable form of
legislation for the United States, to make the law more easily accessible
to the citizens. He is not the first one to endorse this view. For example,
the legislature of the State of New York adopted the Civil Code that
David Dudley Field submitted in 1865, and had the governor signed the
bill rather than veto it, many states might have adopted a New York‐like
civil code based on the French and Louisiana models. The point is not
pure history: the Field code inspired the California Civil Code and with
the Uniform Commercial Code, the United States keeps proving that the
common law is not incompatible with codification.
The writer of this Introduction, also a civilian by training,
certainly agrees and endorses a citizen‐centered conception of law
making, in which the legislator is morally required to be reasonable in
its enactments. 5 He also remains a great admirer of the basic tenet of
the English common law–“law is right reason”–and its ability to discover
the law in a constant search of consistency through the facts of cases,
always accepting, though reluctantly, that what was once declared may

5

Olivier Moréteau, The Future of Civil Codes in France and Louisiana, 2 JOURNAL
39 (2009); and Olivier Moréteau, A Summary Reflection on
the Future of Civil Codes in Europe, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT KOZIOL 1139 (P.
Apathy et al. eds. 2010).
OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES
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later be overruled. 6 The traditional approach of the common law, often
to be distinguished from modern American and sometimes English
practice, does not question Professor Pascal’s recognition of
fundamental principles, nor his opinion that the law cannot be limited
to what is termed positive law. 7
Robert Pascal is a philosopher as much as he is a jurist. He
articulates his philosophical conception of the law in every article he
writes. All men exist ontologically as a community of mankind under
God. Being a community, they are obliged morally to respect each other
and to live and to act cooperatively with each other for the common
good. Such philosophy does not ground human society on a social
contract made by men who lived in a state of nature, and decided by
rational self‐interest to voluntarily give up some freedom in order to
obtain the benefit of political and legal order.
Robert Pascal fully accepts that the specification of right order
must be done under criteria that vary with a particular society. Respect
for the human person is a constant norm, but differences in history,
culture, education, climate, environment, and the availability of natural
resources may generate or demand variations in different legal systems.
His approach to the law is philosophical, not religious. With due care, his
vision of the law may be transferred to other human societies in
different parts of the world.
Professor Pascal clearly and honestly defines his vision of what
the law is and relies on human reason more than on experience: at first
sight, he may seem at the antipodes of Holmes’ statement made on the
opening page of The Common Law (1881) that “The life of the law has
6

Moréteau, The Future of Civil Codes, supra, note 5, at 39. See also OLIVIER
MORÉTEAU, DROIT ANGLAIS DES AFFAIRES (2000), Part I.
7
As Robert Pascal recognizes in Natural Law and Respect for Law, reproduced
at the end of Part One.
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not been logic: it has been experience,” which may explain an uneasy
dialogue with common law scholars. He does not deny the value of
experience but views it as a guide, in common law and civil law alike. As
a legislator, he knows he would have to accept political compromise,
but as a teacher he has to stand for what he views as right order, and
direct the student’s mind to improvements dictated by the common
good.
Robert Pascal is of opinion that something need not be
empirically demonstrated to be considered true. He belongs to a family
of many philosophers and jurists who acknowledge that the very
essence of things cannot be demonstrated by empirical evidence. In
that sense, much like theology, law as he and I see it is a dogmatic
discipline, much like theology, based on the axiomatic existence of a
nature of things that is metaphysical in essence. Such nature of things
cannot reside ultimately in what is posited by man or an assembly of
men, as the positivist disciples of Austin or Kelsen would claim. Such
positivist view might otherwise legitimate Nazism, communism, or some
selfish abuses of capitalism, wherever based on or favored by enacted
laws. The fact that he does not doubt or question his axiomatic vision of
right order does not make him an anti‐intellectual fundamentalist but a
man who relies on moral judgment.
The later part of the twentieth century has been an age of
extreme individualism. The development of human rights prevented the
advent of pure relativism, even where human rights serve individualism.
In such a context, moral speech, even where based on a sound and solid
philosophical basis, is found disturbing and is rejected, sometimes
violently. What is left of good morals parades under the colors of
human rights. No person of reason would challenge the fact that there
is something sacred in every human being, even if this sacred dimension
cannot be demonstrated empirically. People who believe in human
rights should be open to Professor Pascal’s speech and agree that there
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is such a thing as human dignity that justifies some limits to rights even
when posited by enacted laws and generates duties that are moral in
essence.
Robert Pascal initiated a golden age at LSU, when he taught
Institutions of Law, featuring the history and structure of both civil and
common law, this during the first semester of the first year, the great
philosopher Eric Voegelin then teaching Jurisprudence in the spring
semester. This was in the 1950s. In the years 2000, Western Legal
Traditions are taught to all first year students in the fall semester, but
regrettably, Jurisprudence has long ago been relegated as elective.
Robert Pascal’s personality also permeates a short note, actually
a letter to the editor of The Advocate, Baton Rouge’s daily newspaper,
entitled Punishment, Pardon, Parole. This is not meant to be an addition
to an abundant academic literature on a topic in which Professor Pascal
never specialized. It is the reaction of a man of Catholic faith, who
happens to be a law professor, to the spirit of vengeance which
dominates the way criminals are treated in Louisiana. These two pages
may be read as a tribute to his wife Doucette, who passed away in
January 2009, after spending many years of her life doing volunteer
work to improve the condition of inmates and making sure they would
have access to culture, education, and spiritual solace.
A third essay entitled Natural law and Respect for Law
concludes Part One, opening with the following words: “In the era of
Christendom, natural law, whatever its variations in the minds of the
philosophers, always denoted the law of God addressed to man as a
free‐willing creature and obligatory for him to the extent he could
discover it through use of his intellectual faculties. Man used his
intellect and judgment speculatively to ascertain the will or plan of God
and practically to discover how he might conform to it by obedience
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and cooperation.” 8 A footnote cites Thomas Aquinas. Wolfgang
Friedman of Columbia praised Pascal for this Essay, published in the
American Journal of Comparative Law in 1967. In six pages, it gives a full
survey of Roman law, the common law, and the civil law after the time
of codification, showing how the shift from natural law to natural right
generated a move from judges or legislatures declaring the law to their
making the law, leading to a positivistic approach. “Stripped of the
support of the personal moral obligation of obedience, law ceased to
enjoy, and indeed to deserve, the respect required for its
effectiveness.” 9 Law became an instrument of power. Of course power
cannot be the criterion of law. But rather than recognizing the personal
moral obligation to obey the law, one puts the emphasis on the rule of
law and on the search for legislative policy, called “policy science” by
the Author. Pascal concludes that “two major contributions of natural
law thought to the positive legal order have been, first, the principle of
cooperation among the agencies of the law in the finding and
specification of law and, secondly, the personal obligation of the subject
to obey the law. When these two factors are lacking, the legal order
soon suffers loss of respect and efficacy.” 10 Well, it is hard to prove the
contrary.
Professor Pascal keeps telling me that there is nothing new in
this article. Well, this may be true. However, making the point so clearly
whilst embracing the entire western legal traditions since the dawn of
Christendom, all this in a few pages, shows much more than intellectual
mastery. It proves that scholarship can be an art. Like other chapters of
this book, it is to be read both for the substance and for the form: all
could serve as a model in doctrinal and in legal writing classes.

8

See infra, Natural Law and Respect for Law, at 101.
Id. at 109.
10
Id. at 111.
9
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A Man of Vision
Part Two of the book gathers three essays that, in the opinion of
both the Author and the Editor, are the major contribution of Professor
Pascal to the knowledge and future of the law. Legal education, the Civil
Code, and trusts come as three panels of a triptych and it is no surprise
to see the Civil Code as the central part of the altarpiece. These three
contributions appear in the reverse order of publication, actually to be
read starting with education and ending with trust devices, often used
to organize property rights beyond the limits of human life.
A Summary Reflection on Legal Education is the product of a
life‐long thinking process. Robert Pascal has witnessed the evolution of
legal education in the United States over at least three quarters of a
century. He deplores a growing disrespect for the legal order,
demonstrating how legal education contributes to what the Editor is
tempted to call a culture of selfish interests. His thesis is that legal
education contributes to the phenomenon. Students are trained as legal
technicians, they are educated to “think as a lawyer,” through the study
of cases. The inconvenience of the case method is that is does not invite
for an overall vision of what the law is but tends to endorse Justice
Cardozo’s view that “the law never is; it is always about to be.” This
culture of legal uncertainty makes for a world where a lawyer must be
consulted on all important matters and where it is way too often
necessary to litigate in order to assert what the solution is.
Codification of the law is proposed as a first remedy. Without
denying the importance and usefulness of codification in the American
context, this may not be the most convincing part of A Summary
Reflection. After all, there are many areas in the common law where the
law appears as settled and where predictability equals that to be found
in a codified system. On the other hand, there are many issues in codes
or in legislation where, because of vague or general language,
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adjudication is the only way of asserting what the law actually is, with
limited certainty since court decisions are not technically binding
precedents.
The second remedy, rightly presented as more important than
codification, is to make certain that lawyers‐to‐be are required to have
had a liberal education before starting law school. How else can they
understand “that people are not mere individuals, but members of a
community of mankind, morally obliged to respect and cooperate with
each other for the common good”? 11 One should make sure, before
students enter law school or at a preliminary stage in law school, that
they get a philosophical and historical perspective of the nature and
purpose of the law, its moral foundations, and the moral obligations of
lawyers in its application and, where applicable, improvement.
The Editor has been trained in a civil law country where he
taught the law during twenty‐five years before coming to the United
States. French students all take a course in philosophy during their last
year in high school. They all take legal history and history of institutions
during their legal studies. True, the system has its flaws and does not
train ready‐to‐practice lawyers, leaving this task to bar schools and
practitioners. However, trained civilians have a greater perspective and
an overall view of where laws are coming from and where they may
lead us to. They are not as effective as common‐law trained lawyers at
arguing in the detail, but some prove to learn that very fast when
preparing for an LL.M. at an American law school or when moving to
practice. Their ability in making a sound logical or moral argument has
much to do with personality, character, education, and experience, but
it cannot be denied that prior and significant exposure to philosophy,
logics, and metaphysics helps a great deal.

11

See infra, A Summary Reflection, at 125‐126.
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The point is not to bar students having majored in mathematics
and hard sciences from admission to law school. Their logical mind helps
make them great lawyers. Professor Pascal’s idea of supplementing
college education with a summer or early fall introductory course in
legal theory or jurisprudence before starting law school is to be
promoted, especially in a fast changing world facing huge challenges.
Teaching Western Legal Traditions to LSU first‐year law students, the
Editor tries his best to invite them to think over the meaning of law and
legal order and identify the philosophical origins and background of
both the civil law and the common law. The assigned reading of Robert
Pascal’s A Summary Reflection on Legal Education no doubt helps
students to identify the problem.
The central part of the triptych is entitled Of the Civil Code and
Us. The title reveals the intimate connection civil codes are meant to
have with the citizens, at least in the Napoleonic way of making codes.
The French Civil Code had been written in clear and intelligible style,
avoiding technical words or jargon, in order to be readable by a citizen
with a basic education. The Louisiana Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870
follow this model, which can be traced back to the Digest of 1808, much
inspired in the form by the French Code civil of 1804 and its Projet of
1800. These documents may not have as systematic a structure as the
German Civil Code (BGB) of 1900, which has the inconvenience of being
usable by lawyers only, due to abstract language and the multiplicity of
cross‐references. The French and Louisiana Civil Codes and the many
codes they inspired are remarkable by their simplicity of style and
unsophisticated structure which make them “user friendly,” to use
modern parlance. The essay presents and discusses the structure of the
Louisiana Civil Code with a focus on its unity, clarity, and effort to
eliminate ambiguity, praising the Code as it was prior to the revision by
the Louisiana State Law Institute.

14
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The Author then complains about the bulky publication of the
Code, adding many features that make the Louisiana Civil Code difficult
to read in its present publications by West Publishing. This problem has
been remedied with the help of LSU Professor Alain Levasseur who in
2008 started to publish with LexisNexis a Louisiana Pocket Civil Code. It
is indeed important for the public and students alike to be able to read
the code without being distracted by extraneous information, as useful
as it may later be for further research. The problem is the same in
France and other civil law jurisdictions, some like Italy or Switzerland
publishing both annotated and expurgated editions of their codes.
Professor Pascal strongly opposes the addition of unofficial
titles to Civil Code articles and of comments on the occasion of their
revision by the Louisiana State Law Institute. Each revised article is
indeed followed with a commentary explaining the reason for the
change, its extent (often mentioning that it does not change the law),
doctrinal references, judicial decisions and so forth. The Editor knows
the pros and cons of such commentaries in pre‐legislative work, being a
member of the European Group on Tort Law and thus co‐drafter of the
Principles of European Tort Law which include a commentary. He fully
understands what Professor Pascal means when writing that he knows
“from his own experience, in the seventies, as a member of the Council
of the Louisiana State Law Institute, that often the objection that a
proposed article did not convey its full intended meaning was countered
with the decision to “take care of that in the comment.” He approves
Professor Pascal’s judgment that “this is a sloppy way to write a civil
code.” He has identified, teaching Obligations, a number of
discrepancies between Code articles and comments and regrets that
they are part of the bill when revisions are enacted by the legislature
though declared not to constitute part of the law. This is confusing.
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Comments should be published separately and be regarded as no more
than information on legislative history. 12
The substance of codes is discussed in the third section of the
essay, “The character of the Louisiana Civil Code,” which may fairly be
described as one of the best general discussions of the content of a civil
code to be found in the world legal literature. It approaches the code as
a whole and in relation with the philosophical principles on which it is
based. Robert Pascal makes it clear that the Louisiana Civil Code is
founded on the conception of natural law that still prevailed in Spanish
law at the time of the Louisiana Purchase–human beings are members
of an ontological community–and not the one that emerged from the
Enlightenment in France and other countries: each person is an
individual unrelated to others in a state of nature, capable of
association and forming a society based on a social contract. The article
numbered 21 in the Digest and both Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870
invites the judge to appeal to equity when positive law is silent, equity
being defined as an appeal to “natural law,” “reason,” or “received
usages.” The abandonment of the reference to “natural law” in the
revision of 1987 (present article 4), allegedly because natural law “has
no defined meaning in Louisiana jurisprudence” (so says the revisers’
comment, yet claiming that this does not change the law) indicates a
move towards positivism, accentuated by several language changes
made on the occasion of the revision. All language that has a moral
connotation has been amended, and Professor Pascal notes the
disappearance of “natural justice,” “good morals,” and a few others.
This substitution of “modern usage” to traditional terminology conveys
that nothing is right or wrong and that law cannot bind in conscience.
12

Under the leadership of the Editor, the Center of Civil Law Studies will very
soon publish online an easily accessible version of the Louisiana Civil Code,
stripped of all editorial work such as revision comments, cross‐references, or
article headings.
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The discussion goes through several institutions of the civil law
to be found in Books I, II, and III of the Code, including negotiorum
gestio and contract. Negotiorum gestio is one of the most powerful
imprints of the philosophical principles permeating the civil law
tradition. I will never forget the day when Professor Pascal asked me
whether I started my Obligations course with negotiorum gestio: the
question itself was like an illumination. I now discuss negotiorum gestio
before starting contractual obligations and this is an important point.
LSU First year law students take Contracts in the fall semester and
Obligations in the spring. Their brains are formatted to the common law
concept of contract as exchange of promises, with the law encouraging
parties to find their best advantage yet with mechanisms preventing
fraud and protecting reasonable reliance and expectations. A brief study
of negotiorum gestio helps them understand that they move from an
individualistic system of competition to a legal culture that favors
cooperation.
There is much to say and to comment over the substance of this
rich and beautifully written contribution. It inspires my teaching and
scholarship. It should inspire all those concerned with the future of our
modern societies and the major problem of climate change. The choices
individuals and politicians are facing are moral in essence. The planet is
not in danger (it survived dramatic upheavals over the past million
years) but mankind has no promising future without cooperation and
more personal responsibility. Another gem of the civil law tradition is
the standard of the bonus pater familias, or bon père de famille, or good
family father. It may sound terribly chauvinistic at first sight and yet it is
more powerful than the common law standard of the reasonable
person, in that sense that it is future oriented and points to the welfare
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of generations to come, and not to the preservation of immediate and
selfish interests. 13
Standards take us to the realm of fiduciary duties and the law of
trust, discussed in the final article of the triptych. In On Trusts, Human
Dignity, Legal Science, and Taxes, Professor Pascal recognizes some
obvious advantages of trusts over some classical institutions of the civil
law such as usufruct. The trust offers better protection of the ultimate
owner in case of inadequate management of the property. Pascal had
written on trusts and the civil law 14 and may be regarded as one of the
few civilians with a good and complete understanding of what may be
regarded as a landmark in the common law tradition. Pascal does not
suggest that the trust should not have been adopted in Louisiana. He
knows how to analyze trusts functionally and how to adjust the
mechanism to the civil law tradition. His article was a reaction to the
revision of the Trust Estate Law that took place in Louisiana in the early
1960s. As an advisor to the Louisiana State Law Institute Committee in
charge of the revision, he was anxious to define the private trust in
terms compatible with the civil law and to give the beneficiary or his
representative the right to modify or terminate the trust. He points out
that under the generally accepted American rule and under Louisiana
law, a trust may not be terminated by a beneficiary unless the settlor
has given him the power to terminate it. The Louisiana Trust Code
makes things worse, since “The consent of all settlors, trustees, and
beneficiaries shall not be effective to terminate the trust or any
13

See Olivier Moréteau, Post Scriptum to Law Making in a Global World: From
human Rights to a Law of Mankind, 67 LA. L. REV. 1223, 1228 (2007).
14
See, Robert A. Pascal, Some ABC’s About Trust and Us, 13 LA. L. REV. 555
(1953); Robert A. Pascal, The Trust Concept and Substitution, 19 LA. L. REV. 273
(1959); and Robert A. Pascal, The Use of Trusts in Louisiana and its Implications
for the Science of the Unification of Law. Paper presented at 1st International
Congress on the Unification of Private Law, Rome 1950. Unpublished.
Summarized in French in Actes du Congres Internationale de Droit Privé 215
(1951).
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disposition in trust, unless the trust instrument provides otherwise.” 15
Robert Pascal describes these rules as “abusive because they violate the
dignity of the human person.” 16
The Author rightly insists that American law sacrifices the
beneficiary and his dignity by making it so difficult, often impossible, to
terminate a trust: 17 the beneficiary “should be allowed to decide for
himself how he should live, and this living includes the use of wealth
appropriated by or transferred to him for his use and benefit.” 18 Of
course Pascal accepts that this principle of self‐determination is based
on human reason and free will and cannot apply to persons deprived of
capacity. However, he sees indestructible trusts as morally wrong,
permitting “individual persons to be placed in partial and private
economic dictatorships by other individual persons.” 19 It is an American
invention, English law permitting the termination or modification of the
trust by agreement of all the beneficiaries. Under English law, judicial
variation is possible when the beneficiary is deprived of capacity.
Professor Pascal tries to understand why and how Americans
may accept such a state of affairs. He sees that politically speaking the
settlors and trustees form a lobby whereas beneficiaries do not. He
recommends that moralists, economists, and sociologists join lawyers in
attempts to revise trust laws.
Another part of the essay attempts at giving a functional
definition of trust stripped of the notions of “legal” and “equitable”
interests inherited from the common law. Not only should the trustee
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LA. REV. STAT. § 9.2028 (2010).
See infra, On Trusts, Human Dignity, at 175.
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He is no longer a lonely fighter. See Michael McAuley, Of Hurricanes and Me,
39.1 NYSBA TRUSTS AND ESTATE LAW SECTION NEWSLETTER 15 (2006).
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be called a “fiduciary” as it is under present law 20 but beneficiaries
should be recognized as “owners of the present and future interests in
the property, subject to the trustee’s administration, management, and
control under the terms of the trust” 21 so that Louisiana law shows its
ability to function as a “laboratory of comparative law,” adjusting
common law tools to civilian concepts and needs. Nobody is a prophet
in his own land: Quebec heard the message and France is presently
struggling to adjust its new fiducie to present business needs. The
Louisiana Trust Code may be in need of some revision, and Professor
Pascal’s proposals should not be ignored.
Robert Pascal’s articles on trust show a true comparatist at
work, for he also is a Man of Diverse Scholarship.

A Man of Diverse Scholarship
Part Three gathers three essays showing Professor Pascal’s
familiarity with diverse areas of the law. Published thirty five or seventy
years ago, all have some relevance to contemporary legal scholarship
and practice.
Updating Louisiana’s Community of Gains gives a useful
overview of matrimonial regimes in general and of the community of
gains in particular. It addresses Louisiana law with ample comparative
perspective. Community of gains is an area of the law where French and
Spanish law differed and the drafters of the Digest of 1808 were not
fully successful in reducing Spanish law in digest form. Based on the
exegesis of the Louisiana Civil Code articles, the Author gives a full and
clear account of the evolution of Louisiana law on the matter. The
Spanish‐law‐inspired community of gains recognizes the wife’s
20
21

LA. REV. STAT. § 9.1731 (2010).
See infra, On Trusts, Human Dignity, at 193.
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cooperative effort as wife, mother, and attendant to the family’s needs
even where she does not contribute financially. The system was
criticized since it left the community in the husband’s patrimony and it
was subsequently reformed to put husband and wife on an equal
footing. The Author carefully examines all problems and possible
solutions and recommends a conventional regime giving each spouse
full autonomy during the marriage and community benefits upon
dissolution of the marriage. This comes close to the French regime of
participation aux acquêts, combining separation of property during the
marriage and the advantages of community when it comes to an end. 22
In addition to the suppletive legal regime of community of gains
applicable by default, French law offers a broad choice of conventional
regimes ranging from full community to full separation. Participation
aux acquêts is one of those and it is often recommended by notaries,
especially when both spouses are active professionals. Germany has a
comparable regime, also very successful. Professor Pascal’s suggestion
remains a great option for Louisiana.
Characterization as an Approach to the Conflict of Laws, first
published in 1940, is the earliest essay published in this volume. Like all
others it is crisp and reads easily, and makes complex questions appear
like easy ones. One can hardly believe it to be the work of a young
scholar with limited experience. It reads like the work of a master and it
is no wonder that it called the attention of Ernst Rabel, with whom the
Author was to entertain a long friendship. 23 Robert Pascal gives the
clearest presentation of the problems central to private international
law, discusses the leading doctrines of the time, and endorses Rabel’s
views that comparative law is the key to solve the problem of
characterization. Seventy years went by, and this still sounds like a
22

FRENCH CIVIL CODE, arts. 1569 to 1581. This regime was introduced on the
occasion of the overall revision of matrimonial regimes in 1965 and reformed
by Law no. 85‐1372 of December 23, 1985.
23
See infra, Recollections of a Life, at 38.

AN INTRODUCTION

21

needed call. Some progress has been made, for instance in the
European Union, but Rabel’s project remains largely unachieved. This
essay should appear in the first section of teaching materials on conflict
of laws and private international law.
The book concludes with a review of The Italian Legal System by
Cappellettti, Merryman, and Perillo, presented as a classic. The Author
discusses the arrangement of the chapters, wishing them to appear in
an order fitting the Italian legal system rather than the one of the
reader, presumed to be brought up in the common law. Should
procedure be discussed before or after substantive law? The authors do
it before, Pascal recommends after. This is a challenging methodological
problem, a pedagogical dilemma. Do you meet the students and the
readers at their departure point and transition to the system you want
to visit or do you project them upfront to the logic of the system you
study? The question is acute when you educate students already trained
to a legal system into another one.
I am not sure Professor Pascal or I have a final answer to this
question or the others he raises in his writings. But one thing is sure, I
never regretted following a methodological recommendation by my
new mentor at LSU. Every conversation with him is a learning
experience, as will hopefully the reading of this book for many in
Louisiana and the world over.

PART 1
A MAN OF PRINCIPLE

Recollections of a Life Studying and Teaching Law 
The following Recollections have been based on my
unverified memory. I know that my memory may not be
accurate in every detail. This account of my life with the
law was written originally so that my immediate family†
might have a better understanding of what I stood for
and what I tried to accomplish.

I. THE STUDENT YEARS
It was not until I was about to graduate from Jesuit High School
in New Orleans that I thought seriously about what career I might
pursue. Certainly, I intended to attend college, if at all possible–Jesuits,
after all, was a college preparatory school. I did not have law study in
mind at the end of my second year, however, for then I would not have
abandoned the classics curriculum–with four years of Latin and two of
Greek–for the then newly approved scientific curriculum with more
natural science and mathematics. Indeed, in the last two years of high
school I fancied I might like to try naval architecture, perhaps because I
had constructed a large cypress skiff. By May 1933, however, a month
© 2010, by Robert Anthony Pascal.

Previously unpublished.
†
My wife, Marie Elina Cherbonnier; my son, Robert A. Pascal, Jr.; my daughter,
Alice Elina Marie Pascal; her husband, George Edmond Escher; and their
daughters, Lucile Escher, and Claire Escher.
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before my graduation, I had experienced much pleasure and fair success
in debating and thought this an indication I might do well as a trial
lawyer.
My record at Jesuits was good enough to win a scholarship to
either Loyola University or Tulane University. I chose to attend Loyola,
where I majored in English and minored in History. Of course I also
studied the full regimen in Scholastic Philosophy–Logic, Epistemology,
Ontology, Theodicy, Cosmology, Psychology, and Ethics. At that time,
Loyola ordinarily did not admit students to the A.B. (Bachelor of Arts)
program unless they had studied Latin in high school for four years.
After some discussion with the dean of the College of Arts and Sciences,
however, I was admitted to the A.B. program on condition that I would
demonstrate sufficient proficiency in a course in advanced Latin
composition. I enjoyed the challenge and met it reasonably well. But I
have regretted not having studied Greek. Nevertheless, I have had
something of a liberal education, something I now consider essential for
anyone who dares to immerse himself in the study of law as the art and
the science of order in society for the common good and not be, as the
Italians say, a mere causadice, or pleader of cases.
In my first three years at Loyola I never wavered from my
intention to study law, but I gave little if any thought to it during that
time. Then, in the Spring of 1936, events occurred that I believe were
providential. I had heard from family members that one of my mother’s
ancestors had received a Spanish grant to all that portion of Vermillion
Parish east of the Vermillion River and all the shell islands in the bay,
but had sold it all. I decided to try to find out whether all this land in fact
had been sold or whether some yet remained available to the family.
Accordingly, one day, seeing Dean Paul M. Hebert and Professor Joseph
Dainow of the Loyola Law School strolling on the campus, I introduced
myself and asked them how I might ascertain the Louisiana law
involved. This led to Professor Dainow’s invitation to accompany him to
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his office, where he produced a copy of the Louisiana Civil Code,
introduced me to its plan and contents, and drew my attention to the
articles on acquisitive prescription.
My examination of the Civil Code in the days that followed
reassured me of my inclination toward the study of law. Here was a
document detailing succinctly and clearly, in ordinary language, a plan
of order for the ordinary life of persons forming part of Louisiana
society, a document rational in its construction and conforming
substantively to the culture of the people. Here was something worth
studying.
The study of Louisiana civil substantive law (that part of
Louisiana law detailed principally in the Civil Code) and its origins in the
laws of Rome, France, and Spain became for me a passion. From my
very first semester at the Loyola Law School I haunted the Civil Law
Reading Room, studying Roman, French, and Spanish law, probably
spending as much time on that as I did on my prescribed studies. I
neglected all social life. No doubt this collateral study helped me to
place Louisiana civil law in historical and philosophical perspective and
to compare its substance and form to those of the Anglo‐American law.
One thing I discovered early on was that whereas the organization,
form, and style of the Orleans Digest of the Civil Laws of 1808 and the
Louisiana Civil Codes of 1825 and 1870 were much like those of the
French Code Civil of 1804 and its Projet (or projected draft) of 1800, the
substance of their provisions was more reflective of the Spanish civil law
in force in Louisiana at the time of its acquisition by the United States.
My ecstacy over my Civil Law studies, however, did not extend
to the study of Anglo‐American Law. What drudgery I found that to be!
The basic Anglo‐American law, being for the most part unwritten (that
is, un‐enacted as legislation) and incomplete, it was to be discovered by
reading the opinions of judges rendered in preceding controversies,
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extracting with trepidation such rules and principles as might be judged
to underlie them, and extending these by analogy to cover previously
un‐judged and unforseen circumstances of life. My judgment on the
Anglo‐American law was swift: the law of a people too unintelligent or
too lazy to abstract its principles and rules and state them in code‐like
legislation did not deserve serious study. And I gave it very little. As a
result, my grades in Louisiana civil law courses usually were quite good,
but those in Anglo‐American law courses were sometimes less than
satisfactory. Of course my neglect of Anglo‐American law studies was
not wise. My deficiencies had to be overcome by serious private study
later in life.
It annoyed me, too, that, possibly in part because the law school
accrediting agencies insisted that all law, including Louisiana civil law, be
taught by the case method, many professors of Louisiana civil law
subjects attempted to make the analysis of Louisiana civil law decisions
the principal method of civil law instruction. For me, the law was
principally legislation and recognizable custom. Decisions interpreting
and applying the legislation or custom were to be appraised as good or
bad and were not to be deemed binding in future cases, even those
with indistinguishable facts. The civil law, after all, being the principles
and rules declared expressly by the representatives of the people
(legislation) or implicitly by the people themselves through their
repeated actions (custom), nothing judges or scholars could say could
change it one iota. Some Loyola law professors understood that. Some,
however, used case collections as the best and latest expression of the
law and paid relatively little attention to the legislation itself. In courses
taught by the latter I did less well than in those taught by professors
who had a better appreciation of codified law and the proper role of the
judiciary in relation to it.
Toward the end of my second semester at Loyola I allowed my
Anglo‐American courses, and those civil law courses being taught by the
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case method, to be neglected a bit in order to participate in an
appellate moot trial sponsored by the Saint Thomas More Law Society.
The question involved the proper interpretation of the Civil Code’s
articles on offer and acceptance. It proved to be a challenge for me. The
articles, introduced in the Civil Code of 1825, did not seem to have
readily identifiable textual or substantive sources and made little sense
to those schooled in the more familiar Anglo‐American law. My fellow
student advocate and I did reach and propose an interpretation that
seemed reasonable and tenable, but we lost the case. The judges–Paul
M .Hebert, formerly Dean at Loyola and then Professor of Law and Dean
of Administration at LSU, and Professors Antonio E. Papale and Leon
Sarpy, as I remember, nevertheless seemed impressed enough with our
efforts to urge us to continue to research the question.
I alone was able to continue the research. It took all my time
during the summer of 1937, but it was successful. I was able to discover
that the scheme of the articles did have precedent in the Prussian
Landrecht of 1751. I wrote a paper explaining it all in law review
comment form, but did not attempt to have it published. The only law
review in Louisiana at that time was the Tulane Law Review and,
assuming that law reviews published only the writings of students at
their sponsoring institutions, I did not submit the comment to its
editors.
Of course, I did give a copy to Professor Dainow, who, spending
the summer elsewhere, nevertheless had been interested enough in the
project to correspond with me about it. Then, when Professor Dainow
moved to the LSU Law School and was given charge of establishing the
Louisiana Law Review, he asked my consent to publish it in Volume I,
Issue 1, of the Review. That was in the fall of 1938, when I was yet a
student of Loyola. The comment became the basis of instruction on
offer and acceptance under the Louisiana Civil Code in all Louisiana law
schools and remained so until the publication of Professor Saúl
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Litvinoff’s Treatise on Obligations. It was the basis, too, of my becoming
a friend of Professor Mitchell Franklin of the Tulane Law School.
My second year at the Loyola Law School was very eventful for
me. In spite of my continuing neglect of Anglo‐American law studies in
favor of those in Louisiana civil law, in the spring of 1938, at the end of
the first semester, my third in law school, I was informed by Dean James
Thomas Connor, in his office and in the presence of other faculty
members, that the faculty considered my ability to study and do
research in codified law, and my ability to express my findings orally and
in writing, to be such that, were I to pursue graduate studies elsewhere,
it would be their intention to offer me a position on the Loyola faculty.
You can imagine my astonishment. I had not ever thought of teaching.
But I was pleased, both with the trust and confidence placed in me and
with the prospective life itself. I assured Dean Connor and the others of
my interest.
Later in the spring of 1938 it became clear that Professors
Dainow and McMahon would join Dean Hebert at the LSU Law School.
Dean Frederick Beutel had resigned the LSU deanship and Dean Hebert
had assumed the position. I was informed that the Loyola faculty had
communicated with Dean Hebert and the LSU faculty with a view to
having the LSU Law School institute a Doctor of Civil Law (D.C.L.)
program for which I would be the first candidate.
At about the same time, in April 1938, the then not‐quite
finished new LSU Law School building on Highland Road, to be named
Leche Hall after Louisiana’s Governor Richard Leche, was to be
dedicated. Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard Law School gave the
dedicatory address, speaking on The Influence of the Civil Law in
America. Pound stood in the portico at the front of the building,
between the two central columns, and I stood in the sun with the rest of
the audience on the broad steps before and below him, straining to
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hear, for there was no amplification. For me it was a notable occasion.
Pound’s address was published in the fall of 1938 in Volume I of the
Louisiana Law Review at page one.
In May 1938 Professor Dainow informed me he was moving to
Baton Rouge in June, that a Louisiana State Law Institute was being
created, that he had agreed to prepare a Compiled Edition of the
Louisiana Civil Codes under Institute auspices, and that he wished me to
join him for the summer at the LSU Law School as a research assistant
for the project. I did so. Professor Dainow on the first day asked me to
prepare a suggested format and it was accepted. Working full time that
summer and part time while in my third year at Loyola, I completed the
preparation of the Preliminary Title and Books I and II of the Civil Code
for the Compiled Edition. Other research assistants, including Carlos
Lazarus, later a member of the LSU law faculty, James Bugea, later a
member of the Loyola law faculty, Margaret Smith Zengel, a Tulane
graduate, and several others did the work on the long Book III of the
Civil Code. The entire work was published in 1940 and 1942 as Volume
3, Books 1 and 2, of the Louisiana Legal Archives.
[Perhaps it would be well to record here the financial aid given
the Compiled Edition project by the LSU Athletic Department. I had been
hired as of June 1938 to be a research assistant for the Louisiana State
Law Institute, but the Institute did not have legal existence or a budget
until later that summer. My first month’s salary was paid with a
Louisiana State University check marked “From the Athletic Fund.”]
The summer of 1938 at LSU turned out to be for me much more
than a summer job as a research assistant. I had more contact with
faculty members than I had expected, socially as well as professionally,
was included in some discussions about the formation of the Louisiana
Law Review, and was invited to attend the banquet celebrating its
inauguration, even though I was yet a student at Loyola. No doubt that
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invitation was extended to me because my comment on offer and
acceptance under the Louisiana Civil Code was being published in
Volume I, No. 1.
At the end of the summer of 1938 I returned to New Orleans
and completed my third year at Loyola. On the whole it was uneventful
academically. A pleasant experience was having a course in Louisiana
successions taught by Mr. Arthur Peters, a very old practitioner, who
simply analyzed the Civil Code articles, interpreting one with the others,
and only occasionally citing a good or bad decision to read if we wished.
He was able to cover the entire subject matter with ease in the allotted
time and the students could believe they had learned the essentials
well.
On the other hand, my class in taxation proved absolutely
meaningless to me. It was taught by then young Professor Vernon
Miller, a man of sterling character, but one who had taken too seriously
the realism of Karl Llewellen, under whom he had studied at Columbia,
and Jerome Frank. He never voiced an opinion on any question of law,
always stating that the law in any instance would be what the judge
would say it was and that that would depend not only on the legislation
(if any) and previous decisions, but on the judge’s disposition that day,
his digestion, his restful or sleepless night, and so on ad infinitum. When
the exam time came I knew no tax law. The only thing I could do was
imitate the professor. So I began every answer with “It all depends” or
something similar and wildly imagined all kinds of factors that might
influence a judge’s judgment. The result? My examination answers were
posted on the bulletin board with a note from Professor Miller urging
other students to imitate the style. Professor Miller, after some years at
Loyola, went on to become dean of the law school at the Catholic
University in Washington, D.C.
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I returned to the LSU Law School in June 1939 as a research
assistant for the Louisiana State Institute, this time to prepare an index
to the Compiled Edition of the Louisiana Civil Codes. The two other
research assistants on the project were Carlos Lazarus and James Bugea.
Before arriving at LSU I had been informed by Dean Hebert and
Professor Dainow that the members of the LSU Board of Supervisors
had been polled and had agreed to institute the Doctor of Civil Law
degree at their next regular meeting in August 1939. But in July 1939
LSU University President James Monroe Smith took flight to Canada in
the attempt to avoid arrest and prosecution for having pledged
University securities to secure a private loan to buy commodity (some
say whiskey) futures. The Southern Association of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, the University’s accrediting agency of the time,
immediately put LSU on academic probation and forbade the
authorization of new degree programs. As a result I was not able to
register for the Doctor of Civil Law program and was forced to register
for the already established Master of Civil Law (M.C.L.) degree. My
program of study, settled at the Law School before President Smith’s
departure, remained the same, except for a substitution of a mere
thesis in the place of the more demanding D.C.L. dissertation. The
M.C.L. was awarded to me in June 1940. I believe I was the first person
to receive it.
During the year of M.C.L. studies I enrolled in only one formal
course, that in Jurisprudence, given by Professor Thomas Cowan, who
emphasized the social mission of law. Then I conducted two research
studies, one in the Conflict of Laws and one in the law of Acquisitive
Prescription under the Louisiana Civil Code, both supervised by
Professor Dainow. Acquisitive Prescription became my thesis topic, but
the Conflict of Laws research was much more interesting to me and my
paper on Characterization as an Approach to the Conflict of Laws was
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published in 1940, as a comment, in Volume III of the Louisiana Law
Review.
During my year of graduate work at LSU, Loyola orally firmed up
its offer to me of an Assistant Professorship on my being awarded the
M.C.L. Loyola, of course, had been informed early on that I would not be
awarded the D.C.L. because of the Southern Association’s refusal to
allow LSU to institute the degree; but, knowing that, the Loyola law
faculty, the Jesuit Law School Regent, and the then President of Loyola
University had all agreed to the proposal. My contract was to be year to
year at the starting honorarium of $2500. That was not a bad figure.
New attorneys with LL.B. degrees were being given only $900 per year
in the practice and one with a Tulane LL.M. was being offered $1800 by
a large law firm. I looked forward to beginning my teaching career.
In April 1940, however, Father Percy Roy, S.J. became President
of Loyola University. He refused to honor the commitment to pay $2500
for the academic year to one without a Doctorate, offered me $1800,
and asked me to notify him of my decision within a week. I told Father
Roy I would consider his offer, but probably would not accept it.
Professors Dainow and McMahon and Dean Hebert, all former
Loyola faculty members, were astonished the Loyola administration
would not abide by the original agreement, and so were Dean Connor
and other members of the Loyola faculty. Professor McMahon then told
his former law partner, Frank S. Normann of the New Orleans firm of
Normann and Rouchell, of the affair and Normann and Rouchell then
immediately offered me a position as an associate of the firm with a
guarantee of $2500 for the first year. I accepted it and notified Father
Roy and Dean Connor.
No sooner had my decision reached Dean Connor and the
Loyola law faculty than they appealed to the Loyola Board of Trustees,
who agreed that Loyola should stand by its commitment to me. Dean
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Connor, accompanied by Professors Antonio Papale and Leon Sarpy,
then called on me at the Maison Française at LSU, where I was residing,
and urged me to ask Normann and Rouchell to release me so that I
might accept the Loyola offer. This, of course, I refused to do, for then I
would have been going back on my word. Besides, during the preceding
week I had come to believe that possibly the events had been
providential and that the practice was the place for me. I went to
Normann and Rouchell determined to be a good practitioner.
Within six months, however, I became certain the practice was
not for me and so notified Normann and Rouchell. My relationship with
both Frank Normann and Harold Rouchell had been very good and
remained so even after I notified them of my decision to apply for
graduate studies with a view to entering the teaching profession. I
learned much from them and my experiences while with them and I did
believe my prospects with them to be good, but I just did not like
dealing with clients.
Once more Professor Dainow came to my aid. He recommended
that I apply to the University of Michigan Law School for admission to
their S.J.D. (Scienciae Juris Doctor) program in Comparative Law, to
study under Professor John P. Dawson, and for one of their newly
inaugurated W. W. Cook scholarships. I have no doubt that it was
through Professor Dainow’s persuasion that Michigan accepted me for
graduate studies and awarded me a Cook scholarship in spite of my
poor record in Anglo‐American Law at Loyola.
On my way to Ann Arbor by Greyhound bus I had a stay of a few
hours in Chicago. I decided to visit the Northwestern University Law
School where Professor Dainow had studied and where Professor
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld of Analytical Jurisprudence fame, and
Professor John Henry Wigmore, the maker of modern evidence law, had
taught. Walking through the building, I saw Professor Wigmore, already
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retired, sitting in his office. I introduced myself and we spoke for an
hour, he showing much interest in my proposed study at Michigan and
in my ideas on the Conflict of Laws. Perhaps I should add that, had it not
been for Professor Wigmore’s most highly rational approach in his
Student Textbook on Evidence, I would not have passed the course at
Loyola. As presented, it had bored me no end, even though evidence is
logic, and logic fascinates me.
My graduate committee at Michigan was composed of
Professor Dawson, chairman, and Professors Edgar Durfee and Burke
Shartel. From the beginning it had been clear that I would be doing
research under Professor Dawson and soon, because of his own interest
in the subject, it was decided that my research would be in the law of
unjust enrichment in French, German, and Anglo‐American law. Of
course it was to be expected he would be chairman of my committee.
Professor Durfee no doubt was named a member because of his
expertise in the Anglo‐American law of Restitution. Possibly Professor
Shartel was named a member of my committee because it was believed
that someone with my scholastic philosophy background should be
exposed to behaviorist thought.
All graduate students–we were ten, as I remember–were
required to enroll in Professor Dawson’s Seminar in Comparative Law
and Professor Shartel’s Seminar in Jurisprudence. Dawson’s
Comparative Law was much easier for me than it was for my fellow
graduate students, for none of them had ever studied any legal system
other than the Anglo‐American. But I gained very much from the
seminar, for Professor Dawson’s insights into Medieval and Modern Civil
Law were truly remarkable. On the other hand, Professor Shartel’s
Jurisprudence Seminar, being restricted to Dewey‐type behaviorism,
offered me nothing substantive, for he rejected both metaphysics and
revelation as sources of criteria for order in men’s lives and thus denied
the possibility of an ontologically based moral order to serve as the
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criterion for the legal order. Practically every session of the seminar
turned into a debate between Professor Shartel and me. My fellow
students often were more spectators than participants. Although I
never looked forward with pleasure to a Shartel seminar session, the
experience was good for me, forcing me to test my philosophical and
religious convictions at every moment.
The research on unjust enrichment was tedious and boring, not
because of the subject, but because of the method of reporting
demanded by Professor Dawson. A comparison of principles and rules
and their application was of secondary concern to him. He was
interested primarily in a comparison of results reached under similar
fact situations in the different systems, regardless of the legal bases
assigned. The similarity or dissimilarity of principle, institution, and rule
were unimportant to him except to the extent one or the other proved
a “better” way of reaching the solution. It is true, for example, that a
lawyer with a fact situation that he would resolve under “contract” rules
in his own system might find his best remedy in “tort” in another system
and so would be well advised not to restrict his research in the other
system to remedies under “contract.” Similarly, a situation calling for
results under the German rules on unjust enrichment would not have
been resolvable in the same way under the French Code Civil of 1804,
for that Code did not have rules on unjust enrichment, and unjust
enrichment situations were being resolved in France through a
deliberate mis‐application of the rules of la gestion d’affaires
(negotiorum gestio). Similarly, the “fact‐indexing” of legal solutions
undoubtedly is a useful preliminary in efforts toward law reform and
unification of laws. But, perhaps because I always abhorred the “word
index” approach to legal research, the reading of innumerable decisions
in different legal systems based on similar facts to tabulate results and
index them on a fact situation basis seemed to me contrary to my
conviction that law should be expressed in terms of legislation
announcing abstract principles and rules to be applied to concrete
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situations. Of course, to an Anglo‐American realist jurisprude, as was
Professor Dawson, fact‐orientation came most naturally.
Much more pleasant and educationally enriching for me at
Michigan were my informal, extra‐curricular, associations with
Professors Ernst Rabel and Hessel Yntema.
Professor Rabel, once professor of Roman Law in Munich and
later in Berlin, and Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm (now Max Planck)
Institute for Foreign and Comparative Law there, had come to the
United States to escape Hitler’s wrath. Under American Bar Association
auspices he settled first at the University of Chicago Law School to
attempt a new Restatement of the American Conflict of Laws. Finding
that task impossible, he moved to the University of Michigan Law School
as a Research Associate and began writing his four‐volume The Conflict
of Laws: A Comparative Study. On my first day at Michigan I noticed the
name Ernst Rabel on the door of the study next to mine. This excited me
greatly, for I had reported very favorably on his work in my comment on
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws, written during my graduate
year at LSU and published in Volume III of the Louisiana Law Review. I
knocked on the door and, hearing “enter,” went in. Professor Rabel at
first seemed annoyed at the interruption, but I introduced myself. Then
he said “Your name is Pascal? Did you write this?” and held up the issue
of the Louisiana Law Review that was lying on his desk, opened at my
comment. When I said “yes” his demeanor changed and he asked me to
sit down. In the course of the year we developed a close friendship and I
read and discussed with him much of the manuscript for Volume 1 of his
Comparative Study. I learned much from him.
Professor Hessel Yntema, born in Michigan of Dutch stock, also
showed much interest in me. He had been a member of the non‐
teaching Jurisprudence faculty at Johns Hopkins University and came to
Michigan on that experiment’s discontinuance. Legal philosophy, legal
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theory, and the Conflict of Laws were his real interests. He was a man
oblivious of time. Most of his work was done at night. Sometimes he
would come to my study at 10 or 10:30 p.m. and remain there perhaps
as late at 4 a.m. Our conversations, always about legal philosophy or the
conflict of laws, were numerous. Once, when we had talked to 2 a.m., I
mentioned I should like to excuse myself to get some sleep before my 8
a.m. seminar with Professor Shartel. He laughed loud and said, “Skip
Shartel’s seminar. You’ll get more benefit from talking with me.” And
that was that. We talked until 4 a.m. But I attended the seminar.
Professor Yntema was a learned and capable man and I profited from
the many sessions with him.
I might note here that it was while I was at Michigan that I first
became aware of people who failed to distinguish between objective
and subjective guilt. Professor Yntema’s chief research assistant was a
well educated Dutch lawyer of Jewish origin. Yet she really did not
understand how a person of objectively evil action or orientation might
be innocent and guiltless subjectively because of unavoidable
ignorance. I suppose the attitude is really Calvinist and Lutheran, both
believing in the absolutely corrupt nature of human beings since the fall,
the Calvinists in predestination from eternity, and the Lutherans in
salvation by grace, regardless of one’s actions in life. I have never
understood how anyone could so believe.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor occurred December 7,
1941, while I was at Michigan. That did not alter my studies and I was
able to complete the year, but not the dissertation. Michigan awarded
all of us graduate students the LL.M. degree in June 1942.
Before leaving Michigan I received a letter from the Army Judge
Advocate General’s Office offering me a commission as Captain in the
JAG Reserve if I would agree to take charge of establishing a library on
European Law in the JAG office in Washington. I responded immediately

40

ROBERT ANTHONY PASCAL

in the affirmative, filling out (pro‐forma, I was told) and enclosing the
required application form. Dean Hebert had already taken charge of the
JAG’s division on industrial contracts and I am certain it was he who had
recommended me for the post.
Within a week, however, I received a message from the JAG
saying it had had no notice of my being twenty‐six years of age, that the
position called for a captaincy, and that a captaincy could not be given
one coming from civilian life unless he was thirty years of age. Next
thing I knew the position was offered to Professor Dainow, again
presumably on Dean Hebert’s suggestion, and he accepted it.
Having been awakened to the possibility of a commission from
civilian life, I applied to the Air Corps JAG office, but learned that thirty
was the minimal age there too. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard JAG age requirement was twenty‐eight. Being defeated in my
attempt to obtain a commission for legal service, I applied for the Navy
V‐7 line officer training program, but was rejected because my eyes
tested only 20/20 and 20/25, not 20/20 in both, and because my slight
malocclusion might interfere with my chewing hard tack were I in a life‐
boat after a disaster. Such were the peace‐time regulations yet in force.
Finally I applied to the Coast Guard for 120 day training leading to a
commission as Ensign for general duty. The Coast Guard accepted me
and I trained at the Coast Guard Academy for 90 days and then, for
thirty days, aboard the USS Danmark, a square‐rigged sailing ship
“borrowed” from the Danes. We sailed up and down Long Island Sound,
experiencing temperatures as low as 17̊ below zero Fahrenheit, but not
climbing the rigging to furl and unfurl sail if the temperature dropped
below 8° Fahrenheit.
On being commissioned, I and ten other new Ensigns
volunteered for service in the Tenth Naval District, which included the
entire Caribbean area, for we had been trained in anti‐submarine
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warfare and that was where the German submarines were at the time.
On our arrival at District Headquarters in San Juan, Puerto Rico, the
Coast Guard Chief of Staff showed much aggravation, for he did not
know how to assign us to duty fighting submarines, the Coast Guard
District having only one anti‐submarine vessel and that being fully
manned. Finally he gave us a half‐hour to write one‐page accounts of
our pre‐Coast Guard educations and careers. No sooner had he read my
resumé, listing my three degrees in law, my familiarity with Civil Law,
and my one year of practice, than he burst out of his office declaring I
was being assigned as Assistant District Coast Guard Law Officer for the
Tenth Naval District. The District Office needed a Legal Officer with
knowledge of Civil Law, that prevailing in Puerto Rico and other places
in the Caribbean. I was twenty‐seven and a half at that moment, and
only an Ensign, but being assigned to a post I could have had directly out
of civilian life with the rank of full Lieutenant if only I had been twenty‐
eight. Then, six months later, the District Law Officer having been
transferred, I became the District Law Officer. In spite of my new
position and responsibilities, however, I was not promoted beyond the
rank of Lieutenant, junior grade, because my commission was for
general service and a general service officer, according to regulations,
could not be promoted twice without sea‐duty.
My duties in San Juan provided me with valuable learning
experiences. Not only did I render legal opinions on U. S. vessel
inspection and navigation laws and regulations and have supervision
and review of all Coast Guard military justice in the Caribbean, but also I
had charge of the wartime program of giving legal assistance to all Coast
Guard personnel in the District. Our personnel came from most parts of
the United States and its territories and many were stationed in places
where English, French, Spanish, and Danish law still prevailed. They had
legal problems at home and where stationed. The practice was replete
with conflict‐of‐laws problems. In addition, occasionally I sat on
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Admiralty boards, passing judgment on fault or negligence in instances
of minor collisions and the like.
There were three events in my life in the Coast Guard in Puerto
Rico that I must mention. The first was my only experience as a defense
attorney in a criminal trial. A Coast Guard enlisted man was to be tried
by a Navy court martial on the charge of assault of a Marine with a
deadly weapon (a knife) with intent to kill. He asked me to defend him
and I considered it my obligation to do so.
The accused and many Army, Navy and Coast Guard enlisted
men had been in one of San Juan’s many establishments selling alcohol
and providing facilities where the men might encounter women of
doubtful virtue and take advantage of their ready availability for
intimacy. When bells and sirens sounded the curfew hour, there was a
great rush from the second floor to the first and someone stepped on
the heel of a drunken Marine. The Marine, accusing a Coast Guardsman
of inflicting the injury, began to exchange punches with him, all while
surrounded by the Marine’s companions. After a moment the Marine
was seen to be bleeding and a cry went up that he had been stabbed. At
that Navy Police intervened. Several knives were found on the floor. The
Navy Police arrested the Coast Guardsman they believed had fought
with the Marine, an investigation followed, and the alleged attacker
charged.
The report of the Navy investigation contained the testimony of
five eye witnesses, all from the Navy or Marine Corps, each giving an
account of events, but each describing the accused differently. For one
he was tall, for another short and stocky; for one he was very dark, for
another he was medium dark; for yet another he was light colored and
freckled. Not believing that a Naval Court Martial would consider a
stabbing justified as self‐defense in a fist fight, I came to the conclusion
that the best defense might lie in showing an insufficient identification
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of the accused as the attacker. When the trial opened and the Court
called for the accused to stand, five Coast Guardsmen stood up; each
one corresponding in appearance to one of the five descriptions of the
attacker to be found in the investigative report. To the astonished Court
I explained that the only question in the trial was as to the identity of
the attacker. Unless the witnesses, testifying out of the presence of
each other, could select the real accused from the five, I argued, there
could be no conviction. We argued the point daily for two weeks, after
which the Court ruled against my defense, saying that the trial rules
required the accused to present himself. I filed an exception to the
ruling and the trial proceeded.
The Naval Judge Advocate serving as prosecutor was a Reserve
Lieutenant Commander who had been the Attorney General of one of
our Western States. During a recess in the proceedings I entered the
head (Navy parlance for restroom) and, while in a stall, heard the
prosecutor coaching the victim, showing him a knife, and telling him to
make certain he could describe it when asked to do so, in order that the
Court could believe his testimony when the knife was produced. Now,
no one but the unidentified offender had ever seen the stabbing and no
one else but he knew which of the knives found on the floor, if any of
them, had been used. On cross‐examination I called the attention of the
court to the coaching I had heard in the head, and the victim’s
testimony identifying the knife was stricken. But nothing was said to the
prosecuting officer, at least in my presence.
Of course, once the Court forced the self‐identification of the
accused, the witnesses had no trouble in testifying he was the attacker.
He was convicted. I appealed to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy
in Washington. The response was to the effect that the irregularities of
the trial were insufficient to warrant a reversal of the conviction, for
undoubtedly he was guilty. I informed the convicted accused of his right
to appeal to the U.S. District Court, but he declined the opportunity,
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saying, for the first time, that he was guilty and would serve the prison
sentence. I, of course, had never asked him if he was guilty, believing it
my duty to defend him whether guilty or not, and obligated in that
defense only to test the evidence produced against him and make
certain all proceedings were according to law.
At the end of our conversation, the Coast Guardsman, to my
astonishment, produced a spring‐blade knife, said it was the weapon he
had used, and gave it to me. I do not know how he managed to have it
with him on that occasion. I accepted the knife and used it for years in
fishing and bird hunting.
The second incident I wish to mention is my attempt to have an
order of the Secretary of the Navy declared invalid. The Secretary’s
order forbade a person under the jurisdiction of the Navy in an overseas
area to marry without the permission of the Commandant of the Naval
District. A Coast Guardsman had been convicted of violating that order.
The conviction came to me for review so that I could advise the Coast
Guard Commandant for the 10th Naval District, my immediate superior,
whether he should affirm the conviction or reverse it. My memorandum
explained that the Secretary of the Navy had no authority under the U.
S. Constitution or federal law applicable in U. S. territories to forbid
marriage to one in the service. The Coast Guard Commandant was
delighted and reversed the conviction, citing and attaching my
memorandum. The Commandant and his fiancée, after all, were both in
residence in Puerto Rico, trying (unsuccessfully) to get the Naval
Commandant’s permission to marry. The case went up to the
Commandant of the Coast Guard in Washington, however, and shortly
afterwards he, while not seeking to reinstate the conviction,
reprimanded the District Coast Guard Commandant for daring to
question an order of the Secretary of the Navy, his superior officer, and
added that nothing in the Constitution or federal legislation forbade the
Secretary of the Navy to issue such an order. This was new law to me.
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The third event was my first opportunity to teach a class in any
subject. After a year in San Juan without sea duty, I and my similarly
situated fellow Coast Guard officers were ordered to attend a refresher
course in navigation at the Navy’s Tenth Naval District Headquarters. A
retired Navy Captain was the instructor. During the first class, the
Captain stated “this is Napier’s diagram. The Navy insists I teach you
about it, but it doesn’t give you any information you can’t get
elsewhere.” I thought it did and in open class I told the Captain what it
offered that nothing else did. He was nice enough to agree I had taught
him something. After class, he asked me into his office and we chatted
about my previous study of navigation and piloting at the Coast Guard
Academy. The next day I received orders to report to the Navy District
Commandant to take over the class in navigation. It was the first, but
not the last time in my life, that I became an expert by appointment. I
assume the Navy Captain returned to a more leisurely life.
My father died unexpectedly in November 1944. Shortly
thereafter I requested a transfer to New Orleans to be able to attend to
family matters. I was entitled to a transfer to continental United States
because I had spent more than two years in the Tenth Naval District,
then considered a combat zone. In March, 1945, Coast Guard
Headquarters in Washington honored my request in part by assigning
me to Chicago to head the law office there. That legal office was
concerned mainly with anti‐German sabotage matters. When Germany
surrendered I recommended that the office in Chicago be closed and its
affairs transferred to the District Coast Guard Office in Cleveland, as in
peacetime. Washington agreed and rewarded me–for I was yet a
general officer in the Reserve, not one commissioned for legal duty–
with a transfer to the USS Callaway “somewhere in the Pacific.” I arrived
in San Francisco one day after the ship had come in for repairs, she
having suffered extensive damage from a Kamikaze attack.
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The Captain of the Callaway, one of a group of eight assault
transports, designated me ship’s secretary, in which capacity I had
possession of the war plans, prosecutor of offenses triable aboard, and
officer in charge of the Combat Information Center. For a second time I
became an expert by appointment. Fortunately those under my
command were well‐trained technicians. It was my introduction to
Loran and Radar.
In late July the ship was loaded with 5500 men and small
landing crafts to take them ashore at Osaka, the most heavily mined
harbor in Japan. In that proposed landing I was to make certain eight of
those landing crafts made round trips to shore and back, with men,
supplies, and the wounded, until the operation was over or I had been
incapacitated. Fortunately for us, on the day before we were to sail, the
first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. The next day orders were
changed to land as occupation forces. We sailed to Pearl Harbor on the
first leg of our journey.
As we were entering the harbor, I received orders from
Washington to report to the District Coast Guard Office in Honolulu to
take charge of decommissioning CG shore stations in the Pacific. Within
a week I ascertained the CG wished to decommission only those
stations that had been established on formerly enemy‐occupied
territory. That meant I had nothing to do, for no legal obligations had
been incurred by placing stations on land taken from the enemy. My
report was accepted and I was told I could return to the States and
inactive duty anytime I could get transportation, a time estimated to be
six months. Fortunately for me, several days later a Naval transport
docked in Pearl Harbor to load service personnel to take to San
Francisco. The personnel officer aboard was none other than the former
District Coast Guard Legal Officer in San Juan, under whom I had served
in the first six months there. I was added to the ship’s officer
complement and sailed to San Francisco in a stateroom. Within a few
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hours of arriving in San Francisco I was on terminal leave. My thoughts
turned to seeking a law faculty position.
From San Francisco I traveled to Ann Arbor to find out what the
faculty there knew about the opportunities for would‐be law teachers.
Their recommendation was that I should contact Frederick Beutel, then
new at Nebraska and attempting to rebuild the faculty. I did that and,
being invited to do so, proceeded to Lincoln via day coach with open
windows. The travel from Omaha to Lincoln was in morning daylight and
I recall not seeing anything but waving corn until Lincoln appeared as if
from nowhere. The offer from Dean Beutel was good and his faculty
promised to be a stimulating one. He already had hired Felix Cohen and
Thomas Cowan, both jurisprudes. But the prospect of living on an island
in a sea of corn was not too appealing to me. I decided to contact Dean
Hebert, if at all possible, before making a decision.
Dean Hebert had arrived at LSU on October fifteenth and I
visited him on October sixteenth. Within twenty minutes, as I
remember, in my presence, he had telephoned the few members of the
LSU law faculty then in Baton Rouge and also the University President
signifying his intention to hire me, and I became, without more ado, an
Assistant Professor at the LSU Law School. Such was the authority of the
Dean and President in those days. I have been a member of the LSU law
faculty ever since, active until 1980, and Professor Emeritus since then,
occupying an office, publishing occasionally, and enjoying many of the
privileges of the professorial position without its obligations.

II. THE TEACHING YEARS, 1945‐1980
My duties–and opportunities–as an active faculty member
began November 1, 1945. The semester had begun in September and it
was too late for me to take charge of a course. Accordingly, I was able to
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devote all my time to preparing to teach the courses that would be my
responsibility in the second semester, beginning in February.
When conversing with Dean Hebert on my first arriving at LSU,
he had said the Conflict of Laws would be one of my permanent
courses, it being his intention to relieve Professor Dainow of it so that
he could concentrate more on Louisiana civil law. Nothing could have
delighted me more, for I had a passionate interest in the subject and I
knew it very well. Thus preparation to teach this course was easy and
pleasurable. My second course, however, was to be in Louisiana Civil
Procedure (called Code of Practice I, if I remember correctly).
Preparation for this course was much more difficult for me, for even
though the Louisiana Code of Practice was its base, at Loyola it had been
taught by the case method and for that reason I had given minimal
attention to it. One of the students in that class was Albert Tate, Jr., a
recent Yale LL.B., who later, as a judge and as a justice on the Louisiana
Supreme Court, became very well known for his knowledge of Louisiana
civil procedure. Perhaps he learned something from me. More likely, he
experienced the need for much private study.
At the end of that first semester of teaching (the second
semester of 1945‐46) I had two sets of four‐hour all‐essay exams to
read and grade, all hand‐written. I graded the exams by first reading all
“question one” answers, etc., then by reading each exam as a whole. I
compared the scores for each grading and, if there was a serious
discrepancy, read the answer again. The process took me six weeks.
Astonishing to me was the low level of grammar and exposition of all
but a relatively few students. Obviously few had had the advantage of
attending a good high school.
That second semester of 1945‐46 was memorable in other
ways. As that semester began Dean Hebert called for a re‐examination
and improvement of the curriculum. I was named a member of the
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curriculum committee. One aim dictated by Dean Hebert was that to
relieve Professor Harriet Daggett of some of her courses in Louisiana
civil law subjects so that she could concentrate more on a book on
Louisiana succession law. The consensus of the committee was that she
should be relieved of the course in Louisiana Family Law. This much
displeased Mrs. Daggett and, faculty meeting after faculty meeting, she
asked for a delay in coming to a final vote on the matter. Finally, after
many fruitless meetings, I moved the question. The motion passed. Mrs.
Daggett seemed crushed. All others seemed relieved the episode was
over. The committee and Dean Hebert agreed that Family Law should
be taught by Professor Dainow.
Not long afterwards, Dean Hebert walked into my office saying
that he had written Professor Dainow, who at the time was in Germany
as one of the staff assisting U.S. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson
in the prosecution of the Nuremburg War Trials, and had received an
answer. Professor Dainow had indicated that unless he could retain the
Conflict of Laws course he would resign from the faculty. Dean Hebert
did not want to lose him and indicated he would have to ask me to
teach Family Law instead of Conflicts. I agreed, but with
disappointment, for I had envisioned a life teaching Conflicts as well as
areas of Louisiana civil law.
Again I was to be an expert by appointment, for my only
exposure to Family Law had been in my first year course at Loyola, ten
years before. To make matters more difficult, Dean Hebert asked me to
prepare a course‐book on the subject, for Mrs. Daggett’s materials were
out‐dated. This burden came twenty‐three days before I was to go to
the University of Michigan for the summer. I prepared the book by
writing instructions on 5 x 8 index cards and leaving it to a young
secretary to find the materials, to excerpt them according to my
instructions, and to cut stencils and mimeograph it all. She succeeded,
with the assistance of other secretaries and library help, but I was told
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later that she broke down in tears almost every day. This
mimeographed book served its purpose, but I moved quickly to prepare
better materials.
Some time later I began to realize that Mrs. Daggett might have
come to view the curriculum discussions and the eventual assignment of
Family Law to me as part of a plan on my part to capture the course.
Nothing could be further from the truth. Yet, her contacts with me
remained superficially cordial.
In teaching Family Law I had my first sample of student religious
prejudice. One day I explained that the Louisiana law on marriage and
separation from bed and board, as found in the Digest of 1808, was
practically identical with that of the Spanish law in force in 1803, and
that this Spanish law in turn was almost identical with that of the Canon
Law of the Catholic Church at the time. After class fifteen or sixteen of
the students complained to Dean Hebert that I was trying to teach them
Catholicism!
The two months at Michigan in the summer of 1946 were spent
trying to work up fervor for my dissertation under Professor Dawson,
but I am afraid it was a loss of time. The war years had erased my
memory of much I had done and my notes and LL.M. thesis were not
sufficient to refresh it.
In 1947 I again was made an expert by appointment. Part of the
curriculum reform of 1946 had been the institution of a course in Anglo‐
American real property. Someone, from Columbia University, I believe,
had been hired to teach it. Twelve days before the class was to begin,
this Professor X told Dean Hebert that his wife’s newly diagnosed illness
forced him to change his plans. Dean Hebert then asked me to teach the
course. I told him I had not studied Anglo‐American real property, that I
knew there was such a thing as a fee simple, but did not know what it
was. Dean Hebert responded that he had full confidence in me and that
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I had all of twelve days to master the subject. I taught the course
eighteen times before giving it up. The three first efforts were hard on
me and the students. I believe I was adequate to the task after that.
In 1948, being assigned to teach the course entitled Agency, I
decided I would design the course around the Civil Code’s articles on
mandate, introduce the students to differences in the French, German,
and Italian Civil Codes, and compare and contrast it all with the
treatment of the subject in Anglo‐American law. I prepared a
mimeographed course‐book on the subject. Some of my influential
colleagues must not have been sufficiently impressed with the effort,
however, for, after two years, I believe, the faculty decision was to let
Professor Milton Harrison teach a course in Agency with an ordinary
Anglo‐ American course‐book as its basis. Today, however, law faculties
in Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick are, in many subjects, moving in
the direction I had taken in the Agency course and my understanding is
that the LSU law faculty now is considering doing the same.
In the fall of 1948 it was my task to prepare a problem for the
final appellate trial in the Robert Lee Tullis Moot Court Competition. I
prepared a “Widow of Malta” situation, as it is known in Conflict of Laws
literature, one designed to make the participants realize that in the
Conflict of Laws the characterization of the problem often must
transcend the normal categories of the legal systems involved. Research
in foreign law as well as in Louisiana and Anglo‐American law was
required. The briefs were simply superb. I sent copies of them to
Professor Max Rheinstein in Chicago and to Professor Albert Ehrenzweig
in Berkeley. Both found the briefs extraordinarily good. Each included
them in his teaching materials. In 1949 Professor Rheinstein accepted
an offer to come to LSU as a visiting professor teaching courses in the
Conflict of Laws and Comparative Law. While here he told me he had
accepted the invitation because he wanted to see the law school that
could produce students capable of the research and effort required to
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prepare such briefs. I should add that at that time it was forbidden to
moot court participants to get research or writing aid from anyone.
Professor Ernst Rabel came to the LSU Law School as a guest
lecturer in the spring of 1949. His five lectures on the Private Laws of
Western Civilization were well received and printed in the Louisiana Law
Review, Volume X, in 1949‐1950. I was able to be with him often during
this time.
The summer of 1949 proved to be very beneficial for my
professional future. I had gone to the University of Michigan Law School
once more to attempt to complete my dissertation. Again the project
bored me no end. During the summer, however, Michigan organized
and hosted a conference on World Peace Through Law, I think it was
called, and it provided me with the opportunity to meet notable
academic figures from Europe. Among them were Avvocato Mario
Matteucci, Secretary‐General of the International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), domiciled in Rome, Professor
Henri Battifol of the University of Paris, and Professor Ronald Graveson
of Kings’ College, University of London, the latter two extremely well
known doctrinaires of the Conflict of Laws. All three of them and I had
meals together daily for the three weeks of the conference and of
course other contacts. At the end of the conference Matteucci invited
me to attend the First International Congress on the Unification of
Private Law to be held in Rome and to be sponsored by his Institute,
and to be his house guest for as long as I wished. I accepted the
invitation.
In the fall of 1949, Professor Max Rheinstein organized and
chaired, at the University of Chicago Law School, a conference on Family
Law to which fifty persons from the United States, Canada, Latin
America, and Western and Eastern Europe were invited. I was one of
those from the United States. My knowledge of French stood me in
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good stead at the conference, for its official languages were English and
French. Not only was I able to participate in either language, but I was
called upon to translate into French or English what the translators for
the Russian participants had put into English or French. It was common
opinion that the Russians understood and spoke English very well, but
insisted on the translations so as to give them more time to consider
what they wished to say next. Then, too, just before lunch on the final
day, Professor Rheinstein asked me to prepare and deliver a summary
of the talks and observations at the conference. I had less than three
hours to recall the papers and discussions of several days, but I was able
to give a creditable account of two hours duration. On my completing
the summary, Professor Jan Limpens of Brussels, chairman of the last
session, exclaimed “Quelle formation vous avez du avoir!” Once more I
was glad to have had rigorous training by the Jesuits in memory,
analysis, criticism, and exposition. I could not do a similar thing today.
In the early summer of 1950 Marie Elina Cherbonnier, known
more familiarly as “Doucette” Cherbonnier, and I became engaged to
marry. I proceeded, nevertheless, to go to Italy, France, and England for
the summer as I had planned. In Rome I was a house guest of the Mario
Matteuccis and attended the First International Congress on the
Unification of Private Law. Being in the Matteucci home at this time
enabled me to meet many Italian and other European academicians
who came to pay respects to Matteucci in the days before and after the
Congress.
While attending the Congress I made some remarks on the
manner of integrating private trusts in civil law legislation that, for
whatever reason, seemed to please a number of persons who heard
them, including Professor Max Rheinstein and Professor Tullio Ascarelli,
the latter of whom held the chairs in Comparative Law in Ferrara and
Sao Paulo. Professor Ascarelli shortly afterwards sent me in Baton
Rouge several of his books and later an occasional article. No doubt
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Professor Ascarelli was the most famous Italian comparatist at that
time. Another experience at the Congress was being elected to serve,
and serving, as chairman of the session on the Unification of Oriental
Canon Law, a project in which Pope Pius XII was very interested. This
was in the Aula Magna of the “Angellicum,” the Dominican Pontifical
University, situated on the Via Panisperna, directly opposite the Villa
Aldobrandini, the home of UNIDROIT. Presiding at some event held in
the Angellicum was pleasing to me, for it was there that the famous
Garrigou‐Lagrange delivered his lectures on philosophy. Finally, I should
like to say that the Holy Father delivered a lecture to us at the Vatican
on the Unification of Law. After the lecture, the Holy Father walked
among us and spoke to each of us individually, using the language of the
delegate if he knew it, and most often he did.
On leaving Rome I went to Paris for two months, being a tourist
largely, but also visiting often a first cousin of my father, who lived in
Neuilly, and her husband and family. Among the things I remember of
those visits was the excitement of one of her grandsons, then ten years
of age, when telling me that he was going to begin studying Latin the
next year and that he hoped he would be able soon to converse in Latin
with his father and uncle. Colonel John H. Tucker, jr., and his wife were
spending the summer in Paris and I saw them occasionally.
After Paris, I went to London to attend the Fourth International
Congress of Comparative Law. One of my memorable experiences there
was meeting Dean Roscoe Pound of Harvard while we were registering
at Gray’s Inn and then conversing with him as we walked to Lincoln’s Inn
for the first session. It was also my pleasure to see again Professor
Ronald Graveson of King’s College and to have lunch with him at the
Empire Club.
Doucette and I were married in Gretna, Louisiana, on February
3, 1951, the coldest day there in recorded history. There were a few
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days left before the beginning of the second semester and we had
planned a very short honeymoon. Shortly before the wedding, however,
I received a telephone call from Professor Max Rheinstein, acting on
behalf of his dean, Professor Edward Levi, inviting me to come to the
University of Chicago Law School as Visiting Assistant Professor for the
spring quarter. Dean Hebert agreed to a leave without pay and I
accepted. I was to teach the course in Private Trusts. Professor George
Gleason Bogert had retired and a replacement had been hired, but at
the last minute had indicated he could not report until the fall quarter.
Professor Rheinstein knew I had had very little exposure to the law of
trusts, but emphasized his confidence in my ability. Perhaps my few
words at the UNIDROIT Congress in Rome in the previous summer were
more meaningful to him than I had thought.
The University of Chicago Law School was indeed a challenge,
but I managed. While there, in late March or April, I believe, I received
two important letters on the same day. One was from the Fulbright
Office in Washington, saying I would be invited by the Istituto Italiano di
Studi Legislativi at the University of Rome to give a year of lectures on
the Private Law of the United States and that the Fulbright Office would
finance me if I accepted. The other was from Professor Salvatore
Galgano, Director of the Institute, making the invitation provided I
agreed to lecture in Italian. I replied accepting the invitation, indicating I
knew no Italian at the moment, but would learn the language and
deliver my lectures in it. Professor Galgano accepted that. Professor
Max Rheinstein had recommended me on Professor Galgano’s request
that he suggest someone for the position.
After finishing the quarter at Chicago, Doucette and I returned
to Baton Rouge for the summer, where I taught in the summer school
and began to study Italian. I enrolled in the Berlitz School then in New
Orleans for two four‐hour tutoring sessions per week for ten weeks,
doing so on the GI Bill. My tutor was a twenty‐one year old man who
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had migrated from Rome less than a year before. In September we
proceeded to go to Italy by Italian steamer and I was able to practice
Italian on it for more days than expected, for we got caught in a
hurricane and were thirteen days at sea.
Once in Rome and settled in our apartment–the second floor of
a fine villino in the Via Guattani, off the Via Nomentana, not far from
Mussolini’s Villa Torlonia, which we located with the aid of the very
helpful Fulbright Office in Rome. We called on Professor Galgano. Then,
within two weeks we were off to the Università per Stranieri in Perugia,
to study Italian for a month, all while being housed, wined, and dined at
the very pleasing Albergo La Rosetta at Fulbright expense. That being
completed, we returned to Rome and I began writing lectures in Italian.
It was not until spring that I was comfortable lecturing
extemporaneously.
During this time I received an invitation from Professor Fillipo
Vassali, Dean of the Facoltà di Giurisprudenza, and lunched with him
and eight of his faculty members at the Casa Valadier, in the Borghese
Gardens, at the top of the Pincian Hill. He was a splendid host.
My lectures were to begin in December. I was to have about
fifty students. Unknown to me, however, until I received a copy of the
invitation that had been sent out by Professor Galgano, I was to give a
formal “Inaugural Lecture.” Even then I did not realize what the size or
composition of the audience might be. As it turned out, the lecture was
in the Aula Magna with over four hundred in attendance, among them
the Magnificent Rector of the University of Rome, the Praeside (Dean)
of the Facoltà di Giuisprudenza, the American Ambassador, Fulbright
personnel, and professors from many of the Italian law faculties, each of
whom introduced himself after the lecture and gave me one of his
books or other writings. Of course Doucette was presented a bouquet.
After that, however, my lectures were in a small lecture room just
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accommodating the students enrolled in the course. The only fanfare
then was being preceded to the lecture room by a bedele striking the
marble floor with his staff. The students were extremely polite, standing
at attention as I entered and until I asked them to be seated, even if I
had begun the lecture before doing so. And they never laughed at any
mistake in my spoken Italian, or ever would be on my right if we walked
anywhere together. They were most anxious to learn. They did not skip
my lectures very often, and occasionally eight or ten walked to my
home with me to continue a discussion while on the way. Fortunately
Rome’s sidewalks are wide.
I must mention one of the students in that class, Giuseppe
Bisconti. He was twenty years of age at the time and somewhat
ashamed to admit that until then he had managed to learn only five
modern languages well–his Italian and French, Spanish, German, and
English. His accent and intonation in each of them was impeccable. He
slept only four hours each night, exercised twice each week in a
gymnasium, and every second Sunday engaged in mountain climbing.
He spent the rest of his time studying.
In 1955 Bisconti came to the LSU Law School. By that time he
had mastered Portuguese and Russian. Here he established an enviable
record and graduated with an LL.M. The next year he attended the
University of Michigan Law School. Then he returned to Italy to become
the Assistant of Professor Ascarelli, who had just become Professor of
Comparative Law and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law at
Rome. Within two years, however, Professor Ascarelli died and was
replaced by Professor Gino Gorla, who let Bisconti go to appoint one of
his former students as his assistant. Bisconti then decided to abandon
his hope for an academic career and enter the practice. He became one
of Italy’s most esteemed international practitioners. A few years ago he
was President of the International Bar Association, engaging in, among
other things, many human rights activities in Africa. He has offices in
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Rome, Milan, and New York and serves on the Board of the
Southwestern Legal Foundation. LSU has not given him sufficient
recognition.
The year 1951‐52 in Rome proved very enjoyable for us. With a
live‐in tutofare (a maid who does everything) Doucette could live as a
Roman lady. In the previous year I had been elected a corresponding
member of UNIDROIT and on my arrival I was given use of a most
elaborate office in the Villa Aldobrandini, the home of UNIDROIT–
marble floor, red damask walls, painted vaulted ceiling, empire
furniture. I worked there daily on my lectures and profited from its very
fine library and contact with its capable personnel. The only
disadvantage was the total lack of heat even on the coldest days. I
found myself wearing an overcoat, wool scarf, and felt hat as long as no
one else was there. Home was a little better, heated from 9 a.m. to 5
p.m., except when the communist janitor, who at first did not approve
of our living there because we were Americans, would let the coal run
out without notifying us.
Our social life was very good, primarily because of our
association with Avvocato Mario Matteucci and his wife, and with
Mircea Moscuno, a member of the UNIDROIT Institute staff, once
Romania’s Ambassador to the Vatican, and his wife, who remained
permanently in Rome after the Soviet domination of their country. To
indicate the multi‐language character of the social events we sometimes
attended, I will say that one evening at the Moscuno’s home I heard a
guest ask “what language are we speaking tonight?”
Shortly after our arrival in Rome UNIDROIT held its annual
meeting and it was the occasion for renewing some acquaintances I had
made in 1950, notably that of Professor René David of the University of
Paris, Director of the Institute of Comparative Law there, and formerly,
in his younger days, Assistant Secretary of UNIDROIT for legislative
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jurisdictions using French or English. Later in the year he invited me to
give a lecture at his Institute and I did so. Knowing that French students
were not as polite as Italian students or as forgiving of mistakes in their
language by foreigners, I had prepared my lecture meticulously and
intended to read it. When I approached the lectern with the manuscript,
however, Professor David reached over and grabbed it, saying, in
French, “Pascal, you don’t need this. You speak French like a
Frenchman.” But, speaking French after speaking only Italian for seven
months, on three occasions I used an Italian word instead of the French.
The students laughed each time. No Italian would have done so. After
the lecture Doucette and I had lunch at the house of Professor David
and his wife, herself a well known historian of Scots law. During the
same week we also had lunch with Professor Henri Battifol, of Conflict
of Laws fame, whom I had come to know well in Ann Arbor in 1949, and
Mme. Battifol and their children, in their home.
After Paris Doucette and I visited London for a week, as tourists.
One highpoint was being given a grand tour of the Middle Temple by an
elderly barrister, bowler on head, and cane in hand, of whom we had
asked directions on Fleet Street, and the Librarian of the Temple.
Another was meeting a young barrister on a train going to Oxford, he
with top hat in hand to attend a wedding, and his acting as guide for us
all day at the University.
Also in the spring of 1952, I was invited to lecture on
Characterization in the Conflict of Laws at the University of Pavia.
Professor Rodolfo DeNova of Pavia, well known in the field, extended
the invitation to me after reading my comment on the subject in
Volume III of the Louisiana Law Review. The lecture was held in the
amphitheater used by the physicist Volta when he was at Pavia. It was
well attended.
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Ludovico Bentivoglio, a young Italian avvocato of good family
who had a degree from Yale and who was a collaborator at UNIDROIT,
had wanted Doucette and me to be his guests at his home in Pavia.
Having the impression he was destitute and not wanting to put him to
any expense, we had declined the invitation. When we visited at his
home for tea, however, we saw how palatial it was and realized we had
been mistaken about his financial resources.
Also in the spring of 1952, I was invited by the Bar Association in
Naples to give a lecture there. Doucette and I were extremely well
received and the lecture was well attended.
Shortly before I returned to Baton Rouge I received notice that I
had been promoted to Associate Professor with tenure. By that time I
had taught classes for five years at LSU, for one quarter at Chicago, and
for one year in Rome. Perhaps the fact I had been invited to lecture
both in Chicago and in Rome without my having sought either invitation
and the fact some of my Rome lectures were being published in book
form by the Institute for Legislative Studies (under the title Diritto
Privato Statunitense) contributed to my promotion.
The principal event of 1952‐53, in terms of my personal
satisfaction, however, was the faculty’s agreeing to modify the
curriculum, in accordance with my suggestion, by instituting two new
compulsory courses for the first year. In the first semester the course
entitled Institutions of Law introduced the students to the broad
outlines of the historical development of the Roman and Anglo‐
American families of legal systems and to the principal substantive civil
law institutions of each. This course was my privilege and my
responsibility. In the second semester the students were exposed to
lectures in Jurisprudence given by Professor Eric Voegelin of the
Government Department at LSU. In the institutions part of my course
(roughly the latter two‐thirds) the substantive institutions of the Roman
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family of legal systems were studied by examining those of the
Louisiana Civil Code and comparing and contrasting them, where
fruitful, with those in other modern civil codes of Roman, or primarily
Roman, character, notably those of France, Spain, Italy, and Germany.
The Anglo‐American law part of the course covered the Common Law
Writs and their extensions, the growth of Equity, the hardening of law
and equity with the rise of the English Parliament, and the emphasis on
substantive rules and the lessening of procedural concerns with the
advent of fact pleading. Professor Voegelin’s course was a survey of the
historical record of man’s awareness of the ontological sources of order
for humans and, therefore, of the ontological criteria for law, together
with the manner in which these criteria for order could be given
specification in legal principle and rule while respecting the knowledge
and culture of the people and the material, economic, and
environmental conditions in which they lived.
Under the above program, therefore, the students first were
introduced to the history and structure of the fundamental institutions
of the substantive civil law portions of the Roman and Anglo‐American
derived legal systems and then afforded the opportunity to become
aware of the necessity and basis of a moral foundation for law if it is to
be respected as the plan of order for the common good. I do not believe
there was a better first year law program in the United States. Both
Voegelin and I were satisfied of that. I do believe my Institutions course
was quite adequate, but it could not be compared to Voegelin’s in depth
and breath. His immense erudition and understanding had been made
evident in his Walgreen Lectures at the University of Chicago in 1950,
published in 1951 as The New Science of Politics.
But the program soon came to an end. The Institutions course
was offered five times, in the fall, from 1953 through 1957. Voegelin’s
course was offered only four times. It was not offered in spring 1958
because in February of that year Voegelin left LSU to accept three
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positions at the University of Munich: Professor of History, Professor
Political Science, and Director of the Institute of Political Science.
Immediately after his departure the faculty voted to shift both courses
to the third year as electives, a decision that in a practical sense
effected their elimination. It is my belief this action merely reflected
what the faculty would have done even if Voegelin had not left LSU. It is
true there had been some discontent among the students. Some did not
like courses they thought to be too far removed from everyday “usable”
law. Some did not appreciate that Voegelin’s course was mainly by
lectures and outlines distributed by him. And my classes required the
students to use the library too much, my then not having the time to
prepare course‐book materials in those pre‐word processor (and even
pre‐magna‐typewriter) days. Besides, as I have been led to believe,
some of my “enlightened,” skeptical, and, agnostic colleagues seemed
to find the courses “too Catholic,” even though I had little opportunity
to stress religious or theological matters in my course and Voegelin was
a Lutheran. Perhaps a significant factor was that a son of one of my
faculty colleagues had not received a satisfactory grade in my course.
The first year program was returned to a more prosaic plan, leaving the
students with no foundation for study. But that pleased those members
of the faculty who believed each student should make his own analysis,
synthesis, and evaluation of the mass of material thrown at him.
Confusion was good for the student, too many thought.
Yet about four years later, as I remember, there was a
movement to create two new courses for the first year, one an
Introduction to the Louisiana Civil Code and the other an Introduction to
Common Law. The faculty spent considerable time detailing the content
of each course. Even after that the decision to adopt or reject these
courses was delayed because of the opposition, for unstated reasons, of
certain senior members of the faculty. Then, finally, one of them, he
whose son had not done well in my course, moved the adoption of the
proposed courses provided I, Robert Pascal, would not teach either. The
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motion passed. Introduction to the Civil Code became a regular part of
the program, but in time it was re‐named Louisiana Civil Law System.
The Introduction to Common Law was taught for the first time by a
visiting professor who ignored the faculty outline and used a course
book on introduction to the study of law that stressed case‐briefing–a
matter I consider a high‐school type exercise. It was not an introduction
to the Common Law. In later years Professor Hector Currie taught the
course.
Now back to 1953. Besides immersing myself in the Institutions
of Law course, I turned my attention to private trusts. I had taught
trusts law in Chicago in the spring of 1951, before going to Rome, and
now there was much interest in the Anglo‐American institution on the
part of bankers, who wished to create more trust business, and among
those attorneys representing wealthy clients wishing to imitate their
Anglo‐American neighbors in the estate planning and tax avoidance
possibilities of the trust as found in Anglo‐American jurisdictions. Thus, I
prepared and published in 1953, in volume XIII of the Louisiana Law
Review, an article entitled Some ABC’s about Trusts and Us, not taking
sides on the issues involved, but seeking to point out the advantages
and disadvantages of trusts, their consistency and inconsistency with
fundamental principles of good order evident in the Louisiana Civil
Code, and suggesting that we should consider well what we should do.
The article was well received generally, even by my Anglo‐American
colleagues. It was the first of my writings which I consider institutional
studies.
In the mid 1950’s the Louisiana State Law Institute began to
revise the State’s law on trusts. Progress was slow. Sometime in 1959
Dean Paul M. Hebert and John H. Tucker, jr., President of the Louisiana
State Law Institute, approached me together and asked me to accept a
position as Consultant (to the Institute) on Trusts. In that position I was
to sit with the Reporter and his four‐member Advisory Committee,
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advising and helping them in every way I could, but I was not to have a
vote. The purpose of this restriction, I believe, was to avoid
embarrassing the Reporter and his Advisory Committee. Obviously,
however, Hebert and Tucker had not been pleased with their work.
My principal efforts were to try to get the Reporter and his
committee to accept two recommendations: to define the trust in terms
compatible with our civil law–which meant avoiding the Anglo‐American
definition, one explainable only in terms of Anglo‐American legal
history–and to give the beneficiary of age and sound mind, or the legal
representative of an incompetent beneficiary, the power to modify or
terminate the trust, possibly subject to judicial authorization. This is the
rule in England, the origin of the trust. Both of my efforts failed. Some
members of the Institute’s Council–the body with final power–allegedly
were fearful of the first proposal because they thought it might
prejudice the tax advantages of the trust, even though the U. S. Internal
Revenue Service saw no such danger. Others thought using the Anglo‐
American definition would make it easier for out‐of‐state attorneys to
understand our law and give our attorneys and judges the advantage of
being able to use Anglo‐American treatises and literature. Most
members of the Council objected to the second proposal because,
under the existing U. S. tax legislation, the trust income would be taxed
to the beneficiary rather than to the trust itself and–even more
importantly for many–they wished to enable trust settlors to control the
trust assets and income after the establishment of the trust and indeed
beyond their deaths. My position, of course, was that no one with an
economic benefit should be free of tax thereon simply because it was in
trust and, secondly, that it was an insult to human dignity to permit one
person to transfer an asset to another capable person and deny him the
right to control it, for whatever reason.
Some Council members told me privately that they had agreed
with my proposals, but had not voted for them because they
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represented banks or other clients who wanted them to vote against my
proposals. I am afraid this happens often enough on the Institute
Council. Although the Institute was created to provide a body of persons
more informed than most legislators and less likely to be as corrupt as
some often are, the effort has failed. It is a sad commentary on the legal
profession and, especially, those academics who collaborate with the
Institute Council’s bad decisions for personal advantage.
Because I could not in conscience collaborate with the Institute
in the preparation of a trust law that denied the beneficiary the right to
modify or terminate the trust, I resigned my position as Consultant and
explained my thoughts on trust law reform in an article entitled Of
Trusts, Human Dignity, Legal Science, and Taxes, published in 1963 in
Volume XXIII of the Louisiana Law Review. John Tucker, President of the
Institute, criticized me severely, publicly calling me a traitor to the
Institute, he and many members of the Council believing firmly that one
who collaborates with the Institute and fails to agree with its decisions
nevertheless must support them as his own. This is nonsense for anyone
with responsibility to the public, and most emphatically academicians,
who must always profess only what they believe to be true so that the
public may have confidence in their teachings.
When the Louisiana State Legislature convened in 1964 to
consider the Law Institute’s proposed new Trust Code, I sent every
representative and senator a copy of my article. It accomplished
nothing.
The years between 1952 and 1963, between my return from
Rome and my departure for Rome once more–of which I shall say more
later–were filled with a variety of events I wish to record. The first thing
I must mention is my promotion to full professor in 1955, in spite of the
majority of the faculty’s disapproval of the Institutions and
Jurisprudence first year program.

66

ROBERT ANTHONY PASCAL

Some of the faculty, however, must have continued to be
dissatisfied with my tendency to evaluate the law’s fitness for its
purpose in the various courses I taught. One day, sometime after my
promotion to full professor, a faculty member came to my office,
claiming to have been appointed spokesman for several unidentified
others, to tell me “things would go better for me” if I were to “stop
preaching Catholicism so much.” This puzzled me, for I did not recall any
recent event or incident which might have prompted the faculty
members involved to take this action. I do not recall my response, if any
I gave, but I did not let the event change anything I was doing.
On reflection, however, I have come to wonder whether the
“warning” might not have been prompted by my conduct of a seminar
in Soviet law. I offered the seminar in response to a request of a number
of students who had been exposed to me and to Voegelin in their first
year and who had come to develop considerable interest in the
fundamental principles of different legal systems. I was, once more, an
expert by appointment, for my readings in Soviet law had been meager
up to that time. The American course books on Soviet Law were not
satisfactory, in my opinion. There were, however, in English translation,
several manuals on Soviet Law by Soviet authors and the very, very
perceptive and splendidly organized Le Droit Sovietique by Professor
René David. Although few of the students knew French well enough to
read it profitably, I was able to make it the backbone of my
presentations. I stressed the consistency of Soviet law with atheistic
communist thought, its utter inconsistency with a Christian view of man,
and the similarity of many Soviet governmental and procedural
institutions to those of the Roman Catholic Church. Could this have
excited my anti‐Catholic colleagues? I do not know.
If not all of my colleagues at the LSU Law School were pleased
with the thrust of my courses, however, some good word about them
must have gotten to the Loyola Law School. Be that as it may, in March
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1958, I was invited to participate in a Round Table Conference on
Natural Law sponsored by the St. Thomas More Society there. My
presentation was too long, but in spite of that it seems to have made a
good impression. Then the Philosophy Club at Loyola invited me, in
December 1959, to present a paper on Soviet Law. I emphasized, as I
had in the Soviet Law Seminar at LSU, the logic of the Soviet
organization, principles, and rules if one accepted their materialistic
premises and noted the similarity in many instances between the formal
structure of Soviet law and that of the Roman Catholic Canon Law. I
have never sought publication of this lecture, even though I consider it
one of my better institutional studies.
By 1960, certainly, I was offering a Seminar in Comparative Law
and this required me to compare the theoretical foundations of
different legal systems. In addition, for some years I had been a member
of The Monograph Club, a group of professors from varied disciplines at
LSU, where philosophy and sometimes even theology were discussed. I
felt the need to read many works on the Catholic Church’s Index of
Forbidden Books and to be able to make reading assignments in them to
my students. Accordingly, I wrote to Archbishop Joseph Francis
Rummel, Archbishop of New Orleans, whose jurisdiction at the time
included Baton Rouge, for permission to read anything myself and to be
able to have my students read such works as I thought they should for
my courses. Archbishop Rummel was most understanding and
forwarded my letter to Rome. In about two months the New Orleans
Chancery received a document from The Holy Office of the Inquisition
(now renamed The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) signed by
Cardinal Ottavianni, its Prefect, giving me permission to read anything
“not professedly obscene” and giving me the faculty to dispense my
students from the obligations of the Index with regard to readings
assigned by me in my courses. Monsignor Charles Plauché, Chancellor of
the Archdiocese of New Orleans, telephoned me the news, but refused
to deliver the document to me because it gave me more faculties than
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the Archbishop himself had. He did not even want to show the
document to the Archbishop. He did not want to offend him. He assured
me, however, that I could consider myself free to read anything, but
asked me not to inform my students of my faculty to dispense them
from obligations of the Index or to use it. He suggested I simply assign
them the readings I thought required for the course and let them seek
dispensation if they raised the issue.
Twice in later years I asked Monsignor Plauché to deliver the
document to me. The first time he ignored my request. The second
request was made after the Catholic Diocese of Baton Rouge had been
carved out of the Archdiocese of New Orleans. Monsignor Plauché then
told me he had sent the whole file to the Diocese of Baton Rouge. A
thorough search has been made in Baton Rouge by the Vicar General of
the Diocese, but the document has not been found. I assume Chancellor
Plauché destroyed it. Such was the personal regard he had for the
feelings of Archbishop Rummel, who, I suspect, would not have been
offended at all. All of this ceased to matter by 1965, for Vatican Council
II abolished the Index of Forbidden Books.
In the late 1950’s Dean Blythe Stason of the University of
Michigan Law School paid a visit to the LSU Law School. I had some time
to visit with him privately. He knew I had not completed my dissertation
for the S. J. D. and suggested I do so. I explained my distaste for the
project as conceived in 1940 and he agreed I might change the proposal
to one more to my liking. This would be simple he thought, because
John P. Dawson had moved to Harvard, Edgar Durfee had died, and
Burke Shartel had retired. Shortly afterwards he appointed a new
committee consisting of William Burnett Harvey, a professor of
jurisprudence, comparative law, and restitution, unknown personally to
me, chairman, and Hessel Yntema, the only other member.
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I proposed as topic of the dissertation the incompleteness of a
legal system without the institution of negotiorum gestio. That was
approved. When I submitted the first two chapters, however, Professor
Harvey wrote to me that my attempt to critique a legal system on the
basis of philosophy, as I had done in those chapters, was impossible
because, according to him, the philosophy of a legal system was
determinable and discoverable only from an examination of the law
itself. If I persisted in my plan, he emphasized, I could not expect
approval of the dissertation. I do not know whether he was simply
mistaking legal theory for legal philosophy, for the former certainly can
be discovered only from the law itself, or whether he simply denied the
validity of philosophical endeavor. Certainly those who deny the validity
of philosophical thought often use the term legal philosophy in place of
legal theory. I suspect he was a logical positivist. Whatever the case, I
decided not to pursue the dissertation. I did not want to participate in a
Shartel‐like seminar by correspondence. The S. J. D. would not give me
more knowledge and I was already a full professor with tenure with
interest in other things.
Shortly thereafter Professor Max Rheinstein invited me to
contribute an article to be included in a book of essays in honor of
Professor Ernst Rabel. I accepted and used some of my dissertation
research to produce an article on Unsolicited Action on behalf of Others
in American and English Law in which I asserted the philosophical
incompleteness of those laws because of their failure to recognize
negotiorum gestio. But, the article finished, I wrote Rheinstein that I
would not be making a contribution after all. I did not say why. Actually I
had not thought my article sufficiently good to honor a person of the
accomplishment of Ernst Rabel. Later I was very sorry I had done this,
both because the book of essays contained items I thought much
inferior to mine in concept and in depth and because, as I learned later
from Rheinstein, it had pained Rabel very much. Later on, in 1960, on
reevaluating the article, I let it be published in a volume in honor of
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Filippo Vassalli, the Praeside (Dean) of the Facoltà di Giurisprudenza in
Rome at the time of my 1951‐52 visit there. Unfortunately, some years
later I did not accept an invitation to contribute an article to a volume of
essays in honor of Edgar Bodenheimer, whose treatise I had used in
teaching jurisprudence and with whom I had had some personal contact
and correspondence. Again, I had not believed myself sufficiently
capable to do him proper honor. I regret that decision too.
In 1958 Professor Walter Richardson, Boyd Professor of History
at LSU and a prominent member of the South‐Central Renaissance
Conference, in charge of the Conference’s 1959 program to take place
at the University of Houston, asked me to prepare a paper for the
Conference on The Changes in the Roles of Common Law, Equity, and
Statute in the Stuart Century. I did so and delivered it. It was published
in 1960 in Volume 46 of the Rice Institute Pamphlet. I learned much
English legal history preparing the paper and became more convinced
than ever that one cannot understand well the formal composition of
Anglo‐American Law unless he knows its historical development in some
fair detail.
It was sometime in the early 1960’s that I began teaching
Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Law. I was not sufficiently learned to
teach the course once taught by Voegelin and gave a survey of thought
ancient and medieval and modern, using Clarence Morris’ collection of
excerpts in his The Great Legal Philosophers. Armed with Cardinal
Ottavianni’s dispensation from the obligations of the Index, I was able to
read more deeply in the originals. My effort in the course was always to
have the students ascertain the premises of the various philosophers
and to appraise them. In those days the classes were rather well
attended, for the curriculum required all students to select one or more
courses of more cultural value than the bred‐and‐butter kind.
Jurisprudence was one of them.
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In 1962 I received an invitation to return to Rome for the
academic year 1963‐64. Professor Gino Gorla, the successor to
Professor Tullio Ascarelli as Professor of Comparative Law and Director
of the Institute of Comparative Law at the University of Rome, wished to
organize a series of seminars for Continental graduates in law who
wished to prepare themselves for work in Anglo‐American law. Once
more, the Fulbright Office would finance my year abroad. Of course I
accepted. Doucette was more than anxious to be a lady again and it was
an opportunity to provide a taste of another culture for our children,
Robert, Jr. and Alice, then 9 and 7 years of age.
The main group offering the seminars consisted of Professor
Gorla himself, Professor Giovanni Pugliese of Rome, a Romanist,
Consigliere Giovanni Longo of the Italian Corte di Cassasione (or
Supreme Court), who later became its chief justice, Professor John
Henry Merryman of Stanford University, and me. For shorter periods
Professor Barry Nicholas of Oxford and a professor from South Africa
also participated. My responsibility was for three areas: the “mixed‐law”
situation in Louisiana; the law of agency in English and American law,
comparing and contrasting it with the law under the French, German,
and Italian Civil Codes; and the basics of English and American property
law, both real and personal, including future interests. Professor
Merryman led the group in a study of the Anglo‐American trust.
Professors Gorla and Pugliese concentrated on the law of sales. All
professors knew English well and Professor Gorla wanted to have all
discussions in English for the benefit of the students, all of whom knew
some English. Thus the sessions always began in English, but most often
they ended in Italian.
The Italian students were good, but they astonished me by their
ignorance of the French and German civil codes, for the Italian Civil
Code of 1807 was a copy of the French and their Civil Code of 1942
combined French and German elements. Their legal education had been
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limited to current Italian law as if it were the only law ever to have
existed anywhere. Until after World War II the American law schools
were similarly parochial, except in Louisiana, where we have stressed
both the Romanist and the Anglo‐American traditions.
UNIDROIT had again afforded me the fine office in the Villa
Aldobrandini and, of course, we frequently saw the Matteuccis, the
Moscunos, and, from time to time, other friends, lay and clerical. During
the course of the year I was invited to give, and gave, lectures in Bari
and Pavia. In Pavia, to do me honor, I was lodged in a cell in the College
of the Guelphs.
In the spring of 1964 I participated in the sessions of the
International Faculty of Comparative Law in Strasbourg, France, giving
lectures in French on representation in French and American law and on
Anglo‐American property law and trusts, subjects covered in the Rome
Seminars. I also repeated those lectures, in French, at the Mexico City
sessions of the IFCA in the summer of 1965.
The Second Vatican Council was in session during 1963‐64 and
this led to once‐in‐a‐lifetime experiences for Doucette and me. We
occupied an apartment in the Via Archimede, across the street from the
hotel where lived clerics attending the Council, including our then
bishop, Robert E. Tracy, and our future bishop, the then Monsignor
Stanley J. Ott. Bishop Tracy would drop over to see us occasionally,
sometimes seeking our opinions on “interventions” he was to make at
the Council. He was a very progressive, forward‐looking bishop,
dedicated to the proposition that the church was for the people, not the
people for the church, and much given to freedom of religion and
conscience. Through Bishop Tracy we met Archbishop Hallinan of
Atlanta, his very good friend, who was similarly oriented in church
matters. Monsignor (later Bishop) Ott, we knew very well, Doucette
having known him from his birth and Doucette and I having represented
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his parents at his ordination to the priesthood in Rome in 1951. All three
of the above bishops are dead now, each a great loss to the people of
the church and all who knew them.
Another once‐in‐a‐lifetime experience awaited Doucette and
me in connection with Vatican Council II. We were present in St. Peter’s
for the promulgation of the Council’s first two Constitutions, on the
Liturgy and Communications. We were seated not seventy feet from His
Holiness, Paul VI–close in St. Peter’s.
In the fall of 1964 Professor Giovanni Pugliese, whom I had met
in Rome the year before, came to the LSU Law School as a visiting
professor and offered a course of lectures in Roman Law. His wife
accompanied him. They were dynamic people.
Shortly after returning from Rome in 1964, I became interested
in inquiring more into the Spanish origins of Louisiana’s civil law. As far
back as 1941, Mitchell Franklin of the Tulane law faculty had made
known that a copy of A Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the
Territory of Orleans (1808), with source notes on interleaves believed
attributable to Louis Moreau Lislet, one of the Digest’s two redactors,
was in the possession of the de la Vergne family in New Orleans.
Subsequently, in 1958, both Professor Franklin and Professor Joseph
Dainow wrote of these notes in separate items in the Tulane Law
Review. Then, quite by accident, while researching in the Louisiana
Room of the Hill Memorial Library at LSU in late 1964 or early 1965, I
discovered another copy of the Digest of 1808, with notes in the
margins apparently referring to the sources of its articles and seemingly
very much in the hand of Moreau Lislet as found in his olographic will. I
reported this in Volume 36 of the Louisiana Law Review in December
1965.
The discovery of the LSU volume increased my interest in
pursuing further the sources of the Digest of 1808. Then, fortunately, I
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met Louis Victor de la Vergne, then a Tulane law student attending the
LSU Law School summer session and one of three brothers who owned
the annotated interleaved copy of the Digest written about by
Professors Franklin and Dainow. Through him I obtained permission to
inspect the de la Vergne’s volume and to arrange for its reproduction by
photographic process by the LSU and Tulane Law Schools. The
republication was made in 1968 under the title: A Reprint of Moreau
Lislet’s Copy of A Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the Territory of
Orleans (1808). (The de la Vergne Volume). Today it is usually referred
to simply as “The de la Vergne Volume.” In my opinion, this “de la
Vergne Volume” and the LSU copy of the Digest of 1808 constitute
definite proof that the redactors of the Digest of 1808 considered their
work a digest of the Spanish Civil Law in force in the Territory of Orleans
in that year.
In the summer of 1966 Doucette and I vacationed in Spain for
ten days on our way to Uppsala, Sweden, for me to participate in the
Seventh International Congress of Comparative Law. We visited Madrid,
Cordova, Seville, Granada, and Toledo. In Seville, whose people and
architecture reminded me much of New Orleans, I spent some hours in
the Archives of the Indies, where the records of the Spanish era in
Louisiana are preserved.
My particular reason for attending the Congress in Uppsala was
to deliver a paper in the session on The Contribution of Natural Law
Philosophy to Positive Law. I entitled my paper Natural Law and Respect
for Law, arguing that Natural Law promoted the principle of cooperation
among the agencies of the law in finding and specifying the law and
emphasizing the moral obligation of every person to obey the law,
factors without which the legal order suffers loss of respect and
efficacy. My paper and others of the Congress were published in 1967 in
the American Journal of Comparative Law.
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The paper and my comments during the Natural Law session
seemed to receive solid approval from Wolfgang Friedman, of the
Columbia University Law School, Chairman of the session, and I found
myself being asked by Professor Friedman to accept nomination for the
chairmanship of the session at the next Congress, assuring me of my
election if I accepted. I did accept, but later Professor Friedman asked
me to permit my name to be withdrawn from nomination. He explained
that a law professor at the University of Uppsala had complained that it
was an insult to the Uppsala law faculty, the host institution, not to
nominate one of their number for the post. I withdrew my name, of
course. I do not recall another instance of such petty vanity. [About two
years later Professor Friedman was stabbed to death on the front steps
of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York City. His death was a
loss to legal scholarship].
On leaving Uppsala by plane, Doucette and I found ourselves
seated next to a young professor from the University of Montreal.
Before attending the Congress, he had spent a year in Russia and before
that some time in Ethiopia. He was Jean Louis Baudouin, who later came
to LSU several times as a visiting professor. He and his wife became
good friends of ours. Later Professor Baudouin became Law Reform
Commissioner for Canada and then a judge of the Quebec Court of
Appeal (Quebec’s highest Court), where he sits now.
The late 60’s and 70’s were filled with many challenges of
various kinds. One was teaching Jurisprudence to the students
graduating in 1967. There were about sixty‐five in the class. About
twelve of them had studied in the LSU Philosophy Department, then
staffed heavily, if not entirely, by logical positivists, people who denied
the validity of metaphysical enterprise, reduced philosophy to its
negation, and simply sought to posit “policies” that enabled them to
build a theoretical structure to satisfy the urge for a semblance of order
or to exercise power. They were good students, intent on understanding
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what I had to say, but at first unwilling to admit to themselves that their
positivist orientation was in error. They asked me to invite one of their
former philosophy professors to come to our class to give his argument
for positivism. I refused, believing they had been taught well by me and
that the confrontation that might develop would not be good for
anyone. Then, without informing me previously, the students arranged
for the professor to give his presentation in the Appellate Moot Court
Room (now Auditorium) of the Law School and asked me to attend. I
agreed I would. Also unknown to me, the students had plastered
posters in other parts of the University advertising the event as a debate
between the professor and me.
On the day announced, students and others half filled the room.
The professor made a short presentation amounting to an assertion of
the impossibility of knowledge other than the emperical, the resulting
impossibility of moral judgments, and therefore the need to posit
propositions to provide order or seek objectives. That ended, he asked if
there were any questions. Silence prevailed until eventually I arose.
After a few questions which forced the professor to admit that his
posited proposals for order or action had no other basis than his
personal and essentially selfish premises, I sat down. The session ended.
From that day forward none in the class ever mentioned logical
positivism. More than that, some of the (formerly) positivist group
began to take interest in sound philosophy and in religion, one even
entering a seminary for a while. One of them became and remains a
very close friend who, though he has long surpassed me in philosophical
and religious learning, continues to terminate his letters to me with
“your student.” Reward indeed.
In October of 1966 Dean Hebert circulated to the faculty his
Development Memorandum No. 1 in which he called upon each
member of the faculty to offer his comments and suggestions for
improvement of the Law School’s curriculum and activities. Dean
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Hebert’s memorandum, thirty‐six pages long, gave proof of much
thought about the content of the courses, the order in which they might
be presented, the need to compare and contrast civil law and common
law substance and method throughout, and the need to relate law to
economics and the findings of social scientists. Excellent as it was,
however, I thought the memorandum failed to address the problems
caused by the faculty’s diversity of opinion on the possibility of
knowledge of objective criteria for order in the lives of human beings. If
such criteria do not exist, or if we cannot know what they are, then law
is merely the medium through which individuals or groups exercise
power over others for reasons ultimately, if not immediately, essentially
selfish. American law faculties and curricula certainly reflected this
malaise, this vice of the soul, and LSU’s was not exempt. Students were
not being presented with the principles and rules of a legal order
intended to maximize the common good of all. They were, on the
contrary, being coached, largely in courses of their own choosing, in the
rhetorical manipulation of law as “value‐free” “legal materials,” without
respect for law as an instrument of good order, and without any
attempt to present the law as a whole. I, on the contrary, believed, and
yet believe, that objective criteria for human order are knowable, that
the specified legal order must attempt to honor them, and that the
whole of the legal order, at least in its essentials, and its critique to the
best of our ability, must be communicated to the students. Hence, I
wrote an extensive memorandum detailing my conception of law, the
role of the professor, and the content of a proper curriculum for a
Louisiana law school at that time.
Few members of the faculty responded to Dean Hebert’s
Development Memorandum No. l. A Development Memorandum No. 2,
on civil law studies, attracted more responses. In the long run, however,
nothing significant was done. The idea that faculty members form a
collegiate body collectively responsible for discovery, preservation, and
dissemination of knowledge of the whole field of law did not form a part
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of the LSU law faculty’s thinking. Most acted as individuals, interested in
their separate fields alone. Few were interested in the attempt to
formulate and implement a sound, rounded, integrated program
designed to have the student understand the legal order as a whole and
his obligation as a professional to foster that legal order. Even today the
curriculum continues to emphasize rhetoric. It remains basically a
vocational training curriculum rather than one appropriate for
university studies.
In 1967 it was decided that the entering first year students (the
class of 1970) should be given an orientation program featuring single
lectures on the character and study of the Civil Law and the Anglo‐
American (or Common) Law. I was to give the former, Professor Wex S.
Malone the latter. I decided my subject could be made clearer by
comparing, at every opportunity, the history, principles, and
methodologies of the two systems. When I completed my presentation
and Professor Malone rose to give his, he complained to me that I was a
“spell binder.” Later he accused me of attempting to poison the minds
of the students against the “Common Law.” In the years immediately
following, Professor Malone repeated his 1967 presentation, but other
Civil Law professors were asked to deliver that on the Civil Law. Today
everyone may judge the merits or demerits of my presentation, for it
was published in 1999, twenty‐two years after its rendering, in Volume
60 of the Louisiana Law Review.
Some of the students of the class of 1970, whether because of
or in spite of the 1967 orientation program, later proved to be very
interested in the reasons underlying the law. It was my pleasure to have
a number of them elect a seminar in the Conflict of Laws which I offered
in 1969‐70. A prerequisite to the seminar was the diligent previous
private study of at least one of the then popular student texts
(“Hornbooks”) on the subject. As a result, I could concentrate on the
appraisal of various Conflict of Laws theories, principles, rules and
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practices and not have to expound the essentials of what currently was
passing for good Conflicts Law. Four of these students later became
professors of law at LSU and elsewhere, though two later left academia
for the practice. Many in the class have remained good friends.
In the period of 1968 through 1973 I was invited to present
lecture courses in the Honors Program in the College of Arts and
Sciences at LSU. In 1968‐70 the topic was Law in the 20th Century. There
I was able to present a survey of the formal structures of the Roman
Law systems, the Anglo‐American Law, and the Soviet Law, the
philosophical bases of each, Conflict of Laws principles and their bases,
the problem of social and economic communities without a common
legal system (e.g., the European communities at that time), and the
problem of holding persons accountable for actions licit under the
positive law applicable to them, but contrary to sound morals (e.g., the
Nuremberg War Trials). In 1971‐73 the course was on The Growth of
Law and Legal Institutions in the Roman and Anglo traditions. Both
courses gave me much pleasure. I have always believed in the study of
law as the instrument of good order, stripped of the “vocational
training” aspect prominent in law schools, to be a proper part of a
liberal education. Indeed, in 1933 Robert M. Hutchins, a Yale Law School
graduate and then president of the University of Chicago, delivered an
address to the annual meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools in which he emphasized that university law faculties should
concentrate on teaching the nature, function, and criteria of law as a
cultural phenomenon and leave all vocational training to schools
organized by and taught by practitioners. I am much of that mind.
The Louisiana Bar Association held its annual meeting in London
in 1971. As part of the scheme to facilitate tax‐free paid travel on the
continent (or so I suspect) for those attending the London meeting, in
July, 1971, the Institute of Continuing Legal Education at LSU sponsored
a program in Rome on Continental Law and American Law–Insights and
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Contrasts. Professors Pugh, Yiannopoulos, and I, and Judge John T.
Hood, Jr., of Lake Charles, gave the principal talks. Among the
“Discussants” were Professor Giovanni Pugliese of Rome, who had been
visiting professor at LSU in 1965, Avvocato Giuseppe Bisconti of Rome,
and Avocat Raymon Jeanclos of Paris, the latter two LL.M. recipients
from LSU in 1956 and 1957. Avvocato Bisconti made himself the host of
a sumptuous dinner for all faculty and program participants at the
fabled Ristorante Ranieri in the heart of old Rome. It was my last visit to
Rome.
Shortly after my return from Rome, in September 1971, the
Tulane Law Review published a special issue dedicated completely to
Professor Rodolfo Batiza’s article and supporting data entitled The
Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources and Present Relevance.
[What Professor Batiza called the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 is more
correctly entitled A Digest of the Civil Laws now in force in the Territory
of Orleans, but many others do the same.] In his article Professor Batiza
claimed that eighty‐five per cent of the French language texts of the
Digest had been derived from, or substantially influenced by, French law
texts, and this much is true. But Professor Batiza mistakenly assumed
that this usage of French law texts, in whole or in part, in writing the
Digest amounted to an adoption of French law. In so assuming he failed
to recognize that the redactors of the Digest had copied French law
texts only where they expressed Spanish law equally well, or
supplemented it, and modified or rejected them where they did not, all
in conformity with the Legislature’s mandate to prepare a statement of
the Spanish civil law in force in 1808. To bolster his position, Professor
Batiza even denied the validity of the notes of Louis Moreau Lislet, one
of the redactors of the Digest, listing the Spanish law sources of the
Digest’s articles.
Being outraged over this distortion of legal history, I wrote a
reply to Professor Batiza. The Tulane Law Review published it in April
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1972, but sandwiched it between two articles vainly struggling to refute
my contention, one by Tulane’s Dean Joseph Modeste Sweeney and the
other by Professor Batiza.
To this day the Tulane law professors and their followers have
never admitted publicly, if at all, Professor Batiza’s error. Indeed, in
1981 three Tulane law professors, Shael Herman, David Combe, and
Thomas Carbonneau published a book entitled The Louisiana Civil Code:
A Humanistic Appraisal, in which the Batiza view was accepted and in
which it was contended that the Digest of 1808 represented an
adoption of French Enlightenment thought. Then, in 1993, Professor
Herman wrote, under Louisiana Bar Foundation auspices, a book
incorporating the same views, The Louisiana Civil Code: A European
Legacy for the United States. My review of Professor Herman’s book
appears in the Louisiana Law Review, Vol 54, No. 3. I will leave it to
future generations to judge the merits of the controversy.
After the Viet‐Namese War, LSU, with State Department
sponsorship, undertook the task of helping the Viet‐Namese to reform
their laws. A new civil code was drafted and I was one of those asked to
appraise it before its adoption. Similarly, I was asked by the Quebec Civil
Code Reform Commission to serve as a consultant to the Committee on
the reform of Quebec matrimonial regimes law. During this time,
Professor Paul‐André Crépeau of McGill, who was Director of the
Institute of Comparative Law at McGill and also head of the Quebec Civil
Code Reform Commission, asked me whether I would be willing to
consider an offer to join the law faculty at McGill. My response was
negative. Though I did believe a position at McGill would offer better
opportunities for work on an international level, I knew the climate was
one neither I nor my family could adjust to easily and, besides, we
would be too far from our relatives in Louisiana, many of whom were in
advanced age. For the same reason, I declined an invitation to be
interviewed for the deanship at North Dakota. It was always a pleasure,
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however, to attend meetings in Canada. In all I made four trips to
participate in meetings in Montreal, Ottawa, and St. Andrews in New
Brunswick.
In 1971 I obtained the faculty’s permission to experiment
teaching the basics of Louisiana matrimonial regimes, successions, and
donations in one three‐semester‐hour course. I long have believed that
all students should be exposed to all major branches of the law, both
public and private, domestic and foreign. Having all courses in the
traditional method results in the students being too much immersed in
a limited number of subjects and having no information at all about
others. By having the full range of subjects covered in their essentials
and limiting deeper study to some areas to be chosen by the students
according to their likings or prospects in the profession, we could
produce more roundly prepared students. I believe the course was a
success, my being able to cover all essentials of all three subjects and
the students demonstrating their understanding of them all. But the
course much displeased Professor Carlos Lazarus, who regularly had
taught successions as a four hour course, which he rarely completed
because he tried to review an annually increasing number of decisions.
The faculty, however, agreed with Professor Lazarus and I did not offer
my course again. Most of the faculty, I believe, placed more emphasis
on legal rhetoric and “in depth” coverage of portions of subjects than
they did on complete basic instruction.
Professor Joseph Dainow retired in 1973. This gave me the
opportunity once more to make the conflict of law one of my regular
courses. His retirement, moreover, meant that he no longer could be
one of the two faculty representatives on the Council of the Louisiana
State Law Institute. Dean Hebert was astonished I wanted the
appointment, thinking my experience with the Institute when I served
as Consultant on Trust Law would have discouraged me from serving on
the Council. But the Institute was beginning to revise the Louisiana Civil
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Code and I wanted to attempt to bring my ideas to the project. Not only
did I become a member of the Council, but I was appointed a member
of the Institute’s committee on Matrimonial Regimes Reform. The
experiences as a member of each, the Committee and the Council,
proved to be most disappointing and discouraging.
The Committee on Matrimonial Regimes Reform, in conformity
with Institute practice, included academics and practitioners. Two of the
practitioners, though prominent in their practices and in the Institute,
had not had solid grounding in Louisiana civil law. One had studied at
Harvard alone. The other had studied primarily at Yale, but also
somewhat at a Louisiana law school. I thought they gave little evidence
of basic familiarity with the Louisiana Civil Code. An example will suffice.
During the first meeting of the committee I had occasion to remark that
“after all, each of several heirs is responsible for only his share of the
obligations of the deceased at death.” This statement of rudimentary
succession law brought forth immediate denial by the two practitioners,
both contending that each heir was liable solidarily for (the whole of)
the deceased’s debts. Calling their attention to the articles in the
chapter of the Civil Code on the payment of the debts of a succession
produced such consternation that the Committee did not manage to
return to its proper subject for almost four hours. Evidently they had
never read the chapter and it may be that they had been guilty of
malpractice. But other members of the Committee may have
entertained the same misconception, for many remained silent on the
issue. I had to wonder whether they understood matrimonial regimes
law under the Code sufficiently well to be members of a committee
charged with its reform.
Probably it is correct to say that the principal concerns of most
members of the committee centered around two aspects of the
community of gains as of that time: the position of the husband as
“head and master” of the community of gains, which gave him sole
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authority to administer its affairs and generally sole authority to
encumber and alienate its assets, the wife’s consent being required in
only specific legislatively provided instances; and the fact that whereas
the wife’s creditors could reach only her separate assets for satisfaction,
the husband’s creditors could reach both his separate assets and the
community assets, rules that in effect treated the community of gains,
until its dissolution, as part of the husband’s patrimony. No one could
doubt that the feminist movement of the time, with its increasing
feminine interest in emerging from the traditional career of a married
woman as homemaker and child rearer and in entering upon careers
outside the home and independently of her husband’s affairs, would
dictate a reform in the two aspects of the community of gains
mentioned above.
The feminist cry of the day, in every state with a community of
gains, was for “equal management.” For me this was nonsense, for
neither husband nor wife could be certain of the community assets he
or she might control and the creditors of each would probably demand
the consent of both husband and wife to every single credit transaction.
One solution would be to abolish the community of gains, legislate a
separation of assets and liabilities, and provide for an equalization of
fortunes at the end of the marriage by matrimonial regime or
succession law. A better solution in my mind was to keep the
community of gains, recognize the right of each spouse to use any
community asset, give each spouse control over the encumbrance and
disposition of only those community assets acquired by him or her
during marriage, restrict each spouses’ creditors to satisfaction from
only those community assets acquired by that spouse and from his or
her separate property, and, at the end of the marriage, combine all
community assets and liabilities and partition them.
After two and one half years of wrangling in the original
committee, in the Council of the Law Institute, in a second committee
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appointed by the Council, and again in the Council, the Council
approved a bill containing features essentially those I had proposed. The
Council had come to realize that “equal management” was not feasible.
The Louisiana Legislature’s House Committee on Civil Law and
Procedure, however, rejected the Institute’s bill and asked the Institute
to prepare one based on the “equal management” principle.
At the next meeting the Law Institute prepared to accede to the
Legislature’s wishes. I suggested, argued, and moved that it not do so.
The Institute had submitted its recommendation. As a body charged
with submitting for enactment only such bills as it deems best for the
common good, it should not act contrary to the conclusions it had
reached after full study and debate. To do so would be to permit itself
to become a mere legislative drafting bureau and to violate its statutory
duty. My motion failed to pass. Perhaps the members of the Council
feared a loss of appropriations if it refused the Legislature’s improper
request. The matter being settled, I resigned from the Institute Council,
not being willing to assist in drafting legislation I could not approve.
Never thereafter did I participate in an Institute enterprise.
The bill finally approved by the Institute Council and enacted by
the Legislature asserts a general rule of “equal management,” but the
general rule is much restricted. The encumbrance and alienation of
community immovables requires the act of both spouses. So do
donations of value. Under the laws regulating banking operations,
negotiable paper and assets represented by title, he or she whose name
appears on the account, paper, or title alone may act. And furniture in
the house may be sold by the spouse on the premises. But in one
respect the “equal management” rule gives the wife power formerly
enjoyed by the husband alone: that to borrow or purchase on credit, on
one’s personal separate account or on the community’s account,
without giving security, thus entitling the unpaid creditor to reach any
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community asset for satisfaction. It is to be suspected that the rule has
increased the incidence of divorce.
During the years of wrangling over matrimonial regimes reform,
in the spring of 1975, Loyola invited me to give a one‐semester course in
the Louisiana Civil Code’s structure, principles, and institutions. This
course delighted me. Students were not to be bothered with
examinations and, of course, they were not to receive academic credit.
The result was that only students truly interested in the Civil Code
attended. Some Loyola faculty members attended and so did a few
Tulane students and one of their faculty, Professor Alain Levasseur, who
in 1977 joined the LSU law faculty.
My effort was to emphasize what the articles stated to be law
and to note simply, without argument, what the jurisprudence and
doctrine had said about it. In the course of doing so it became apparent
to me that often the students, like those at LSU, had tended to seek the
meaning of the Civil Code through jurisprudential and doctrinal opinion,
rather than interpret the Code themselves and evaluate the
jurisprudence and doctrine by their understanding of the legislation.
There was an outstanding example. For years the judiciary had placed
all heirs’ shares of a succession under administration if any one of them
claimed benefit of inventory. There was, however, no basis for this in
the legislation until the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure in
1960. Before that time the only solution warranted by the legislation
was to have a partition if one or more, but no all, of the heirs claimed
benefit of inventory and then to subject to administration only the
assets falling to those heirs who had claimed benefit of inventory. The
class was astounded, but all recognized that the jurisprudential
interpretations before 1960 and the Code of Civil Procedure’s provisions
often unfairly operated to deprive those heirs, who wished to have in
kind their shares of the specific assets left by the deceased, of the
opportunity to have them, for the administrator could ignore those
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heirs’ wishes. (In 1986, finally, legislation was enacted essentially
returning to the scheme intended by the Civil Code. But the return to
reason was not to last too long. Later legislation sponsored by the
Louisiana State Law Institute seems to negate the legislation of 1986.
Creditors’ ease of collecting and the simplification of succession practice
for attorneys seem to have been given preference over an heir’s
attachment to his share of the specific assets of the deceased.)
Two tragedies of 1977 were the deaths of dean Paul M. Hebert
and Professor Joseph Dainow. To them both I owe my entry into law
teaching and encouragement over the years. Professor Dainow had
retired in 1973, but he had continued to attend faculty meetings and
participate in meetings of the Law Institute Council (as a “senior
member” of that body). Dean Hebert had not retired and died suddenly
of a heart attack while arguing before the LSU Board of Supervisors for
recognition of the Law School as a separate fiscal and administrative
unit of the Louisiana State University system.
After the deaths of Hebert and Dainow I began to think of my
own retirement. Although I was but sixty‐two years of age, I realized
that my energy level had begun to decrease and that I could not
continue to put the same effort in teaching and writing that I had
maintained through most of my years on the faculty. Fortunately for me
and my family, however, I did not retire immediately, for by the time I
retired in 1980, at age 65, LSU’s retirement plan had changed and I was
able to claim both social security benefits and a retirement stipend from
the Louisiana State Teachers Retirement program.
My last year of teaching, 1979‐80, was a very satisfactory one
for me. I had returned to teaching the first year course entitled
Louisiana Civil Law System some years before and had acquired some
recognition for it. Professors Alain Levasseur and Simeon Symeonides,
who would teach the course in the fall of 1980, paid me a supreme
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compliment. They suggested that I should teach all students entering
the Law School in 1979, in two sections of roughly two hundred each,
that each of them would attend all classes, and that they would prepare
the examinations in the course and grade all papers. This was an offer I
could not refuse. I enjoyed every class session and I believe that the
students did so also. Returning alumni who were in those classes never
fail to tell me they were in the course and how much they had
appreciated the classes.
During the last class session, in the Law Auditorium, a “singing
telegram” messenger burst into the room and sang his tune. That
finished, he continued to stand there. On my suggesting that, having
finished his song, he should leave, he exclaimed “Oh, there’s more.” At
this point a belly‐dancer entered the room. I quickly grabbed her arm,
turned her around, and escorted her back through the door. Turning to
the hushed and disappointed students, I reminded them I was
conducting a class, not a spectacle, and proceeded with the class. After
the class, a female student, a little older than most in the class, chided
me for not letting the students “have their fun.” I replied to her that had
I allowed the young belly‐dancer to proceed she probably would have
accused me of contributing to the degradation of women. She thought a
moment and said “I believe you’re right.” From that moment she
became very friendly.
A number of students from the Louisiana Civil Law System class
enrolled in my class in Matrimonial Regimes in the first summer school
session of 1980, the last class I was to teach before retirement. At the
end of the class, the students presented me with a light blue and white
tee shirt on which was superimposed the declaration, “I’m for pristine
purity.” In the several years prior to retirement I frequently spoke of
“the Civil Code in its pristine purity” (meaning before its contamination
with poor amendments). No doubt this was the source of the words on
the tee shirt, but I suspect the motivation for the shirt was my ejection
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of the belly‐dancer from the room a few months before. Another gift I
received on that day was a hand‐carved and hand‐painted sculpture of a
woodcock, the shooting of which had been and remains my favorite
sport, done by a relative of the student who had chided me about
ejecting the belly‐dancer. These two gifts were the only ones I accepted
from students in my thirty‐five years of teaching. I believed these
students had appreciated my efforts and had no thought of trying to
influence my judgment in grading their papers.
In my last year as an active faculty member I was invited by the
Tulane Law Review to submit an article to be included in an issue in
tribute to Professor Mitchell Franklin, who had retired from the Tulane
law faculty in 1967 and from the University of Buffalo Law School in
1974. My article, entitled The Sources of Civil Order according to the
Louisiana Civil Code, was published in the commemorative issue, 54
Tulane Law Review No. 4, June 1980. I consider the article one of my
better works. It was, at any rate, my swan song after a career of thirty‐
five years.

III. RETIREMENT
It having been known for some time that I would retire from the
active faculty at the end of June, 1980, the student editor of the
Louisiana Law Review informed me the Review intended to dedicate an
issue to me and include in it a short account of my career. That would
have been welcomed by me except for the fact that the editor of the
Review then asked me if I would “approve” of “Professor X” (who shall
remain unidentified) to write the piece. Being afraid “Professor X” might
be told I had been informed he would be asked and not wishing to put
him in the position of being reluctant to refuse under the
circumstances, I urged the editor not to do more than publish a picture
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of me with a simple notation of my retirement. My wish was honored in
the Fall 1980 issue of the Review.
At the time of my retirement I had hoped to do two things
before I died. One was to write an exposition of the institutions and
principles of the Louisiana Civil Code that would be meaningful to
persons untrained in law, both those who were interested in the subject
simply as a cultural phenomenon and those entering upon the study of
law. The other was to compose a short monograph on the rational
foundations for the delineation of the legislative and judicial
jurisdictions among states or nations, a work by which the adequacy
and fairness of existing “conflict of laws” rules might be judged. Neither
intention was ever realized.
I had begun the Civil Code project early and had completed a
number of chapters on the Code as enacted in 1870 and amended
before 1960, the year until which the amendments had not been so
destructive of the Code’s original design and so opposed to its
underlying principles of good order. It was my plan to treat that as one
part of the work and then, in a second, to discuss the amendments of
1960 and later. As time progressed, however, I realized that both the
changes made in 1960, when so much of the Civil Code was modified
and shifted to the new Code of Civil Procedure, and the revisions of the
Civil Code by the Louisiana State Law Institute in the 1970’s and later,
together with the new mode of publication with source notes,
references to prior decisions, and “comments” on the intended
meanings of the new texts, were such as would destroy any real hope
for the preservation, much less the encouragement, of civilian
methodology and sound principle in Louisiana. The Anglo‐American
legal methodology had triumphed over the Civilian. Under the
circumstances, I lost all interest in any description and appraisal of the
post‐1960 Civil Code and realized that only antiquarians would read
what I had prepared on the Code as it stood until 1960. It would have
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little if any relevance for the present. I am neither an antiquarian nor a
historian. I am interested in the present and the future. Thus I
abandoned the project.
Two radical particular changes in legislation during the eighties
and nineties demonstrated a significant movement away from the
Spanish and Christian concepts, once so evident in our Civil Code, of the
ontological community of mankind in general and of family solidarity in
particular. The movement, of course, was toward the individualism of
the post‐industrial revolution Anglo‐American law. The first change was
the abolition of forced heirship, an institution which implicitly
recognized property to be a family asset, rather than that of an
individual alone, limiting one’s right to dispose of his assets gratuitously
to persons not his descending or ascending heirs. Although the present
law supposedly retains “forced heirship” in favor of first generation
children under twenty‐four years of age and certain incapacitated
persons, it is not truly heirship, but a provision for lump sum alimony.
The second grave change, made possible largely by the abolition
of forced heirship, is the extension of the power of the settlor of a trust
to control who is to benefit from the assets placed in trust for possibly
unlimited generations. With this change, begun in the Louisiana Trust
Code of 1964 and augmented periodically, one may ignore his heirs and
satisfy his hubris by controlling his assets long after his death, even if he
cannot possibly foresee who will be his beneficiaries. Probably Louisiana
law today exceeds that of any other jurisdiction in sanctioning this
selfish pride. Money, or wealth, has become Louisiana’s golden calf.
Ontologically based obligations among family members are ignored.
I do regret not having written my other planned monograph, on
the philosophical bases of delineating the legislative and judicial
jurisdictions of states and nations, before the Louisiana State Law
Institute drafted its 1991 legislation on the subject, now added to the
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Civil Code as its Book IV. Those articles reflect generally accepted
American ideas on the subject, but they suffer from the general
American positivistic attitude in law. Probably my ideas would not have
prevailed, but I could have had the satisfaction of attempting to provide
proper guidance.
There were, nevertheless, several bright spots for me in these
twenty‐one years since retirement. In May, 1982, the graduating class,
all of whom had been enrolled as first year students in my fall 1979
offering of the course in the Louisiana Civil Law System, asked me to
give the commencement address. I did so, most happily, but I am afraid
they heard only what they had heard from me before: that they must be
priests of good order, having always in mind that humans form a
community under God and that it is their obligation to exercise their
profession as attorneys, judges, or legislators in such manner as will
preserve and augment the good of each and all.
In the summer of 1983, I was invited to address the Quebec Law
Teachers, at their meeting in St. Andrews‐on‐the‐Sea, New Brunswick,
on “Louisiana’s Mixed Legal System.” Then, in 1987 or 1988, LSU
Political Science Professor Ellis Sandoz, Director of the Eric Voegelin
Institute at LSU, which he founded, asked me to edit Voegelin’s The
Nature of the Law for inclusion in his in‐progress republication in English
of all of Voegelin’s works. The monograph had been written by Voegelin
while teaching the course in Jurisprudence in the LSU Law School, but,
because he left before its publication to assume positions at the
University of Munich, it had never been published. I agreed to be an
editor of the monograph only if Professor James Lee Babin, of LSU’s
English Department, a philosopher, theologian, and literary giant who
had studied all Voegelin’s works intensively, were to be co‐editor with
me. The volume, No. 27 of The Voegelin Works reprint, appeared in
1989.
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Then, to my surprise and astonishment, in May, 1995 Loyola
University in New Orleans conferred on me the degree of Doctor of
Laws, honoris causa. I had always maintained close contact with the
Loyola law faculty, some of whom were my former students at LSU. Yet I
had never expected such recognition.
The last major event of my retirement was being asked to
deliver the 1998 Tucker Lecture. The Tucker Lectures, annual affairs,
celebrate John H. Tucker’s long involvement in Louisiana Civil Law study
and reform and are sponsored by the Center of Civil Law Studies at the
LSU Law School. I was quite astonished by the invitation, for over the
years Colonel Tucker, as he was called, and I opposed each other in our
views and recommendations. Nevertheless, I accepted the invitation
and entitled my talk Of the Civil Code and Us. My effort was to give a
summary of the changes made in the Civil Code’s format and underlying
principles both before and after its reform or revision in recent years. I
was extremely happy that the lecture hall was filled beyond capacity,
that a number of those attending were from the Loyola and Tulane
faculties, and that no one left before I had finished speaking. The
lecture was published in the Fall 1998 issue of the Louisiana Law
Review.

IV. SUMMATION
It is difficult for one to appraise accurately his overall success or
failure in his chosen profession. Yet, reflecting on what I have written
above, I am willing to make some observations.
First of all, I must acknowledge I have been more successful as a
teacher than as a professor. I sought to expound law accurately and
critically–the principal role of a teacher–and I believe that I did, but I
have not succeeded in more professorial activities. Thus, I have not
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succeeded in my attempts to improve the law school curriculum. Nor
have I managed to encourage the bench and bar to be more faithful to
civilian (codification) methodology. Nor have I been able to influence
legislative changes for the common good. Nor have I left a major
treatise on any subject.
Certain personal characteristics no doubt contributed to these
failures. I have not been very tactful in presenting my ideas and in
criticizing those of others. I tend to be literal, direct, and brutally frank. I
have not been willing to compromise on matters of principle. Then, my
firm convictions that truth is ascertainable, that both philosophy and
revelation lead us to believe that humans exist ontologically as a
community under God, and that this community is the basis of morality
and law, enrage those who deny these truths and accordingly see both
morality and law as non‐morally obligatory social conventions under
which all seek protection in the exercise of power for ultimately selfish
reasons.
It is on my record as a teacher of law, then, that I must base
what success I have had. I continue to believe I did teach effectively.
Were I to have the opportunity to relive my life, I doubt that I would live
it very differently.

V. POST SCRIPT 2001 ‐ 2010
It would be inconceivable for me to allow the publication of my
“Recollections” without acknowledging the intellectual stimulation and
friendship offered to me in the years 2001‐2010 by my colleagues
Michael McAuley and Olivier Moréteau.
Michael McAuley, originally from Montreal, came to LSU in
2000. He is a man of remarkable classical education, culture, and
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character; a true scholar, well‐grounded in both Civil and Anglo‐
American law, with an ardent desire and ability to contribute to their
appraisal and improvement. Unfortunately he is no longer at LSU.
Academia is not always appreciative of genius.
Olivier Moréteau, formerly the Director of the Institut de droit
comparé Edouard Lambert in Lyon, France, since 2005 occupies the
Russell Long Chair and is also Director of the Center of Civil Law Studies
at LSU. He too is grounded in the Civil and Anglo families of law. He is
particularly concerned with the language of the law and its adequacy,
now that so many different peoples with different tongues are being
brought together under a single law. His store of knowledge is to be
envied.
These two colleagues have taught me much and I believe they
have learned something from me. They have given me life in my old
age.

Punishment, Pardon, Parole 
Louisiana is known to be a jurisdiction with little charity
toward convicted persons. Instances of parole are few
and pardons seldom given. The prevailing attitude is one
of vengeance, the avoidance of which is one of the
reasons for assigning arrest, trial, sentencing, and
correction to public authority. I am not aware that this
“letter to the editor” has had any effect on anyone.

In this time of high crime incidence the outcry–popular, political
and official–is for long‐term imprisonment, execution for serious
offenses and victim participation in sentencing, parole and pardon. A
spirit of vengeance prevails.
Little thought is given to effective correction and rehabilitation.
Still less is given to charity and forgiveness. Almost no recognition is
given to the share in the offender’s guilt that we “non‐offenders” must
bear by reason of our failure to practice the kind of justice and charity
toward others, especially in matters of personal dignity, education and
economic sufficiency, that is demanded of us as members of a
community of mankind under God.



Letter to the Editor, originally published in THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, U.S.),
Sept. 4, 1996, at B6. Reprinted with the permission of the The Advocate.

98

ROBERT ANTHONY PASCAL

The moral duty of civil society to apprehend the criminal, to
take measures reasonably calculated to correct and rehabilitate him,
and to restrain him as long as he is a serious danger to others, is not to
be doubted. But is civil society warranted in punishing anyone simply as
retribution for his offense?
Punishment as retribution is as old as history itself. Its practice
is universal even today. The notion usually alleged as its justification is
that the injury, loss or damage occasioned by the offender must be
balanced by injury, loss or damage to the offender himself. The Old
Testament is full of this kind of reasoning, and in the New Testament
Jesus, the Christ, assuming to Himself the sins of men of all times,
suffers and dies to atone for them. Yet the message of Jesus is that we
must not return violence for violence, but forgive “seventy times seven”
and never seek vengeance. Even without this revelation, any other
thought would be inconsistent with our having been created in the
image of an all‐loving, all‐merciful and all‐forgiving God.
Love and forgiveness being the supreme norms for human
relations, imprisoning an offender without providing adequately for his
correction and rehabilitation, or continuing his confinement after his
rehabilitation, or executing him when imprisonment would suffice to
protect others–a condition met easily in almost every society, as Pope
John Paul II has noted–must be considered morally reprehensible.
In the same spirit of love and forgiveness, victims of crime must
be shown compassion by society, helped to bear their material, spiritual
and emotional losses and encouraged to become reconciled to those
who have hurt them. But they may not be allowed to participate in
sentencing, parole and pardon. Their suffering frequently tempts them
to seek retributive punishment, even the death sentence, and to object
to parole and pardon even though the offender has been rehabilitated
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and reasonably may not be considered a serious threat to the safety of
anyone. Vengeance cannot be condoned.

Natural Law and Respect for Law 
The Sixth International Congress of Comparative Law, in
1966 in Uppsala, Sweden, had a section on the effect of
Natural Law on modern legal systems. The following
was my contribution. Wolfgang Friedman, chairman of
the section, and other participants, particularly those
from the Soviet dominated countries, thought it well
done.

In the era of Christendom, natural law, whatever its variations
in the minds of the philosophers, 1 always denoted the law of God
addressed to man as a free‐willing creature and obligatory for him to
the extent he could discover it through use of his intellectual faculties.
Man used his intellect and judgment speculatively to ascertain the will
or plan of God and practically to discover how he might conform to it by
obedience and cooperation. 2 It was an objective law, knowable with
certainty in its immutable principles and capable of being specified or


Originally published in 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 500 (1967). Reprinted with the
permission of the American Journal of Comparative Law.
1
The reference here is primarily to the differences in the thought of Aquinas,
Scotus, and Occam. Aquinas regarded the eternal law, of which natural law was
a part, as God’s rational plan for the universe; Duns Scotus and William of
Occam, on the other hand, stressed God’s will rather than His plan.
BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE (2d ed.1962), has a short exposition at 26‐29.
2
THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW, Summa Theologiae, II.I.Q. 91, aa.l‐3.
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completed in time and place by human laws elaborating an order
consistent with these principles. Under this thought the functions of
legislator and judge were deemed to consist essentially of discovery and
specification rather than of creation and prescription. 3 With the advent
of Humanism the emphasis began to shift from God the Creator to man
the creature, and from the law of God to the rights of man. In the
period of Enlightenment, natural law finally gave way to natural right.
Human law, then, came to be looked upon as order self‐imposed by
men for the maximum preservation of their natural God‐given rights,
now solemnly declared to be inalienable and to consist of life, liberty
and property, or the pursuit of happiness. 4 Philosophical skepticism and
positivism removed even natural right from the foundation of human
law and left it standing on the doubtful bases of subjective and formal
norms, 5 history, 6 determinism, 7 and power. 8 Now, finally, with the
lesson taught if not learned that mere power cannot be regarded as the
basis of law if we are to survive, the search is on again, and perhaps it is
3

This is explicit and implicit in St. Thomas. See id. II.I.Q.91,a.3; Q.94.aa.4,5;
Q.95,aa.l,2; Q.57.
4
Locke and Rousseau are the obvious champions of this form of thought. The
phrase “pursuit of happiness” is the felicitous substitute for “property” in
Locke’s formula used in the American Declaration of Independence.
5
Hume’s insistence that only the empirically observable was reliable or
relevant and that morals were emotional rather than rational at once deprived
morals and law of objective basis. Kantian morals and law, having their
foundation in a subjective norm, the categorical imperative, are in final analysis
subjective. Positivism, relativism and pragmatism, all denying the validity or
relevance of metaphysics, necessarily reject the notion of objective criteria.
6
Savigny, Burke, Maine, Hegel and Marx, for example, each in his way
emphasized historical criteria for law.
7
The behaviorist philosophy, represented especially by Dewey, had profound
effect through the Realist movement in the United States, though Realism as
such did no more than stress the effect of extralegal factors on the legal
process.
8
Besides being formal in its approach to law, positivism is in essence a
philosophy of power. See, for example, Friedrich’s appraisal of the positivist
position in his THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 176, 177 (1957).
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the effort toward consensus 9 that is being substituted for the hope of
the discovery of objective criteria. 10
Thus, from Christendom to the present the broad shift in
thought about the foundation of human law has been from natural law
to natural right, then to subjective and formal criteria, history,
determinism, power and finally, it seems, toward consensus. Each of
these positions has contributed much to the determination and
redetermination of the substance of legal institutions. This is well
known. Less often considered, however, are the effects which these
changes in fundamental thought about the bases of law have had on the
structural forms of legal institutions and on the recognition of personal
obligation to obey the law, effects which in turn have led to a gradually
increasing disregard for the law as the plan for order in society and,
therefore, to the reduction of the efficacy of the rule of law.
It is simple enough to recognize that during the period of
natural law in the scholastic sense positive law was found and declared
rather than made. In England, for example, even to the first part of the
seventeenth century, Parliament was conceived as a court in which
rules found to be declarative of the natural law were enacted into
positive law. Interpretation of legislation was always a process of jus
dicere rather than of jus dare, but this was also true of judicial activity in
the area of unwritten law. The judges found and declared the specific
rule, the substantive justification of which was its participation in the
natural law. From these premises secondary rules were easily deduced
9

The author regards McDougal’s policy science as founded on consensus. See
note 33 infra and the text to which it refers.
10
The effort toward consensus made by those denying objective knowledge
must be distinguished from another current effort toward consensus, that of
the Christian world to achieve a consensus on the differentiation of a revelation
which all Christians accept as objectively known in its compact form. It is only
the effort toward consensus for itself without regard to objective truth which is
to be criticized.
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for organic legal processes. The erroneous judgment could always be
repudiated in a later case, the statute that violated the natural law
could be declared invalid, and the rule of law that violated the sense of
justice could be avoided by the action of the Chancellor as keeper of the
king’s conscience. 11
At the same time continental legal institutions, though differing
from those in England by reason of diverse history and culture,
manifested similar understanding of the foundation of positive law.
Indeed, it cannot be forgotten that one of the main bases given for
accepting and utilizing the Corpus Juris was that its principles conformed
to or expressed the substance of the natural law even if the particular
specifications found in this written record of another people’s legal
order were not in form suitable for application to the society of the
particular time and place. 12 Separation of powers, as distinguished from
separation of functions, was unknown. Monarchs could apply and
interpret the law as well as find and specify it, courts could issue arrêts
de règlement, and all could admit of dispensations from the accepted
rule whenever its application contravened the principle on which the
rule itself was founded. 13 Thus in England and on the Continent natural
11

The writer has sketched the English conditions before and after
Enlightenment‐thought in Changes in the Roles of Common Law, Equity, and
Statute in the Stuart Century, 46 RICE INSTITUTE PAMPHLET 98 (1960).
12
Whereas the work of the Glossators appears to have been primarily to
discover the rules and principles of Roman law from the Corpus Juris, the
Commentators were more concerned with adapting the ratio scripta to their
time and place. In the overall view, the effort was not so different from Gény’s
concern with interpretation of the French Code Civil in a manner relevant to
French conditions near the turn of the century and yet consistent with “les
données” implicit in its texts.
13
The French Revolution, so far as it concerned the legal system, might be said
to have been against feudalism and the abuses of the ideas and practices
described in the text. These abuses, nevertheless, are not to be attributable to
the ideas themselves, but to the failure of the institutional forms to provide a
framework in which they could be given effect without danger of abuse.
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law thought made for a subordination of human law to a standard
considered objective and for forms of organic legal institutions that
indicated cooperation in the finding, declaration and interpretation of
legal order rather than a balancing of powers.
The shift from natural law to natural right produced a profound
change in the organic institutional sources of private law, which change
in time led to a lessening of respect for the system of the law itself.
Natural right, the champion of natural liberty, gave philosophical
justification to the supremacy of legislation, a development that
changed the interrelationship of the organic sources of law from one of
a partnership of equals with different functions in the discovery and
specification of law to one of a hierarchy of separated branches of
government with limited distinct powers. Thus in England judges,
though they continued in fact and in theory to discover and specify the
unwritten common law, did so only by sufferance of Parliament. This
principle led rapidly to the abandonment of the practice of reversing
former errors and to the development of strict stare decisis, it being
reasoned that those judgments on the content of the common law
which Parliament had not overturned by statute had tacitly been
approved, or enacted, by Parliament, and thus had become law which
only Parliament itself could alter. Equity, formerly the king’s conscience,
the agency through which failures in the specification of order could be
remedied for the case at hand, ceased to exist as a law‐correcting
agency. 14 All that separated law and equity from that time forward was
the subject matter of which the courts of law and equity could take
cognizance. 15 The chancellor was to declare solemnly that he knew no
equity but that found in the precedents in chancery. 16 The law and
14

See note 11 supra.
At the turn of the century Maitland was to define Equity in this manner.
MAITLAND, EQUITY—A COURSE OF LECTURES 1 (1909).
16
Roberts v. Wynn, 1 Ch. Rep. 236 (1663); Cowper v. Cowper, 2 P. Wms. 685
(1734).
15
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chancery courts, then, ceased to deal as much with the specification of
justice as with the application of a law which was, for them, positivistic,
or separated from its philosophical base.
The French development, though not identical to the English,
proceeded on essentially the same basis and to essentially the same
result. With the legislature given supremacy, law was declared to
consist of, and solely of, the legislative will. If it was the duty of the
legislature to enact laws consistent with natural right, it was not the
function or privilege of judges, administrators or professors to enquire
into, much less question, the judgment of the legislature in this
regard. 17 Judges were not expected to decide cases without citing the
texts of the laws on which their decisions were based. 18 Interpretation
itself was reserved as a legislative function. 19 The judge was not even to
explain the meaning of the legislative text; he was only to cite it and
give his conclusion as to its application to the facts at hand. 20 No
provision was made for equity; 21 the judge who refused to decide a case
on the ground that the law was deficient, that is to say, lacking an
applicable declaration of legislative will, was to be prosecuted for denial
of justice to the parties. 22 Never was there to be an appeal to extralegal
17

GÉNY, MÉTHODE D'INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ POSITIF nos. 26 and 27
(2d ed. 1954), contains a short statement with citations of representative
literature.
18
Under the Law of April 20, 1810, art. 7, “Judgments . . . which do not contain
reasons, are declared null.” Because the only reason a judge could give was the
text of a law, he was expected to cite it. Cf. R. DAVID & DEVRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL
SYSTEM 15 (1958).
19
The legislation on this subject enacted from 1790 to 1828 and practically
repealed in 1837 is cited in DALLOZ, ENCYCLOPÉDIE, Droit Civil, v. Interprétation,
no. 10.
20
CODE CIVIL FRANÇAIS, art. 5.
21
The PROJET DE CODE CIVIL DE L’AN VIII, Liv. Prelim., Titre. V., art. 11, which
referred the judge to équité when the texts were silent or insufficient, was not
adopted aspart of the Code Civil.
22
CODE CIVIL FRANÇAIS, art. 4.
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criteria to ameliorate or temper the application of the legislative rule.
The judiciary sank into a position of lesser importance, if not of
inferiority. Professors of law were enjoined to expound the legislative
will and not criticize it. 23 As Buguet said, he knew not a droit français,
but only the Code Civil. 24 The French legal literature of the first part of
the nineteenth century came to manifest exegetic brilliance and
jurisprudential sterility. The new generation of lawyers and judges knew
only the scheme of the law as it could be understood deprived of its
philosophical reason for being. 25
Thus, both in England and in France the theory of legislative
supremacy produced a spirit of methodological positivism for all except
the legislature. Hobbes was vindicated. But the human search for justice
and abhorrence of injustice are too strong to allow formal theory to
obstruct too long the granting of justice in fact. To this we may attribute
in large measure the practice of distinguishing facts to reach other
results in later cases, the exaggerated tendency to distinguish ratio
decidendi from dictum, and even the construction of facts in such a way
as to avoid application of the old rule found in English and American
decisions of the era. So, too, came the revolt against the stagnant
inadequacy of French law in the middle 1800’s. One device was the
misuse of declarative institutions of law, e.g., the use of negotiorum
gestio to give a remedy where the gérant had not thought of acting for
anyone but himself, for no rule of unjust enrichment had been enacted

23

On instruction in law from the Revolution to 1808, see BONNECASE, LA THÉMIS
33‐68 (2d ed. 1914).
24
On the approach of the school of exegesis see, inter alia, BONNECASE, L'ÉCOLE DE
L'EXÉGÈSE EN DROIT CIVIL 128‐130 (2d ed. 1924).
25
GÉNY, supra note 17, at no. 28, quotes from Boutmy, Les rapports et les
limites des études juridiques et des études politiques, 17 REV. INT. DE
L'ENSEIGNEMENT 222‐223 (1889), a passage which shows how much this state of
affairs was considered correct even at this late date.
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by the legislature. 26 Another manifestation was the occasional judicial
revolt in the form of openly declaring judgments according to
conscience rather than law, 27 or in declaring a rule of law to exist even
though there was no legislative text specifying it. 28
In short, the relative or methodological positivism induced by
the shift in thought from natural law to natural right provided the milieu
in which disrespect for the forms of law was tolerated for the sake of
rendering the law more conscionable. This already amounted to a
breakdown in the respect for law as the system by which good order is
specified.
Yet it remained for philosophical skepticism and its offspring,
relativism and positivism, to bring about general distrust and misuse of
legal institutions. Skepticism, by casting doubts on the ability of the
human mind to know external reality, drove it to seek sources of order
in criteria essentially subjective and formal, such as the adjustment of
wills and a reconciliation of interests, 29 or in the essentially
deterministic historical dialectics of spirit or matter and behaviorism. 30
Some of these philosophies of law did have salutary effects not
to be ignored. In Germany, for example, the interest in history as the
specifier and index of the principles of order both checked an excessive
zeal for the reformulation of law along rationalist lines at the expense of
culturally developed institutions and stimulated an interest in historical
26

See, for example, Picard, La gestion d’affaires dans la jurisprudence
contemporaine, 1921 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 419, and 1922 REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL 5.
27
On the “phénomène Magnaud” see 2 GÉNY, supra note 17, at 286 et seq. On
the libre droit movement see 2 GÉNY, supra note 17, at 330 et seq.
28
E.g., Cass. Req. 15 juin 1892, S. 93.1.281. Of a similar nature is the principle
and rule of abus de droit.
29
E.g., Kant and Pound.
30
E.g., Hegel, Marx and Dewey.

NATURAL LAW

109

studies that facilitated the development of a carefully integrated
dogmatic systematization. It is probable, too, that the genius for
adaptation of ancient institutions to meet modern conditions, shown in
English legislation of the last century, was sharpened by the awareness
of English legal development. Moreover, all of the philosophies
mentioned introduced pseudo‐objective criteria for law which, if
honored, would have produced, at least seemingly, satisfactory
schemes of order for the general good.
The opportunity for general good through compliance,
however, is not the same thing as personal obligation to obey the law,
and this is precisely what the subjective and deterministic philosophies
of law failed to supply. Thus, law came to be regarded as founded on
force or power either threatened or applied. Philosophers of law denied
that a rule without sanction could be law 31 and in the popular mind, as
Holmes was to put it, law came to be no more than that which the bad
man was forced to obey. 32 Law, then, became essentially a power factor
standing at the service of those who could use it to achieve desired ends
and in opposition to those who would seek ends not attainable through
law.
Stripped of the support of the personal moral obligation of
obedience, law ceased to enjoy, and indeed to deserve, the respect
required for its effectiveness. Misuse of legislative, judicial and
executive authority increased and was increasingly tolerated. Respect
for justice through law began to be replaced in fact and theory by the
pragmatic use of legal forms for the achievement of desired ends,
31

Hobbes’ position on this point has been adhered to generally by the
“analytical” jurists of the last century and this.
32
In The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). Holmes, however,
did not mean to state that law was without norm, but only that the students of
the law, to whom he was addressing his remarks, must know the law in this
way in order to advise a client.
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separating the law on the books from the law in fact. Law ceased to be
the framework of order and truly became the instrument of power. To
some extent American legal education reflected this thought, exhibiting
for more than a generation more interest in the development of skills
for the achievement of desired objectives than in the actual or potential
content of the legal order or the formal structure through which such an
order might be expressed and maintained. 33 Many a law graduate of the
twenties and later understands little or nothing of the plan of the legal
order. The law is his weapon or his foil in the effort to satisfy his client’s
desires.
It is safe to say that events of recent memory have provided
dramatic proof that power cannot be the criterion of law. There is
renewed interest in natural law, but skepticism is too widespread to
permit of its general acceptance. In the place of sheer power, the more
general approaches seem to be through efforts toward consensus. The
emphasis on the rule of law is one of these; policy science is another.
The interest in the rule of law is, of course, an approach which
emphasizes order through adherence to law. Its deficiencies are the
existential disagreements on the criteria, role and substance of law, and
more seriously, the persisting nonrecognition of a personal moral
obligation to obey the law, the very condition that led to the power
theory of law. Policy science, it seems, seeks consensus on the
objectives of the law rather than on the law itself. 34 Granted that
consensus does increase the probability of consistent action, it does not
33

Even today American legal education is characterized by: (1) an insistence
that “method” is more important than “substance” or content; (2) a program
essentially of optional courses rather than one planned by the faculty for
progressive instruction; (3) the common opinion that narrow courses “in
depth” are to be preferred to systematic exposition of the structure of the law;
and (4) a passion for learning through discovery and dialectic rather than
through instruction, which is considered “dogmatic.”
34
McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy
Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L. J. 1345 (1947).
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provide an objective basis either for the content of the law or for a
personal obligation to obey it as distinguished from an offer of general
advantage from conforming action, thus opening the way to
nonconformity where personal advantage is envisioned. Moreover,
because it transfers from law to policy science the primary role of
ordering life in society, it is antithetical to the rule of law and serves to
undermine the traditional respect for law as such. 35 In this milieu the
exploitation and evasion of law can be expected.
If this thesis is correct, then on reflection it can be said safely
that two major contributions of natural law thought to the positive legal
order have been, first, the principle of cooperation among the agencies
of the law in the finding and specification of law and, secondly, the
personal obligation of the subject to obey the law. When these two
factors are lacking, the legal order soon suffers loss of respect and
efficacy.

35

Friedrich has well described and decried a similar phenomenon in the
concept of law in the Basic Law of the Germany Federal Republic and in other
systems. In his opinion, “totalitarianism may be considered an exaggerated
expression of this general tendency toward the emphasis on policy. For in
totalitarianism the leaders claim for themselves the right to decide policy
matters without any regard to legal forms.” FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 216‐219 (1957). The author does not imply that American
policy science has gone this far in practice, but only that its thought is similar to
that which Friedrich describes.

PART 2
A MAN OF VISION

A Summary Reflection on Legal Education 
My reflections on legal education began long before my
retirement in 1980. A major critique is contained in a
memo to the Dean and Faculty of the LSU Law School in
1966, now published as an annex to Alan Watson’s The
Shame of American Legal Education, 2nd ed. 2007. The
following Summary Reflection began as a simple essay
on the deficiencies of American legal education, but it
evolved over time to include the observation that
whereas knowledge of Anglo‐American law is the
province of professionals alone, that of modern codified
law is available to all who can read, a factor that limits
abuse of the law and simplifies its study.

Disrespect for the legal order has become endemic. In general,
both its professionals and the public at large manifest it. Lawyers often
seek to manipulate the law to serve clients’ purposes, whether or not
the result is consistent with the order it projects, regarding their
practice more as a power service for those who can pay their exorbitant
fees than as a profession at the service of good order. Indeed, for many
in the public at large and for many professionals, the very notion of law
as a plan of order to be respected, honored, and obeyed is considered


Originally published, with a Foreword by Olivier Moréteau, in 69 LA. L. REV. 125
(2008). Reprinted with the permission of the Louisiana Law Review.
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an infringement on individual freedom (and, recently, privacy). Clients
demand lawyer delinquency for selfish reasons and, at the same time,
knowing their champions to be willing delinquents, distrust them.
Elected judges are suspected of being inclined to favor persons
represented by attorneys who have contributed to their campaigns for
election. Appointed judges are expected to interpret and apply the law
in terms of the political, economic, religious, and philosophical views of
those who control their appointments. Legislators are believed to be
influenced unduly by the generous offerings of lobbyists and to vote
their benefactors’ or constituents’ wishes even if they know them to be
contrary to the common good. Practicing lawyers serving as members of
law reform groups have been known to sponsor their clients’ selfish
interests rather than the general good. For most persons, lawyers,
judges, legislators, and the public, law is the instrument of power par
excellence. Justice, equality, fairness, and the common good often are
ignored, though the rhetoric in use pretends they are of concern. The
degree of selfishness dominating the practice of law can be judged by
the enormity of the fees charged, the relatively little attention given
those unable to pay them, and the manner in which established law
firms mistreat their young associates, requiring so many hours of effort
from them that often they must leave home before their children awake
and return home after they have fallen asleep.
Shamefully, legal education in the United States has
contributed, and continues to contribute, to this societal disaster. Law
schools have not demanded that the would‐be law student have an
education in which he has been asked to ponder what it means to be
human, or what relation he has to others by reason of his nature, or
whether there is anything like a moral obligation. A college degree of
any kind suffices for enrollment, though it may evidence no more than
intense vocational training in engineering, natural science,
mathematics, business, or canoe paddling. Nor do law schools attempt
to supply the deficiency during law studies. Once in law school the
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student may have the opportunity to elect a course in “legal
philosophy,” “legal theory,” or “jurisprudence,” but very often such
courses are sketchy surveys without demand for critical appraisal. Most
students (and many faculty members) regard them as perhaps
interesting, but nevertheless irrelevant to the “practical” world of law.
Indeed, learning what history has taught us about man’s
awareness of his nature and his relation to others need not be a
prerequisite for legal studies as usually conceived in the United States
today. If law itself is regarded as nothing more than the record of
previous battles for power in courts and legislatures, a record of
humanly created “facts” not qualifiable as good or bad, if the notion of
law as an order for men in society projected for their common good is
rejected and there is substituted in its place a concept of “problem
solving” when the posited aims of individuals clash, then training in
rhetoric will suffice. In essence, this thought predominates in legal
education in the United States today. Its inadequacy was addressed
brilliantly by Robert Maynard Hutchins, once dean of the Yale Law
School and the president of the University of Chicago when, in 1933, he
addressed the Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law
Schools. His message was very clear. Law schools could remain as they
were—and yet are–if every university would establish in its college of
liberal arts a “Department of Jurisprudence” so that would‐be law
students could receive adequate exposure to the liberal arts and to the
art, science, purpose, and obligatory moral force of law before entering
law school for their professional training. Unfortunately, his plea was
not heard.
It is not difficult to trace in bold outline the change in thought
leading to the current cultural crisis. Until the 1500’s, in the era of
Christendom, the prevailing thought in Western culture was that
metaphysics as well as revelation permitted the affirmance of the
following propositions: (1) the existence of all persons as an ontological
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community under God; (2) the existence, therefore, of the ontological
(moral) obligation of each person, as part of the whole, to respect and
cooperate with every other for the spiritual and material good of each
and all—an obligation in justice at least for the metaphysician, but in
charity and mercy as well for the believer in revelation; and (3) the
moral certainty of one’s conscious existence after death in a state of
beatitude commensurate with one’s degree of holiness in life, that is to
say, one’s conscientious endeavor during life to discover one’s relation
to God and other persons and, with God’s grace, to live accordingly.
Under this understanding of the human condition, just political
societies, their just laws, and lawful private agreements, could be
recognized as institutions through which the general, unspecified,
ontologically founded moral obligation to respect and cooperate with all
persons is made specific for persons in particular societies of particular
cultures in particular circumstances of time and place, as such morally
obligatory, entitled to respect, honor, and obedience, and justly
sanctioned by one’s conscience, political force, and fear of social
opprobrium.
In the last five hundred years, however, as Eric Voegelin
summarized in his The New Science of Politics (1951), a gradual change
in thought has come to dominate in the public sphere. It discredits and
ignores both revelation and metaphysics as valid sources of morally
obligatory norms of human action, and does so on the basis of a
gratuitous assertion that only the empirically demonstrable may be
taken to be true. If this is so, then neither God, nor the ontological
community of persons, nor life after death, need to be taken into
account in human affairs, for none is subject to empirical verification.
Persons, accordingly, are to be considered simply as individual beings,
unrelated to each other in the ontological order, without moral
obligations to each other, living a life without discoverable meaning and
without hope of conscious existence after death. Under this
misunderstanding of the ontological condition of man, each person
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becomes his own god. Individualism is born. Exercise of power over
others to attain one’s posited, criteria‐less objectives can become one’s
way of life. Concern for others can be subordinated without guilt to the
attainment of one’s personal wishes. Conventional morals and laws and
associations and contracts of all kinds then may have prudential force,
but, being without ontologically based moral force, cannot bind in
conscience.
Protestantism, perhaps unwittingly, added to the spread of
individualism. The followers of Luther and Calvin, perhaps adhering too
literally to St. Paul’s admonition to rely on the word of God rather than
human wisdom, limit themselves to revelation, limit that to the Bible,
and then interpret the Bible in ways that eliminate personal holiness as
a condition for salvation. For Luther, one’s salvation depends entirely on
one’s justification through faith (trust) in Christ as savior, itself a free
gift of God that can not be earned. For Calvin, God predestines some
persons to salvation and others to damnation, without regard to their
actions during life.
In each case, individuals are unable to contribute to their own
salvation. Ontologically based morality and concern for others logically
become irrelevant to salvation. Even the Biblical morality taught so
zealously by Protestants logically can have relevance only as a calculus
for the individual’s earthly happiness. Then, too, the Protestant tenet of
individual interpretation of Scripture renders morality purely subjective,
reinforcing the spirit of individualism.
Whatever the explanation, the observable fact is that high
individualism, and its logical corollary, selfishness, pervade the
American mind and that their source and raison d’être must lie
ultimately, at least in large measure, in the secular and religious
influences that have no room for the community of man under God and
its corollary, the ontological moral obligation to respect and cooperate
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with everyone for the spiritual and temporal good of all. It is a spirit that
makes competition normal and thus gives pseudo‐legitimacy to a life in
which taking advantage of another is not regarded as morally wrong.
In this truly anti‐intellectual and normless milieu, individualist
and self‐centered, combative rather than cooperative, it is no wonder
that legislation and judicial opinion have come to be regarded as no
more than records of previous competitions among men in legislatures
and courts, non‐normative human acts—mere facts—that might be
manipulated for selfish purposes in later “legal” conflicts with others.
Europe and the Americas all have suffered from this development, but
Anglo‐American jurisdictions, particularly those in the United States,
have felt it more than the modern Romanist jurisdictions. It is suggested
that the difference can be accounted for by the manner in which law is
perceived, evidenced, organized, promulgated, studied, and taught in
the two legal cultures.
Since the French Revolution most modern Romanist
jurisdictions tend to limit law to legislation enacted by the elected
representatives of the people in legislative assembly. Nothing else may
be considered law. Once enacted it stands as a closed frame of
reference. There is no recognition of the relevance of a former
historically developed background law, or of philosophical or theological
principles against which it may be construed, interpreted, or appraised.
The will of the legislature is its only norm. John Henry Merryman once
said that modern Romanist law is culturally agnostic. Perhaps it would
be more correct to say that in most modern Romanist jurisdictions what
constitutes right order (jus in Latin), and therefore justice, is exclusively
the province of the legislature, and that both the judiciary and the
executive are limited to rectitude in the application and enforcement of
the legislation.
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This legislative positivism does place enormous moral
responsibility on the legislature, but it does offer definite advantages.
One is that all judicial decisions must be based on the legislation.
Another is that decisions may not be regarded as binding precedents,
though everywhere a long line of decisions interpreting or applying the
legislation in a certain way can be persuasive. A third is that the
legislature must aim at a complete statement of the legal order.
Perfection being impossible, almost all Romanist jurisdictions permit the
judiciary to decide the case for which there is no legislative rule by
specifying a rule based on principles explicit or implicit in the legislation
as a whole. In this fashion the legislation remains the ultimate
reference. The fourth and greatest advantage of legislative positivism,
however, is that the law, being limited to legislation, may be
promulgated in its fullness.
The fullness of promulgation in modern Romanist jurisdictions
usually is enhanced many times over by the fact that the main
legislation on private law, the civil and the commercial, is to be found in
civil and commercial codes that tend to be splendidly organized,
conceptual and abstract in their provisions, carefully integrated and
internally consistent, and written in simple, non‐technical vocabulary.
Thus organized and written, the codes make possible a reasonable
understanding of the basic law by anyone who can read. The same
organization and usual clarity of expression have facilitated the
development of treatises and manuals of different levels that provide
further promulgation for laymen and professionals and facilitate
instruction in (and study of) the law with economy of effort. The result
is a popular and professional awareness of the law that makes it difficult
for both laymen and professionals to avoid its provisions by deliberate
falsification or obfuscation. Differences in construction, interpretation,
and methods of application can and do exist, but seldom is there a
question as to what rule of law applies or what is its basic import.
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Those subject to Anglo‐American private law have not been so
fortunate. The limitation of law to a simply stated, complete, and
conceptually consistent plan of order promulgated for all to know is
foreign, seemingly repugnant, to English and American legal minds.
There are statutes, increasing in number in modern times, but always
on particular matters, and usually regarded as modifications of the basic
law, the unwritten, un‐enacted, and un‐promulgated Common Law.
Never have statutes achieved the status of legislation detailing the
whole of the private law. Efforts to have lawyers and judges construe
and apply comprehensive statutes, such as the Uniform Commercial
Code, as complete frames of reference, replacing all other law for their
subject matters, in the manner of Romanist codes, have failed. So great
is the tendency to apply statutes against the background Common Law
that one usually cannot say he understands a statute’s effect until the
judges have construed it.
To inform oneself of what presently is to be considered the
unwritten Common Law is a rather difficult task, even for trained
attorneys, judges, and professors. It is an impossible task for the
untrained. The best evidence of what had been considered
authoritatively to be the Common Law is in the decisions rendered in
particular suits, not founded on statutes, between particular persons
and under specific fact situations. They are applicable retroactively and
theoretically are without prospective operation. In practice,
nevertheless, previous decisions are regarded as precedents to be
followed as long as differentiating facts do not exist or the judge
determines that the precedent no longer satisfies current notions of
right order or justice, which notions have always been the actual basic
substance of the Common Law in every period of its history. Thus,
Common Law jurists often pride themselves on their ability to actualize
justice according to current standards in every case and on not being
limited by legislated rules; but they suffer from a lack of the
predictability available through carefully prepared legislation,
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underestimate the flexibility of abstractly worded rules, and ignore the
retroactive character of their decisions.
The decisions are published, but their great number, their
factual particularity and orientation, and, in our time, the diversity of
thought on the notions of good order or justice reflected in them, make
it difficult to determine what really had been declared to be the
Common Law or what it is likely to be declared to be in the next case.
Here the English have had advantage over the Americans. Having one
hierarchy of courts, and barristers and judges devoted to consistency in
decisions and opposed to attempts to manipulate the law to please
clients or particular political parties, professionals can give probably
sound predictable opinions in consultations and in rendering judgments.
In the United States, however, the judiciaries of fifty states each render
decisions that may not be consistent with those in other states,
attorneys have no compunction against arguing that out‐of‐state
decisions provide better solutions than those reached in their own
states, and the judges themselves may even render new solutions
according to their own peculiar notions of good order or justice. Indeed,
the attorney in the United States not only must inform himself of
multiple versions of the Common Law, but also must inform himself of
the notions of good order or justice held by the judge or judges before
whom he must plead his case.
How does one teach such a law? Perhaps by stressing its
methodology rather than its substance. In 1870, Dean Langdell of the
Harvard Law School declared that inasmuch as decisions were the only
authoritative evidence of what had been declared to be the Common
Law (or the meaning of statutes), law students should learn by studying
the decisions. The “case method” became the usual and favored way of
training law students. Typically professors select decisions in their fields
of assumed competence, order the reading of them in some fashion,
quiz the students on their opinions of the premises and reasoning of the
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judges, ask them to compare the decision with others, and elicit from
them alternative reasoned solutions. Perhaps no attempt will be made
to give the students an overall account of the law on the subject. The
emphasis is on rhetoric in solving competing contentions on what had
been or might be declared to be the law in a particular case. It is always
hoped that in time the student will learn to “think as a lawyer,” the
ultimate goal of the method. The branches of the law studied are
considered of lesser importance than rhetorical exercises, and so
students are permitted wide discretion in choosing courses.
The case method quickly convinces the future professional that
Justice Cardozo must have been right when he wrote “the law never is;
it always is about to be.” It is always uncertain until the judge declares
what it is in the particular circumstances. This means the non‐
professional cannot avoid seeking legal advice in important matters,
even though the legal counselor himself must share much of that
uncertainty. Differences of opinion on the law often must be settled by
suit, or by compromise or negotiation, much of which could be avoided
by clear legislation. The lack of certainty also contributes greatly to the
length of legal documents, for the parties must specify in great detail
provisions that would be totally unnecessary with Romanist type
“suppletive” legislation, legislation that supplies details of law
applicable unless contradicted by express agreement. And the
uncertainty facilitates dishonest claims and dishonest legal arguments.
The tide must be turned. It could be turned if law academics
were to give serious attention to two objectives.
The first must be to bring to Anglo‐American private law the
development and style reached by the Roman legal culture with the
confection and promulgation of the French Code Civil in 1804. The
whole of the Anglo‐American private law must be stated in legislation
that all can read and understand and that will be used in fact as the
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exclusive basis of all professional advice and all judicial pronouncements
in the realm of private law. The reasons are clear. Every person is
entitled to a succinct statement of the legal order under which he is to
live. Lawyers should be able to provide sound advice with minimal
doubt. Judges should not have to wonder what is the legal rule they are
to construe or apply. Law students should be able to study the
substance of the law and not merely legal methodology. The extensive
copying or imitation of the French Code Civil style throughout the
Roman legal world is proof of the human hunger for its advantages.
Admittedly this cannot be accomplished quickly or easily. It
might not have been accomplished at all in France without the
persuasion of Napoleon Bonaparte. It could not have been
accomplished at all without the works of French jurists of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who analyzed, synthesized, and
evaluated the diverse laws that prevailed in France at the time. The
effort in the United States can succeed only if its law faculties will begin
in earnest and complete a similar doctrinal study that can provide a
basis for codification. It is a project that should not be delayed. Law
faculties in the United States already know that legal education cannot
be limited to the Anglo‐American law and have begun to foster
“polyjural” or “transsystemic” studies. Perhaps students who manage to
obtain sufficient knowledge of codified law in action will begin to clamor
for codification here. If so, the American project could become a reality.
It would be a mistake, however, to ignore that uncertainty and lack of
clarity in law are fee‐generative. Thus the work of codification must not
be allowed to become dominated by the practicing profession.
The second object is even more important than the first. It is to
make every effort to make certain that the legal professionals‐to‐be
approach their studies with absolute integrity, recognizing that people
are not mere individuals, but members of a community of mankind,
morally obliged to respect and cooperate with each other for the
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common good, and morally obliged to respect the legal order as the
specification of the manner in which these obligations are defined and
executed in their society.
To that end, liberal education should be a minimum
requirement for all legal professionals, and that liberal education must
be better than that of the secularist educators, who have ignored
metaphysics and revelation.
What purported revelation is true, if any, is a matter of faith.
But legal professionals, being, in the words of Ulpian and Justinian,
“priests of right order” in the societal lives of men, must be acquainted
with the impact various religions based on alleged revelations, whether
true or false, have had on the lives of people. It must be part of their
liberal education.
Metaphysical philosophy is another matter. It must not be
ignored in any man’s education. It is the exercise of a faculty that all
men possess, the only faculty through which they might fulfill their
yearning for knowledge of who they are, what relations they have to the
rest of being, and what obligations to others result therefrom.
Secularists deny the validity of metaphysical conclusions, and
therefore their relevance to men, because they can not be
demonstrated. They can not prove this negative to be true, but have
succeeded in having their thought prevail simply by ignoring
metaphysics in all their endeavors, especially in education, as Cardinal
John Henry Newman predicted they would in 1854. There is no
justification for this. The speculative thought process is the same for the
natural scientist and the metaphysical philosopher. Only the objects of
their inquiries are different. The natural scientist will seek the
implications of observed phenomena for as yet unobserved, but
potentially observable, phenomena. The metaphysical philosopher will
seek the implications of observed phenomena for unobservable
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phenomena. The natural scientist will want to confirm his conclusions
with demonstrations, but often will be certain enough to act upon them
before he has demonstrated their truth. The metaphysical philosopher
must rely either on logical necessity or on the consistency, coherence,
and compatibility of his inferences from observed phenomena.
The metaphysician, for example, logically can be certain a
creating and sustaining God exists, for otherwise there is no explanation
why anything exists. For his proof of other aspects of the unobservable,
however, the metaphysician must rely on the accuracy of his inferences
from the observable. Thus the ontological community of mankind can
be inferred from their observably unavoidable interdependency, and
the ontological moral obligation of each person to respect and
cooperate with every other, as occasions arise and permit, logically
follows from the fact of the ontological community. Thereafter, the
manner in which the unspecified general obligation to respect and
cooperate with others in a particular society is a matter of practical
reason, of fitting moral means to moral ends. It is the vocation of legal
professionals.
To summarize this all too summary reflection, legal education
can improve the competence and character of future legal
professionals, and indirectly their service to people, by making certain,
in pre‐legal studies, or at least in preliminary studies in law school, that
they understand the nature and purpose of law, its moral foundations,
and their own moral obligations in its articulation and application; and,
furthermore, legal academicians could improve and simplify the
effective promulgation of the law, thereby increasing laymen’s
knowledge of it and facilitating law study, law practice, and the judicial
process, by moving rapidly toward codification in modern Romanist
style.
Probably, Robert Maynard Hutchins would have agreed.

Of the Civil Code and Us 
This 1998 lecture may be my very best work. The
Louisiana Civil Code as it was originally is praised for its
organization, its simplicity of style and language, its
sound principles of good order, and its attunement to
the culture of the people. The changes made over the
years, however, abandon the notion of good order
based on the communitarian nature of man and reflect
high emphasis on individualism. The change is radical.

I. PREFATORY REMARKS
It is a joy and satisfaction to me to have been asked, so many
years after my retirement, to give one of the annual Tucker Lectures. I
hope my faculties have not so deteriorated with age that my effort will
be found wanting.
Colonel John H. Tucker, jr., and I had a stormy relationship. For
each of us the Louisiana Civil Code proved to be a consuming interest.
We, however, had different opinions on the historical origins of the


Originally published in 59 LA. L. REV. 301 (1998). The twenty‐sixth John H.
Tucker, jr., Lecture in Civil Law sponsored by the Center of Civil Law Studies,
Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University, 1998. Also published in
Spanish, translated by Adriana Correa, and with Introduction by Francisco
Reyes Villamizar, in 33 REVISTA DE DERECHO PRIVADO 25 (2004) (Colom.). Reprinted
with the permission of the Louisiana Law Review.
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substance of the law it projects, he thinking wishfully of it as French and
I knowing it to be Spanish. We also differed on a number of projects
amending the Code or contradicting its principles, he and I having
different conceptions of the legal order proper for the common good,
conceptions based on different appreciations of the relationship of
human beings to each other in the ontological order. I have no doubt
that, were he alive today, Colonel Tucker would not like my having been
asked to deliver a lecture in a series dedicated to his memory. But if he
now enjoys the Beatific Vision—as I hope he does—he will have come to
understand that I was right all along and will approve of what I have to
say tonight.
My first encounter with the Civil Code came in the spring of
1936, during my last year in bachelor of arts studies at Loyola University
in New Orleans. I had just learned that my mother’s ancestors once
owned half of Vermillion Parish and all the shell islands in the bay.
Wondering if any could be left for the current generation, I thought it
well to inform myself of the legislation relating to land transfers,
successions, and acquisitive prescription. Shortly thereafter, while
walking on the campus, I saw Paul M. Hebert and Joseph Dainow, the
one then dean and the other assistant professor at the Loyola Law
School. I introduced myself and inquired how I might go about my task.
They responded very kindly, even though they must have thought me
naive to think I could learn in short order all I needed to know about
land titles. Professor Dainow even invited me to his office and showed
me a copy of the Louisiana Civil Code, explained its general content and
organization, and took particular pains to call my attention to the
articles on acquisitive prescription. I went to work reading the Civil
Code.
A passion for logic and order and simplicity of statement had
been instilled in me at Jesuit High School and at Loyola. It was not long,
therefore, before I was able to appreciate the logic, coherence, unity,
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simplicity, and clarity of the Civil Code’s statement of the substantive
private law under which Louisianians lived. If my intention to study law
had not yet become irrevocable, it became so at this point. Appreciation
of the quality of the substantive law described in the Civil Code, of
course, had to await its systematic study, which I began the following
fall. To speak in metaphor, the shape of Miss Louisiana Civil Code was
enough to make her my mistress. Once I learned of her ancestry and
character, I found her all the more attractive.
Tonight I shall try to describe the shape of Miss Louisiana Civil
Code when I first met her and note some of the changes in her
appearance wrought by the attentions of men. Then I shall describe the
elements of her character in her pristine purity and note how they too
were altered in time. Finally, I shall speculate on what we may do to
heal and rejuvenate her and to teach ourselves to show her more
respect.

II. THE FORM OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
No part of a people’s law is more reflective of its culture than
what traditionally is known as its civil law, that is to say, its domestic,
private, non‐commercial, substantive law. A civil code is an attempt to
express the general scheme of this civil law in a reasonably brief, would‐
be complete, orderly, coherent, and integrated fashion. To accomplish
this there is of necessity a certain degree of abstraction, even to the
point that sometimes a principle will be stated as a rule, permitting its
application to a myriad of life situations readily recognizable as
occasions in which the principle should prevail. Language becomes
extremely important here. Simplicity of sentence structure and use of
layman’s non‐technical vocabulary, rather than legalese understood by
law professionals alone, should characterize it. Indeed, a civil code
should be so well written—not drafted—that even the layman reader
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should be able to recognize that the legal regime described there
conforms to and reinforces an order consistent with a proper
understanding of the relation of human beings to each other in the
ontological order and consistent with the culture of the people and the
physical environment in which they live.
In all these respects, we in Louisiana have been blessed by our
Civil Code. That we have had such a good one can be attributed
principally to two factors, that the French and Spanish peoples in
Louisiana at the time of their coming under United States domination
were determined to retain the Spanish civil law under which they had
lived, 1 and that by 1806, when it became necessary to prepare a digest
of that Spanish law in French and English in order to be able to preserve
it, the French Code Civil of 1804 and its last preliminary draft, the Projet
of 1800, were in existence to serve as models of organization and
verbiage.
I do believe that it would have been impossible for our local
jurists to compose an adequate digest or codification of the Spanish civil
law, in the short time available to them, if the French models had not
existed. Spain itself had nothing of the kind at that time. Indeed, it is a
tribute to Louisiana’s jurists that the first Spanish Civil Code, in 1889, in
some respects imitated their work. But using the French Code Civil and
1

Louisiana was under Spanish domination and law from 1769 to 1803, when
the Territory was acquired by the United States. Most of what is now the State
of Louisiana was carved out of the Louisiana Territory by the United States
Congress in 1804 and designated the Territory of Orleans. The determination of
the residents of the Territory of Orleans to retain the civil law portion of the
Spanish law in force is manifest in the Orleans Legislative Council’s Act of 1806,
vetoed by Governor W.C.C. Claiborne, identifying the laws in force in the
Territory of Orleans, and the manifesto of the Orleans Legislative Council dated
May 28, 1806. See NATIONAL ARCHIVES, ORLEANS TERRITORIAL PAPERS, VOL. VIII, and LE
TELEGRAPHE, June 3, 1806 (New Orleans), both reprinted in A.N. YIANNOPOLOUS,
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM, Appendix at 8‐9 (1971).

OF THE CIVIL CODE AND US

133

its Projet as models of form or organization and taking the very texts of
these documents where they expressed Spanish law as well as French or
could be altered to do so, our commissioners produced A Digest of the
Civil Laws in force in the Territory of Orleans in 1808. This “Spanish girl in
French dress” was the forerunner of our Louisiana Civil Code of 1825
and the Louisiana Revised Civil Code of 1870, which retained the French
form and essentially Spanish character.
The organization of the Louisiana Civil Code proper, then, is
similar to that of the French Code Civil. After a Preliminary Title on Law
in General, the entire subject matter of the civil law is divided into three
main parts, or Books. Book I treats of persons, the subjects of the law;
Book II, of permissible interests in things, or patrimonial goods, the
objects of the law; and Book III, of the acquisition, transfer, and loss of
rights to things. Today, a Book IV, on the Conflict of Laws, has been
added, 2 asserting Louisiana’s understanding of its jurisdiction and that
of other states and nations to have their laws apply to particular
persons, things, and events. I must note the inappropriateness of
making this subject a part of the Civil Code, even though its Preliminary
Title always contained a few articles on it. That inappropriateness lies in
this, that jurisdiction between the States of the Union properly is a
matter of United States Constitutional law, 3 though neither the
Congress nor the United States Supreme Court is very ready to provide
the norms; and jurisdiction between Louisiana and foreign nations is a
matter of international law, not of federal law or of Louisiana law. 4 It is
2

By 1991 La. Acts 923, redesignated Book IV, Articles 3515‐3549 by the
Louisiana State Law Institute.
3
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, the “full faith and credit” clause.
4
The advent of nationalism and positivism in the 19th Century brought with it
the tendency to reduce international law to national law applicable to
international situations. This is an unacceptable notion. Finding the appropriate
norms for legislative and judicial jurisdiction in international matters is no
different from finding the legislative or judicial norms for national or state law
in the absence of legislation.
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well for Louisiana to specify legislatively what it believes those
jurisdictional norms to be; but the subject matter does not belong in a
code specifying Louisiana’s civil law. Miss Louisiana Civil Code, then, has
been fitted with a disfiguring bustle. Here I will ignore the bustle and
comment on her shape proper.
To understand the organizational genius of the Civil Code, the
content of each book may be examined briefly. Book I, on persons,
contains the legislation on the general capacity of persons to act for
themselves; their representation if under the age of majority or found
by judgment of a court to be incapable of acting for themselves by
reason of a disability of mind or body; the laws on marriage and divorce;
those on filiation and adoption; and the laws on the personal
obligations of those related to each other by marriage, blood, or
adoption. All these laws, with few exceptions, are imperative laws, that
is to say, laws that may not be waived or modified by unilateral will or
by agreement because it is in the interest of good order or good morals
that they be observed. Book II describes the interest in things
permissible by law: ownership, the personal servitudes like usufruct,
use, and habitation, and servitudes over land. These laws, too, are
imperative, for it is in the interest of good order that the forms of
property be uniform and as simple as possible.
Book III is far more complex than Books I and II, but it has unity
in that its many legal institutions have a common denominator: all
relate to the acquisition, transfer, and loss of patrimonial things. Purely
interpersonal rights and obligations are not within its province.
Accordingly, its principal theme is liberty. One may act juridically as he
pleases, subject to restrictions by imperative law only in the interest of
good morals and the common good. Thus a testator may do as he
pleases with his assets as long as he disposes only of lawful kinds of
interests in things and realizes, for example, that a disposition violating
a descendant’s right of forced heirship will make it possible for that
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descendant to claim his legitime. But Book III not only provides rules on
testaments, it also provides suppletive laws on intestate succession, that
is to say, laws that relieve a person of the task of making a will if he or
she is satisfied with that distribution of his assets the law considers just
and in keeping with the wishes of most persons in the circumstances of
the deceased. In a similar fashion, one has the maximum liberty to
contract in patrimonial affairs, subject only to restrictions in the interest
of good morals and the common good. Spouses, for example, may enter
into a marriage contract specifying what interests each shall have in
their assets on hand at marriage or acquired thereafter and which of
them can manage or dispose of them; but if they fail to contract, or to
the extent they do not provide differently by marriage contract, the
suppletive law on the community of gains will apply, specifying rules
presumably just and hopefully in keeping with the culture and probable
wishes of the spouses. And similarly again, there are suppletive laws on
contracts in general and on sale, lease, loan, and all the usual contracts,
which fill in the details of contracts executed in more general terms. The
seller, for example, is presumed to warrant the object’s fitness for the
use intended if he and the buyer do not agree otherwise; and the lender
who does not demand interest when making the loan is, by suppletive
law, deemed to have intended to lend gratuitously, unless there is a
usage to the contrary. These suppletive laws render lengthy instruments
unnecessary, but lawyers and notaries tend to want to create the
illusion their fees are justified.
The remainder of Book III is largely of imperative character. The
obligations arising from lawful voluntary acts in the interest of another,
from unlawful acts causing injury or damage, and from displacements of
patrimonial assets without legal cause, are all subject to imperative
laws. Imperative also are those laws on preferences among creditors,
and those pertaining to the acquisition of un‐owned things by
occupation, the acquisition of things owned by others by possession for
a period of time, and the loss of rights to things by the passage of time.
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The Civil Code, then, brings order to complexity, and does so
very economically, in a short and relatively well written book. The
Louisiana Civil Code is not unique in this virtue, but it does possess it.
Having the opportunity to consult a relatively short and well written
book containing an official authoritative statement of the essential
principles and rules of a major segment of the legal order is an
advantage that our brethren of the Anglo‐American legal world have
not experienced with regard to their traditional civil law, evidenced as it
is by a multitude of judicial decisions in Common Law and Equity from
which one must extract at his peril the law’s principles and rules.
Indeed, whereas the Anglo‐American lawyer, when dealing with
unenacted Common Law and Equity, seeks always to find in his
sources—the previous decisions—a way to contend the “law” is as he
would wish it to be, and thus is seeking always to re‐invent the law, the
lawyer working with codified civil law should inquire how his situation
already has been ordered by the enacted law. If he finds the rule
applicable to his situation unjust, his remedy is not through the
judiciary, but through the legislature. The lawyer and the judge ought
not to participate in the making of law, though they of necessity
participate directly in its application and incidentally in its
interpretation.
This requires that a civil code be written simply, clearly, with
internal unity, and as free as humanly possible of all ambiguity. Here,
the language clarity, style, and simplicity of our Civil Code must be
appreciated. As mentioned before, the French texts of the articles of the
Digest of 1808 often were copied or adapted from the French Code Civil
or its Projet, whenever they expressed, or could be altered to express,
the Spanish law; and the elegance and directness of the French Code
Civil is acknowledged universally. The articles added to the Civil Code in
1825 often were taken from other French sources and usually of good
style. The articles written in French by our codifiers often were less well
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done, but graceful enough, and the English translations of the French
texts generally have been quite clear if less worthy in style.
The Civil Code, indeed, was written to be a book for the people,
not simply for lawyers and judges. This was true for the French Civil
Code, where a major purpose of codification was the proclamation of a
new uniform legal order to replace the vast multiplicity of local customs.
It was hoped every poilu would carry a copy in his pocket, to read it
during wine‐breaks, and thereby learn and appreciate the new civil law.
Here in Louisiana our original objective was to state the Spanish civil law
in force clearly and simply, in French and English, the languages in
predominant use, so that all the population might know what it was.
Published as they were originally, without titles to articles, without
cross‐references, case references, comments, and notes of various
kinds, our Digest and Codes were eminently readable documents.
The official edition of the Revised Civil Code of 1870 was a
relatively small hard bound volume of 514 pages in all, of which 438
were devoted to the Code’s Table of Contents and the text of the Code
itself, and 73 to an index. The volume contained nothing else. Not only
could it be carried and held in hand easily, but its articles in any Title or
Chapter could be read continuously, as a whole, as they should be, so
that the relationship of each article to the others as parts of the whole
could be understood.
Since 1980, however, the bulk, the format, and the extraneous
material content of the only available one‐volume edition of the
Louisiana Civil Code 5 have increased steadily. It is terribly bulky. There
are 1424 pages in the 1998 edition. The pages are large, measuring 9
13/16 inches by 7 5/16 inches. The texts of the Civil Code proper, with
extraneous material between those articles recently revised by the
Louisiana State Law Institute, occupy 742 double‐columned pages. They
5

LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE 1998, one of “West’s Louisiana Deskbooks.”
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will occupy more pages as the Louisiana State Law Institute continues its
work of revision. In addition to a Table of Contents for the entire
volume, which includes a complete Table of Contents for the Civil Code,
there is a so‐called Numerical Analysis of the Civil Code, really nothing
more than the Civil Code’s table of contents expanded by listing each
article by number and its unofficial, editorially added title. This uselessly
takes up fifty pages. Then there are other features too numerous to
detail completely: a table of changes made by the last legislative
session; a preface; two guides on the use of the publisher’s research
tools; a foreword; a discourse on the Civil Codes of Louisiana; a reprint
of Title 9 of the Revised Statutes, the so‐called Civil Code Ancillaries; and
various tables ad infinitum.
The various features mentioned above can have some utility,
and thus the volume is a useful single‐volume research tool. But they
complicate the effort to read the Civil Code as the simple, direct,
comprehensive, and readily understandable work it is intended to be.
No doubt having a big book, updated and republished every year,
coupled with a failure to publish a supplement with recent changes that
would make older editions usable, is to the financial advantage of the
publisher and to that of the editor, for then the number of volumes
sold, the price, and the royalties all increase.
The most objectionable features of this book from a theoretical
point of view, however, are two, and blame for them can be placed at
the feet of the Louisiana State Law Institute for recommending them
and at those of the Louisiana state legislature for adopting them. As the
Institute proposes revisions of portions of the Civil Code, it provides an
unofficial title for each article and an extensive commentary on such
things as the history of the text, the reason for the changes in wording,
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the previous text, and so
forth. The legislature enacts revisions of the Civil Code in bills that
contain not only the articles’ texts as revised, but also those distracting
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and sometimes inaccurate article titles and revisors’ comments. These
titles and comments are declared not to constitute part of the law, but
are published with them, and often their language would limit or
expand the meaning that the text of an article seems to have. Thus in
fact the articles themselves often no longer convey exactly the intended
meaning of the legislated law. 6 I know from my own experience, in the
seventies, as a member of the Council of the Louisiana State Law
Institute, that often the objection that a proposed article did not convey
its full intended meaning was countered with the decision to “take care
of that in the comment.” This is a sloppy way to write a civil code.
Indeed, when the Louisiana State Law Institute completes its revision of
the Civil Code it will be necessary to rewrite it so that its full meaning
can be derived from its texts, at least if we wish to have that great
benefit of codification, the restriction of positive law to the legislated
texts (except for the rarity of custom).

III. THE CHARACTER OF THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
My inquiry into the character of the Louisiana Civil Code will
seek answers to three questions: First, what institutions of our civil
government may specify the rules of the legal order we know as the civil
law? Second, what norms should inspire this specification of the civil
law? Third, what norms or principles of order do we find explicitly or
implicitly in the law specified in the Civil Code? Answers to the first two
of these questions can be discovered from an examination of the
articles in the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code on Law in General. The
answer to the third question must be extracted from the articles in
Books I, II, and III.

6

See, for example, Article 1575 as amended by 1997 La. Acts 1421 and
Comment (c).
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A. What Governmental Institutions May Specify the Law?
Under the Civil Code only legislation and custom may be
considered (positive) law. 7 Neither the Digest of 1808 nor the Civil
Codes of 1825 and 1870 permit the decisions of judges to be considered
declarative of authoritative rules of law. True, a judicial decision must
operate as a definitive interpretation and application of the law for the
particular parties in the particular controversy. That is its function. It
also may serve as a guide to what should or should not be considered a
proper interpretation or application of the law in future similar cases;
but it may not be considered to project an authoritative rule for the
future.
Very clearly then, according to the Civil Code, authoritative
positive law is always either legislation, a product of the judgment and
will of the people’s elected representatives in legislative assembly, or
custom, a product of the judgment and will of the people themselves
expressed implicitly and informally by their general acquiescence in
actions and solutions practiced uniformly over a period of time.
Of course legislation cannot be expected to be infallibly
complete. It is a human product. Custom sometimes arises to fill a gap,
but often neither legislation nor custom will supply the rule of order. In
that event the Civil Code directs a resort to equity. 8
B. The General Norms for Legislation and Custom
Are there any particular norms that legislators are to follow
when specifying the law? The Civil Code does not answer the question
explicitly, but I suggest it does implicitly. If judges are expected to
appeal to equity when the positive law is silent, then it must be because
that is the proper source of norms for the legal order. It would be
7
8

Articles 1‐3 as amended by 1987 La. Acts 124.
Article 4 as amended by 1987 La. Acts 124.
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inconsistent to require judges to appeal to equity in deciding an
unprovided for case and to free the legislature of the same norms.
Custom, too, being a form of law, must be subject to the same norms.
What, then, is the content of “equity”? The Digest of 1808, the
Civil Code of 1825, and the Revised Civil Code of 1870 as enacted all
defined “equity” as an appeal to “natural law,” “reason,” or “received
usages.” 9 The text came into existence for us with the Digest of 1808,
which, it is to be remembered, was a digest of the Spanish law in force.
It should be correct, therefore, to assume that “natural law” was
intended to have the meaning attributed to it in Spain, judgments about
proper human order both consistent with Spanish culture and based on
the understanding that all men ontologically—by creation—form a
community of mankind under God and, being a community, are obliged
morally to respect each other and to live and act cooperatively with
each other for the common good. It is to be distinguished from the
“natural law” of Enlightenment thought, which had not reached Catholic
Spain in 1803. This Enlightenment “natural law” did not acknowledge
the ontological community of mankind. 10 On the contrary, it regarded
each person as an individual unrelated to others in the order of being,
capable of association, but not members of an ontological community.
Thus respect for others and cooperation for the common good were not
morally obligatory, but only dictated for individual selfish concerns.
Positive law and other conventions thus were deprived of morally
obligatory force. Certainly it was the Spanish conception of natural law
and not that of the Enlightenment that the Civil Code recognized.

9

The Article was numbered 21 in the Digest and in the Civil Codes of 1825 and
1870 as enacted.
10
The classic formulations are those of Hobbes and Locke. Modern versions are
those of Rawls and Dworkin. For an excellent appreciation of the latter two
philosophers, see Bobby Jindal, Relativism, Neutrality, and Transcendentalism:
Beyond Autonomy, 57 LA. L. REV. 1253 (1997).
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In 1986, however, in revising the Preliminary Title of the Civil
Code, the Louisiana State Law Institute substituted the term “justice”
for “natural law” in the definition of “equity.” 11 The revisors’ comments
state the change in wording does not change the law and that it was
made because “natural law . . . has no defined meaning in Louisiana
jurisprudence.” This should not have been surprising, for “natural law”
is a philosophical concept, not one of positive law. Yet neither does
“justice” have a “defined meaning” in Louisiana jurisprudence. But
these comments do not themselves constitute law, and hence the
change in wording may be regarded as a change in the law. Indeed, I am
compelled to suspect that a change in the law was intended because
the revisors wished to render Louisiana law more secular. With “justice”
not having a definition in Louisiana law, it may be inferred that the
revisors wished to limit the content of “justice” to notions to be found
explicitly or implicitly in the positive law. The entire legal order,
therefore, would have to be considered the creation of legislators not
bound by any norms exterior to their collective will and “justice”
equated with the positive law and its implications. This positivistic
notion is very prevalent in other legislations. It is, however, an insult to
human dignity and to the Creator who gave men their dignity by giving
them free will and the intellectual capacity to discover norms for its
exercise.
The same attitude is reflected by other changes in articles
already revised by the Louisiana State Law Institute. Thus “natural
justice” has been eliminated; the concept of “duty” has been
suppressed because of its strong philosophical overtones;  and “moral
obligation” has been reduced to a second class legal obligation implied

11

Article 4 as amended by 1987 La. Acts 124.
Note of the Editor: what has been suppressed is: “binding in conscience and
according to natural justice.”
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by law. 12 I may note too that “public order and good morals” and
“public good” have become “public interest” 13 or “public policy.” 14 Both
terms are in the positivistic tradition, that is to say, that in which the
denial of the possibility of knowing anything to be true if it is not
demonstrable empirically leads to the necessity of inventing, or
positing, norms of action. “Interest” is used in the positivistic vocabulary
to designate a subjective advantage or preference, without concern for
its justification in terms of the ontologically indicated good. Indeed,
“policy” is positivism’s substitute for “principle” and “value” its
substitute for “good.” “Policy” is one’s norm or suedo principle because
he likes it and wills it. “Value” is what one chooses as a good for
whatever reason he may have. It need not have philosophical or
theological justification. The positivist posits his own criteria. He is his
own god.
The implications of this substitution of this so‐called “modern
usage” for words having traditional meaning consistent with an
understanding that morals are discoverable through philosophy and
revelation, has serious consequences. If nothing is ontologically either
good or bad, right of wrong, then the meaning of discussion and
dialogue have changed radically. No longer are they efforts to discover
what is true or good. They have become power struggles in which
assumed positions are paraded about in the hope they will be accepted.
And because nothing is either right or wrong, there is absolutely no
criterion for anything other than selfish gratification or advantage; and
then law cannot bind in conscience. Marriage, partnerships, indeed
conventions of all kinds, including political societies and their laws,
logically can be regarded only as arrangements for selfish concerns, to
be flaunted and ignored when selfish advantage is not achieved through
12

Article 1760 as enacted by 1984 La. Acts 331, replacing former Article 1757,
and Comments (d) and (e).
13
Article 7 as enacted by 1987 La. Acts 124, replacing in part original Article 11.
14
Article 1968 as enacted by 1984 La. Acts 331, replacing original Article 1985.
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them. A society cannot continue long in this way without being
regarded as an arena for competition and conflict resolution rather than
for the specification of a cooperative just order.
Possibly we in Louisiana had been saved from this positivistic
development until now because the Civil Code itself acknowledged
“natural law” and “natural justice” as sources of ordering principles for
the legal order. With the elimination of “natural law,” “natural justice,”
“public good,” and “good morals” from our legislation’s vocabulary,
however, there is danger that we too will join the ranks of the
positivists.
C. Principles Explicit or Implicit in Books I, II, and III
Before attempting to elaborate on some of the main principles
of order we find in Books I, II, and III of our Civil Code, it will be well to
state as succinctly as possible the general criteria by which I judge they
should be appraised.
In order for positive law to be morally good it must be founded
on the truth that otologically persons exist, not as autonomous
individuals, but as members of a community of all mankind. The source
of this community is a sharing in transcendence that all can experience
and that unites all in a whole of which each is a part. Accordingly each
person, as a part of the whole, is obliged morally to respect all others
and to live in a manner consistent with the good of all others, the
common good. In short, mutual respect and the common good morally
require the cooperation of all. All selfishness and exploitation of others
must be avoided. The function of law is to provide an order for living
that specifies how best this respect and cooperation may be realized,
taking into consideration the culture of the people, the environment in
which they live, and the fact that, as persons with God‐given capacities
for observation, reflection, and free will, they must not be denied self‐
determination except to the extent required by the common good.

OF THE CIVIL CODE AND US

145

1. Mutual Respect and Cooperation in Life the Fundamental
Principles
In my judgment, the principles of mutual respect and
cooperation for the common good underlie the entire Civil Code. I think
of them as being the essence of what Justinian meant by his first
precept of the law, honeste vivere, or live honorably. Indeed, I believe
they should be seen as including the remaining two of Justinian’s
precepts, alterum non laedere and suum cuique tribuere, or harm no
one and give everyone his own (or his share?). 15 But here I shall restrict
my remarks to institutions of the Civil Code falling more directly under
the precept honeste vivere, or live honorably, or show all men respect
and cooperate with all for the common good.
a. The Basic Institution Eliciting Cooperation
Nowhere is the principle of cooperation more clearly
manifested than in the institution known to the Romans, and to the
legally trained at least, as negotiorum gestio, the undertaking and
management of an affair for another without obligation or
authorization. I consider it the basic institution of the civil law. Under
the Civil Code of 1870, 16 the person who undertook such a performance
in the interest of another was entitled to his expenses and costs, even if
his endeavor was not successful, as long as his intervention and
performance might be judged objectively as “useful” to the other, to
use the Roman law word, or as “good management” for the other, to
use the phrase of the Civil Code itself. There was no requirement that
the other (“the principal”) be aware of the voluntary undertaking, or
that it be in conformity with his actual wishes, unless the gestor knew
them. The important criterion was the “utility” or “good management,”
or, in my words, the quality of cooperation judged objectively. Thus the
15
16

INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN (A.D. 533) 1.1.3.
Articles 2295‐2300.
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law recognized that even though the mode or instance of cooperation
had not been specified by legislation, custom, contract, or
authorization, and perhaps actually was not desired by the principal,
one was always to be encouraged to act for the benefit of another if his
action could be recognized objectively as an act of cooperation.
The French Code Civil extended the same range of application
to negotiorum gestio, 17 but the advent of individualistic thought
brought with it the restriction of the institution in other legislations.
Thus the Austrian Civil Code of 1811 18 required a necessity for acting to
prevent imminent damage to the principal’s interest, or an instance of
evident, paramount advantage to him, and the German Civil Code of
1900 19 required that the intervention be conformable to the actual or
presumable wishes of the principal. Recently the Louisiana State Law
Institute, its reporters and council apparently being largely of an
individualistic mind, have restricted the gestor to instances of
“necessity” of action to protect the principal unless the gestor first
obtains the principal’s consent. 20 In the latter case, of course, there
really is no case of negotiorum gestio, but actually a contract between
principal and gestor. Thus our Civil Code has been rendered less tolerant
of voluntary cooperation. Perhaps we should be thankful that the
lawfulness of voluntary cooperation is yet to be found at all in our new
negotiorum gestio rules, even if it is limited to instances of necessary
action to protect interests of the principal. The modern Anglo‐American
private law, being highly individualistic, though Anglo‐American public
law is not, does not even recognize the institution.

17

CODE CIVIL DES FRANÇAIS (1804), Articles 1372‐1375.
ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (1811), Articles 1035‐1040.
19
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH (1896), Articles 677‐687.
20
Articles 2292‐2297 as enacted by 1995 La. Acts 1041.
18
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b. Cooperation by Agreement—Contract
Only in negotiorum gestio does one find the generation of a
legal obligation otherwise than by provision of law or custom, on the
one hand, or by private juridical act on the other. The objectively well‐
conceived intervention by the gestor, coupled with its appropriate
execution, operate to convert the general moral obligation of
cooperation into a specific mode of cooperation that can be given legal
recognition. The Civil Code used to have an Article 1757 that testified
generally to the process. It in effect declared that unspecified moral
obligations were given no effect in law, but that once the moral
obligation was specified in some way it could have force as a natural
obligation or as a civil or legal obligation, depending on whether the
requirements of the law for civil obligations had been met. Today the
idea of a general moral obligation on ontological grounds has been
abolished and “moral obligation” exists only where the law posits it. 21
The matter is of considerable importance. Contract, for
example, derives its legal force from the consent of the parties, but it
derives its moral force from the fact it specifies how the general
obligation of cooperation shall be particularized in the particular
instance. Unless the contract results in the specification of a previously
existing moral obligation the parties are morally free to ignore it. Of
course the positive law may say there is a legal obligation, but all this
means is that the defaulting party may suffer consequences, usually
being compelled to pay damages or to suffer a damaged credit rating.
As a result, if we look to the positive law alone, a party is free to
calculate what course of action is more in his selfish interest and act
accordingly. Thus the certainty of transaction is lost, with attendant
damage to faith and trust in people in the daily affairs of life. We all
have perceived this in our time.
21

Articles 1756 and 1760, as enacted by 1984 La. Acts 331, and Comments
thereto.
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Recent developments in contract law here and internationally
reflect a consciousness of the essential necessity of making contracts
fairer and of demanding more good faith in agreement and
performance. Recent changes in the Civil Code’s articles on obligations
reflect that. 22 But in my mind, this is not enough. Persons will be well
advised to abide by the new norms for selfish reasons, but, unless the
law emphasizes that the law binds morally as well as legally, we can
expect to continue to encounter avoidance of the law or its breach
whenever selfish interests are strong enough, and the chance of being
made to suffer consequences remote. This is why I believe that the Civil
Code should state clearly the moral bases of negotiorum gestio,
contract, and all other institutions of which it treats. The law should
teach, as the Spanish law formerly in force emphasized. 23
c. Required Cooperation—Intra‐Family Obligations
The instances of negotiorum gestio and contract are instances
of voluntary cooperation among men. There are areas of life, however,
in which cooperation is required. Rarely is this true among strangers.
But among family members it is the general rule.
Thus the law imposes imperatively the general personal
obligations of husbands and wives to each other, and, in earlier days,
did not recognize divorce. Marriage, after all, is the foundation of family
life, and family is the foundation for civilization; but now divorce is easy.
Similarly, because children must be reared properly in terms of support,
discipline, and education in matters divine and secular, and their assets
administered, not only must parents do their part, but, in their absence,
blood relatives, even collaterals, are obliged to accept the tutorship of
children if the parent dying last has not appointed one. 24 Originally the
22

See for example, Articles 1759 and 2003 as enacted by 1984 La. Acts 331.
LAS SIETE PARTIDAS DE LA LEY (1348) 1.1.1, 4, 10.
24
Article 263 as amended by 1976 La. Acts 429.
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appointment of a tutor and his administration in principle required the
assent of a family meeting, that is to say, a meeting of members of the
minor’s extended family, 25 and thus emphasized the cooperation
expected of family members. Beginning in 1926 26 the family meeting
could be dispensed with, and in 1950 it was abolished, only a judge’s
approval being required. 27 Thus the extended family’s role in the rearing
of children has been reduced. Until 1972 ascendants and descendants
were obliged to render to each other all services (even personal ones)
required in the event of insanity, 28 but now under the civil law insanity
calls for support only, not personal care, and then only if funds are not
obtainable from other sources, another sign of the relaxation of
required family cooperation.
The principle of cooperation among family members was
evident also in the way in which the Civil Code provided for a sharing of
wealth among them. Although under Spanish law, evidenced by the
Digest of 1808, the matrimonial regime between husband and wife was
primarily a matter of contract, as it remains today, the community of
gains—a sharing of their earnings, fruits, and revenues, and things
acquired therewith—was a “necessary part” of every such marriage
contract. 29 This remained in effect in Louisiana only until 1825,
however, when for the first time the community of gains could be
avoided. 30 This was the first blow against family sharing of wealth.
Among blood relatives—and one must remember that in
Louisiana the notion of family was limited originally to legitimate
relatives by blood and only later expanded to include relatives by
25

Articles 281‐291, repealed by 1960 La. Acts 30.
1926 La. Acts 319 was the first of several.
27
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:651 (1950), repealed by 1960 La. Acts 31.
28
Article 229, par. 2, now repealed.
29
DIGEST (1808) 3. 5. 10.
30
Article 2305 of the CIVIL CODE OF 1825; present Article 2328 as enacted by
1979 La. Acts 709.
26
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adoption—wealth was indeed familial. Thus fathers and mothers by the
general rule even today enjoy inalienably the fruits and revenues of the
unearned capital of their minor unemancipated children, 31 which
revenue thus becomes available to the parents for their and their other
children’s needs. Parents have always owed support and education to
their children, of course, out of any means they have; 32 but over and
above this, by the general rule until 1979, as I interpret the Civil Code,
ascendants and descendants of every age owed each other alimony
when one was relatively in need and the other enjoyed more income
from property than he needed for himself. 33
Both need and ability to pay were relative to the circumstances
of the parties, 34 and the legitimate person seeking alimony did not have
to show inability to provide for himself. 35 No legitimate person was to
be expected to earn his living if his or her ascendants or descendants
enjoyed income from capital assets in excess of what they required for
their own living. Thus a young man or woman might very properly
choose to forsake money‐making and devote his or her time and talents
to other purposes, perhaps to charitable service, to free legal advice to
the poor, to theological, philosophical, literary, or scientific studies, or
simply to observing the beauties of nature along the beaches. Wealth
31

Article 223.
Article 227.
33
Article 229 must be interpreted against Article 227 and others. If the two are
interpreted alike, then there was no need for Article 227, for fathers and
mothers, as parents, are also ancestors. On the other hand, the Civil Code does
not seem to have favored giving one person rights to the earnings of another.
Thus the parental right of enjoyment in Article 223 never has extended to the
minor’s earnings. Similarly, Article 160, providing alimony for the divorced wife,
originally limited her claim to amounts “out of the property of her husband.”
Here certainly “property” was understood to mean income from property, and
not to include earnings, as is evident from the article’s amendment by 1916 La.
Acts 247 to read “property and earnings.”
34
Article 231.
35
No article so required.
32
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indeed was familial. Illegitimate children also could demand alimony
from their fathers and mothers and, after the death of either, from the
heirs of the deceased parent, out of the revenue of property inherited
by them, though only to the extent necessary to supply basic necessities
of life and only if they could not earn their own living and had not been
provided with capital sufficient for the purpose. 36 But today much has
changed, even legitimates are restricted in alimony claims to what is not
otherwise obtainable for minimal needs. 37 This, however, is only part of
the shift of Louisiana civil law from a very Catholic position on family
wealth to a more secular, individualistic one.
Perhaps we see the same thing in changes that have come
about over the years in our laws on successions and donations. There
can be no doubt that the succession laws in force in Louisiana during
our Spanish days and until 1825 were designed to keep wealth in the
legitimate blood family. If a deceased died with even only one
descendant, that descendant—or descendants—could claim four fifths
of all the deceased had acquired during life and not alienated for value.
If he left no descendants, but only ascendants, they were entitled to
one third of all the deceased had acquired during life. 38 In the latter
case, the inheriting ancestors eventually passed most of the property on
to their descendants, collaterals to the original deceased and members
of his extended family. Beginning in 1825, in spite of an impassioned
plea by Governor Roman to retain the old law, our legislators reduced
the forced portion. 39
Over the years it was reduced more and more and ancestors
were deleted from the ranks of forced heirs. Then in 1996 forced
36

Articles 240‐243.
Article 229 as amended by 1979 La. Acts 249 and Article 230 as amended by
1992 La. Acts 1014.
38
DIGEST (1808) 3.2.19 and 20.
39
CIVIL CODE OF 1825, Articles 1480, 1481.
37
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heirship was abolished except for children under twenty‐four years of
age or incapacitated and certain grandchildren. 40 Otherwise there is
complete liberty of testation. Family property has given way to
individual property.
The attacks on forced heirship began in 1920, when the first
trust legislation provided that the forced heirship laws would not apply
to assets placed in trust. 41 The Constitution of 1921 forbade the
“abolition of forced heirship,” but not its modification. 42 Thereafter
gradual modification was the rule. Opposition to forced heirship
increased after 1981, when illegitimates were given the same
inheritance rights as legitimates. 43 The final blow, however, came after
a determined and well‐financed campaign on the part of three groups in
the population. Persons of highly individualistic thought insisted on
freedom to do what they wished with “their” property, on freedom of
testation in order to control their heirs through threats of
disinheritance, and on the possibility of using the trust device to avoid
taxes. Then second spouses often wished to make certain their partners
in marriage could leave all their property to them and not have to leave
any to their children by prior marriages. Finally, there were those less
concerned with family property than with the profits they could gain
from the new law: the banks, institutions seeking large donations, the
attorneys for all involved, legislators seeking re‐election, and paid
lobbyists. The good of the family, the primary institution of society, was
given second place to high individualism and greed. Power over people

40

The current legislation is in Articles 1493 and 1495 as enacted by 1996 La.
Acts 77, 1st Ex. Sess.
41
1920 La. Acts 107, § 8.
42
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16 (1921).
43
The rules on intestate succession contained in Articles 880‐901 as enacted by
1981 La. Acts 919 for the first time made no distinction between legitimates
and illegitimates.
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replaced cooperation in life. The common good lost ground, for it was
not being recognized as the end of the law.
Forced heirship, it should be pointed out, when available to
descending heirs regardless of age, and especially when it covered most
of the deceased’s patrimony, gave offspring a certain immunity from
parental and ancestral tyranny. Societies in which forced heirship does
not exist are notorious as places in which children are threatened with
disinheritance if they fail to comply with the wishes of their elders in
such matters as marriage, education, and vocation in life. By being
assured of a goodly portion of the parent’s or ancestor’s wealth on his
or her death, offspring can feel more free to act and live in accordance
with their own aptitudes and judgments. This enforces human dignity as
well as the family character of wealth.
In spite of the Spanish civil law’s emphasis on wealth being
familial, however, children were not permitted to sue for a dowry,
marriage settlement, or other advancement on eventual inheritance.
The provision to that effect, yet in our Civil Code, 44 is testimony to the
cultural recognition of a moral obligation to make such advancements
to children during the life of the parent. This attitude, however, even
before the increasing reduction and final elimination of most instances
of forced heirship, had lost ground to a tendency to deny children the
enjoyment of what they had inherited even as legitime or forced
portion. Thus as early as 1844, by intestate succession law, the surviving
spouse was given a usufruct, until remarriage, over community assets
inherited by children of the marriage, no matter what their ages. 45 In
our own time, the spouse dying first was given the right to award the
surviving spouse a usufruct for life over community and separate
property inherited by any child of the deceased, whether or not a child
44

Article 228.
1844 La. Acts 152, § 2; Article 916 as enacted in 1870, now replaced by
Article 890 as enacted by 1996 La. Acts 77, 1st Ex. Sess.
45

154

ROBERT ANTHONY PASCAL

of the survivor. 46 Similarly, under the law on private trusts, the heir’s
inheritance might be placed under the control of a trustee and the
revenues from the legitime only paid to the forced heir. 47 Of course, the
current abolition of forced heirship for most instances goes far beyond
that.
I may mention briefly some of the other ways in which the
familial character of property once was evident in the law of succession
on death and donations. First of all, ancestors on death were presumed
to have intended to distribute their assets among their legitimate
descending heirs equally by roots, so that, unless the ancestor had
expressed a contrary intention, all property given during life to such
heirs had to be added to that remaining to the ancestor at death in
order to determine the mass to be divided among all the heirs. Those
who received more during the ancestor’s life would receive
proportionately less at his death. 48 Secondly, until 1844 spouses were
not ordinarily heirs of each other, the succession of a deceased
intestate going always to legitimate blood relatives if any existed. 49
Thus, family property did not cross over to the surviving spouse’s family
by intestate succession, whether land, businesses, or heirlooms.
Recalling that the community of gains was a necessary part of
every marriage contract until 1825 will help one understand this,
together with the fact that, inasmuch as in those days wealth usually
meant land or family enterprises, neither the family wealth nor the
family’s peace could be protected if part of it were to be inherited by
another family. For the same reason illegitimate children were not
allowed to inherit with legitimate children, but, if in need, they were
46

Article 890 as amended by 1990 La. Acts 1075.
Louisiana Trust Code, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9: 1841 and 1963.
48
Articles 1227‐1241 as enacted originally.
49
See DIGEST (1808) 3.2.1. 43‐57; CIVIL CODE (1825) Articles 911‐927. The change
was made of 1844 La. Acts 152, § 2, cited in footnote 45.
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always entitled to claim alimony from the heirs of the parent out of the
revenue produced by the inheritance. 50 Over the years all these notions
have changed, but I think to the detriment of families. Illegitimate
children now share intestate succession with legitimate children, 51 even
if this results in a partition destroying a family’s home or economy.
Surviving spouses inherit deceased spouses’ shares of community
property if there are no descendants. 52 Thus parents and other
ancestors and collaterals never succeeded to a deceased intestate’s
share of community property. As to separate property, the intestate
inheritance of parents when brothers and sisters exist has been reduced
to a mere usufruct. 53 The presumption that an ancestor wished to treat
his descendants equally has all but vanished. 54
One result of all this, to the benefit of attorneys and notaries, is
that almost everyone now must think seriously of writing a will.
Formerly our suppletive laws on matrimonial regimes, successions, and
donations were such that most people did not have to think of express
marriage contracts and wills. The suppletive laws provided for results
that were fair and in keeping with family responsibilities, sensibilities,
and expectations. Now there is much uncertainty and much tension,
and certainly an opening to injustice to heirs by reason of rash action by
people in old age or under the influence of second spouses, unmarried
partners, or donation‐seeking institutions.

50

Articles 917‐924 and 241‐245.
Article 888 as enacted by 1981 La. Acts 919.
52
Article 889 as enacted by 1981 La. Acts 919.
53
Article 891 as enacted by 1981 La. Acts 919.
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Article 1235 as enacted by 1981 La. Acts 77 restricts the demand for collation
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d. Respect for the Person

The Civil Codes originally showed tremendous respect for the
individual person as a creature with God‐given capacities of intellect,
judgment, and will. Indeed, these capacities of intellect, judgment, and
will, themselves a consequence of the human being’s consciousness of
his own consciousness, define personhood. And whereas the
membership of each person in an ontological community of mankind
obligates each to seek the common good, it is the fact of individual
personhood that requires the community of mankind to respect each
individual’s capacities for self‐determination to the extent the common
good does not dictate otherwise. Thus it is that, under the Civil Code, a
person of the age of majority, and not declared incapable of acting for
himself by a judgment based on criteria declared in the legislation, may
not be denied the management and disposition of his assets by other
persons of their own volition. There simply is no provision in the Civil
Code allowing this. Minors’ and interdicted persons’ affairs are
controlled by parents, tutors, and curators whose representations and
administrations must follow general laws on the subject. 55 Under the
laws on trusts, however, anyone transferring property (the settlor) to
another (the beneficiary) may place a third person (the trustee) in
charge of the administration of that property and the disbursement of
its revenues in accordance with the express wishes of the settlor with
few restrictions in law. 56 In this way, the judgment and will of the
beneficiary or his legal representative are superceded by those of the
settlor. A person of age, therefore, might be hampered in the
integration of the management of his affairs, and so might the tutor or
curator of an incapable person be unable to integrate the incapable’s
assets to best advantage. Moreover, property given a minor in trust
does not become subject to the enjoyment of his parents for the good
55
56

Articles 216, 221, 246, 354, and 389.
Louisiana Trust Code, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:1731, 1761, 1781, 1801, and 2061.
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of the family as a whole. 57 The private will of the settlor is permitted to
supercede laws established to strengthen the family for the common
good.
I would like to note that my most fundamental objection to the
trust as introduced into Louisiana law is that the beneficiary or his legal
representatives may not modify or terminate it. Had modification or
termination of the trust by the beneficiary been accepted by the
Louisiana State Law Institute and our Legislature, that objection would
have been removed. The trust, in that case, would have amounted to no
more than a plan for investment and management that, in most cases,
probably, the beneficiary or his legal representative would have been
well advised to honor. This is, and always has been, the general rule in
England, the origin of the trust. It does more honor to the dignity of the
human being by allowing him to make patrimonial decisions for himself.
It is true that some income tax advantages would have been lost by
giving the beneficiary or his legal representative such control, but I for
one see no reason to allow a tax advantage to those who are given
assets in trusts. The tax burden should fall equally on all with equal
revenue, whether realizable immediately or not. 58
My second objection to the trust as enacted in Louisiana is that
the trust was defined in Anglo‐American law terms—placing “legal title”
in the “trustee” and “beneficial interest” in the transferee or
“beneficiary”—whereas the same result could have been accomplished
by acknowledging that property given to one person could be subjected

57

No provision of legislation so provides expressly, but it follows from Sec.
1724 of the Trust Code (LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1724) under which neither the Civil
Code nor other legislation may be invoked “to defeat a disposition sanctioned .
. . by this Code.”
58
All this was discussed at length in the lecturer’s article, Of Trusts, Human
Dignity, Legal Science, and Taxes, 23 LA. L. REV. 639 (1963).
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to management and control by another. 59 Indeed the trust was so
defined in Louisiana’s first trust legislation 60 and in effect was so
defined in the Uniform Gift to Minor’s Act. 61 The argument for the
Anglo‐American definition was one toward uniformity with the trust
definition in other States, and generally I favor uniformity in laws from
State to State. But as long as we retain our traditional concepts of
ownership and its modifications we should use a definition of trusts
compatible with them. Probably the motivation of those who prevailed
was not simply uniformity of law, but the prospect of rendering easier
the introduction of other concepts of Anglo‐American property law that,
indeed, have been introduced gradually over the last thirty‐four years. I
shall speak of them later in this lecture.
e. Wealth is for the Living
The Civil Code contains or contained a number of rules that may
be classified under a general principle that “wealth is for the living.” On
reflection, you will agree with me that this principle is in reality one
demanding respect for the living person and thus cooperation with him.
The first rule that I should like to mention is that even now
under the Civil Code no one is permitted to make a donation of all his
property that will be effective before he dies. 62 He must reserve to
himself an amount sufficient to provide sustinence for himself.

59

Id.
1920 La. Acts 107.
61
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:735 et seq. Replaced by the Uniform Transfers to Minors
Act, LA. REV. STAT. § 9: 751 et seq., which, however, uses the Anglo‐American
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62
Article 1498.
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The second rule, related to the first, is that one may not dispose
of future assets, except by marriage contract. 63 One might indeed regret
such a disposition.
The third rule, theoretically yet in effect, is that all testamentary
dispositions remain revocable. 64 No one during life is to bind himself
irrevocably as to the manner in which his patrimonial assets will be
disposed of at his death.
Similarly inspired was the fourth rule, that one might not
dispose of the naked ownership of any asset while retaining its usufruct,
that is to say, its use and its revenues. 65 Such a disposition, after all,
would be the equivalent of an irrevocable legacy. But this rule no longer
is in effect. Its first diminution came through the Trust Code of 1964,
under which one establishing a trust might give another the naked
ownership or principal interest and reserve to himself the usufruct or
the income interest. 66 Finally in 1974 the Civil Code itself was amended
to permit one to donate the naked ownership of particular things to
another and reserve the usufruct to himself without employing the
trust. 67 Thus, one is now permitted to make the equivalent of
irrevocable legacies. Having been given this power, one might, by
making a number of donations of the naked ownership of particular
things, effectively achieve the equivalent of an irrevocable will. Is this
for the common good? Or will it give power to second and third
spouses, to avaricious children, to the detriment of the donor?
Next, under this rubric of “wealth is for the living,” I should like
to mention that our Civil Code yet provides a fifth and most important
rule, that only persons already in being, that is to say, born or at least
63

Articles 1528, 1532.
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Article 1533 before amendment by 1974 La. Acts 210.
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conceived, may receive things by donation. 68 Perhaps this is the
strongest rule evidencing the principle “wealth is for the living.” But
here again the Trust Code has come to the rescue of those who believe
they should be able to do with “their property” what they wish and
thereby impose their own schemes of order on their transferees in
perpetuity. Thus the Trust Code of 1964 provided that a “class” of
persons, consisting of one’s children or grandchildren, or both, born and
unborn, might be designated beneficiaries of the income or principal, or
both, of assets in trust. 69 This was bad enough. Such a trust might last
for many years, for it could continue until the last member of the class,
whether child or grandchild, died. Thus if one of my good friends, who
already has eleven children and thirty‐three living grandchildren, and
undoubtedly will have more by birth or adoption, established a trust for
them as a class, the trust would last until all his children and
grandchildren, born or yet to be born or adopted, had died. But our
gifted legislators now have managed to give settlors of trusts yet more
power to dominate the future. Under legislation of 1997—not
sponsored by the Louisiana State Law Institute in this instance—a
settlor may establish a trust for a class of persons consisting of all his
“descendants in the direct line,” whenever born to the end of time, or
all his “descendants in any collateral line” (yes, that is the language)
whenever born to the end of time, or any combination of these persons,
as long as at least one member of the class is in existence on the
creation of the trust. 70 How many centuries or millennia will trusts of
this kind continue? What computer will be able to determine the
interests of the perhaps thousands or millions who eventually will be
beneficiaries of the settlor? Will banks, who usually become substitute
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Articles 1472‐1474.
Louisiana Trust Code, LA. REV. STAT. § 1891 as enacted in 1964.
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trustees if not named original trustees, be happy with this legislation?
Of course they will, as long as the trusts can pay their fees.
Finally, under this same rubric, I should like to mention a sixth
rule of the Civil Code, that one transferring ownership of a thing to one
person may not provide that, at some time in the future, ownership
should shift to a third person. This in our law has been called a
prohibited substitution. 71 In the Equity side of the Anglo‐American law
such shifting interests have been recognized provided that, as of the
time of the act of disposition, it can be known certainly that the shift
will occur, if at all, within the life of a person in being and identifiable
through the instrument of disposition plus twenty‐one years. There are
various modifications of this “Rule Against Perpetuities” in various
Anglo‐American jurisdictions, but this is the classic rule, settled by
judges “as a matter of convenience.” Wags rationalize this rule by
asserting every Englishman believes his children unfit to manage and
preserve property, but has great faith that his grandchildren will be fully
capable, rational, and prudent on reaching twenty‐one years of age. We
do not have such a rule in the Civil Code because the Code does not
allow shifting interests.
From the very beginning, however, the Trust Code allowed the
settlor to provide for some substitutions. Thus it allowed the settlor to
direct that in the event a beneficiary died intestate and without
descendants, his or her interest would belong to the other members of
the class. 72 Today, however, the settlor may provide for substitute
beneficiaries in certain cases, and sometimes the substitute beneficiary
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Article 1520 as enacted originally. As amended by 1962 La. Acts 45, the
article now asserts substitutions in trusts are allowed to the extent provided in
the Trust Code.
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Louisiana Trust Code, LA. REV. STAT. § 9: 1895 as enacted in 1964.
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need not be identifiable until the death of the principal beneficiary. 73
We have gone beyond the limits of the Anglo‐American Rule against
Perpetuities.
Is it not correct to say, now, that the notion “Wealth is for the
living” has been transformed into “Wealth is for the dead to control to
the end of time”? Have our legislators thought of human dignity? Have
they thought of the common good?

IV. CONTRITION AND REDEMPTION
The picture I have painted of the changes wrought in the form
and substance of our Revised Civil Code of 1870 is not a pretty one. But
the disorder introduced into our civil law, and therefore into our lives, is
real, and I have wanted to note it particularly so that some might realize
we must redeem ourselves.
Some of the changes I referred to as matters of form could be
remedied easily by legislative action. Certainly it would be easy to
remove from the Civil Code the new Book IV, on the Conflict of laws,
and give it separate existence as the Louisiana Conflict of Laws Code. It
would be easy to publish revisors’ comments separately from the Civil
Code, if they are to be preserved at all, and to delete all titles to articles,
in order to emphasize that only the texts are law. Of course I realize we
might not be able to prevail upon publishers and editors to do this, for
they see financial profit in the present practice. We must do what we
can, too, to reduce the detail often found in some recent amendments
to the Civil Code. A well written Civil Code should concentrate, as nearly
as possible, on reducing all statements of rule to fairly simple
specifications of principle so as to permit intelligent application
73

Louisiana Trust Code, LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1973 and 1978 as amended by 1997
La. Acts 254.
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according to circumstances and not bind judges to detail that can hinder
the accomplishment of justice. In short, we should seek to do what we
can to make the Civil Code the people’s law book and give laymen,
students, lawyers, and judges a better opportunity to appreciate our
basic plan of civil order and have it realized in action.
Of great concern to all of us, however, should be the fact that so
many of the amendments to the Revised Civil Code of 1870 have
demonstrated a triumph of individualism and its corollaries, selfishness,
greed, and power over the lives of others. The spirit of cooperation in
living, proper to a legal system meant to order the lives of men to their
common good, has been all but eliminated, as has been all reference to
moral norms for the law. Our Civil Code has been rendered profoundly
secular, positivistic, and individualistic.
A. Whose Fault Is It?
The fault is ours, collectively to be sure, and individually in
particular degrees. Often the Louisiana State Law Institute, created to
provide guidance to the Legislature, has proposed this legislation, and
on occasion it has done the Legislature’s bidding even after it had
judged what the Legislature demanded to be inconsistent with the
common good. Some law professors collaborated in these bad reforms
and attorney members of the Louisiana State Law Institute Council
often have acted as lobbyists for their clients in spite of knowing the
common good to lie elsewhere. I have had personal experience of what
I say here.
None of this should surprise us. Generally speaking, in all
aspects of society individualism has replaced the community of mankind
in the thinking of most persons, and thus selfishness has come to
replace the sense of moral obligation to cooperate with others for the
common good.
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B. What Can We Do?
This virus of individualism and selfishness will not be overcome
except to the degree we can bring people at large to recognize that we
are ontologically a community of mankind under God and for that
reason have the moral obligation to seek the common good. This is a
formidable task in an age in which each person, regardless of
intelligence and education, has a voice—or vote—in the direction of
formulating the plan of order we call law. In retrospect, the Irish monks
who brought civilization back to continental Europe after the
destruction of the Christianized Roman Empire had an easier time, for
by convincing the elite in power they could bring proper order to the
lives of their subjects. Now we must convince the people at large so that
they will demand good order from their law‐making representatives.
We must start somewhere, however, and I suggest that law
faculties could do much. Our graduates, after all, dominate the law‐
teaching process, the law‐making process, the judicial process, and the
executive offices as well. We may not be able to control effectively the
pre‐law‐school preparation of those who would wish to study law,
though I suggest we could go so far as to make certain all who enroll
have had something approaching a liberal education, that is to say, one
in which they have been required to become familiar with what people
have learned over the ages of the nature of man and the relation
between God and men and among men in the ontological order. Studies
in business, economics, engineering, the natural sciences, agriculture,
and music are all very well and good, but I wonder how much such
studies help one to understand humanity, the basis of morals, and the
nature, function, and purpose of law.
I do not believe we could attain such an objective in the
foreseeable future, but we could insist on a program of study in law
school that would help students, the future lawyers, legislators, judges,
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and executives, understand the necessity of working with law as an
instrument for ordering the form of cooperation for the common good
and resisting every effort to regard law as an arena for competition for
selfish interests. Today too little attention is given to that. The
concentration of academic effort often seems to be mainly on the
manipulation of legal materials to reach objectives of the client or those
of the judge. It is legal rhetoric neutral as to truth and purpose. The
emphasis is not on the structure of the legal order, its underlying
principles, its fitness for its proper purpose, and the roles of the
legislator, lawyer, and judge as priests of good order.
Finally, I would like to suggest that the law faculties should
demand a reform of the Louisiana State Law Institute. Probably no other
group in our society is in a better position to do so. And the Institute
must be reformed in several ways. First, it must not be allowed to
remain a self‐perpetuating entity. Second, the governing council should
be re‐composed to include educated non‐lawyers: philosophers,
theologians, social workers, economists, educators and ordinary people.
By all means lawyers on the Council must not be allowed to vote when
their clients’ affairs would be affected by the legislation proposed.
Third, the Institute must be required to publish its proposals a
reasonable time before it gives them its final approval so that the public
will be able to voice its approval or disapproval and make
recommendations. Fourth, the Institute must be forbidden by law to
alter its recommendations once they have been made to the
Legislature. Once its recommendations have been made, its work on the
project should be considered at an end. Colonel Tucker helped create
the Institute to help the Legislature enact better laws. It must not
permit itself to become the servant of the Legislature for the enactment
of laws less good than those it has proposed.

Of Trusts, Human Dignity, Legal Science, and Taxes 
In 1959 the Louisiana State Law Institute appointed me
advisor to the Institute’s Reporter and his committee
charged with writing a new private trust estates law. I
decided to concentrate my efforts on two essential
points, to define the private trust in terms compatible
with our own civil law, and to give the beneficiary or his
representative the right to modify or terminate the
trust. Neither proposal was accepted by the Reporter
and his committee or by the Council of the Institute. At
that point I resigned my position, wrote the article
below, and gave a copy to each member of the
Louisiana legislature. My campaign was not successful.

The legislature of the State of Louisiana has directed that a
revision of the Trust Estates Law be prepared for its consideration. 1 In
this article the writer shall express his recommendations and the
reasons which underlie them. The observations to be made fall into
three categories: the substance of the trust and the uses to which it


Originally entitled “Of Trusts, Human Dignity, Legal Science, and Taxes:
Suggested Principles for a Louisiana Trust Estates Law,” and originally published
in 23 LA. L. REV. 639 (1963). Reprinted with the permission of the Louisiana Law
Review.
1
The Louisiana State Law Institute received an initial appropriation for this
work in 1958. See ELEVENTH BIENNIAL REPORT OF THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE
(May 8, 1960).
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should—and should not—be put; its form or technical structure; and its
tax consequences.

I. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TRUST
What Is an Express Private Trust?
The present Trust Estates Law 2 declares an express private trust
is created when one person (the settlor) transfers legal title to property
to another (the trustee) for his own benefit or that of a third person
(the beneficiary). 3 This statement conforms to both the historical origin
and the present technical formulation of the express private trust in
Anglo‐American law. Functionally, however, as the writer has elsewhere
explained, 4 the express private trust is a property regime, a
dismemberment of ownership, in which control and management are
separated from beneficial right. 5 Only the person who is at the time
owner of the property or patrimonial right may create the trust. He may
do so for his own benefit, transferring only the power of control and
management to the trustee and retaining the beneficial rights in the
property; or he may create the trust for the benefit of others,
transferring to them the beneficial rights in the property subject to its
control and management by the trustee. 6 It is a fiduciary institution
pure and simple. The trustee in principle never has a beneficial interest
in the property interest over which he has management and control. He
2

LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1791‐2212 (1950).
Id. at § 9:1811, as amended, 1952 La. Acts 209, § 2.
4
Especially in Robert A. Pascal, The Trust Concept and Substitution, 19 LA. L.
REV. 273, 274‐76 (1959).
5
See LAWSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PROPERTY 9, 10, 77 (1958).
6
Anglo‐American law, but not Louisiana law, recognizes a third manner in
which a trust may be created: the settlor may declare himself trustee of his
property for another, thus transferring beneficial interests and retaining
control as a fiduciary for the beneficiary.
3
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is not a mandatary, nevertheless, for his authority and duties are
dictated by the settlor within broad limits imposed by law, and not by
the person who is to have the beneficial interest in the property subject
to the trust.
Is the Express Private Trust Consistent With the Rest of Louisiana
Property Law?
To this question the answer must be that it is not. Understood
and defined functionally rather than in technical Anglo‐American terms,
the express private trust can be fitted into Louisiana law without formal
difficulty; 7 but the separation of control and interest, which is of the
essence of the private trust, is very little favored; and when it is
permitted it is always by the body social acting through general laws
prescribing both the occasion and the form; 8 never otherwise than in
express private trusts is one individual allowed to deprive another
individual of control of his property and dictate the rules of its
administration. 9
Basic Louisiana property law seeks to give to the owner
maximum control over his patrimony. This is the spirit and principle
7

See especially Pascal, supra note 4, in which this is demonstrated in
connection with the supposed, but in fact unjustified, antagonism between
trusts and the prohibition against substitutions.
8
Paternal authority, tutorship, curatorship of interdicts, administration of
successions by administrators and executors are the most common examples.
The phenomenon of separation of control from interest is also present in the
business corporation, but here the question is avoided legally by treating the
stock share, rather than what it represents, as the object of ownership.
9
An apparent, but unreal, exception is the custodianship of money or securities
donated to minors under the Gifts to Minors Law, LA. REV. STAT. § 9:735‐742
(Supp. 1962), added by 1958 La. Acts 195, §1. This institution, however, is really
a trust defined in modern terms, the minor being the beneficiary owner and
the custodian the administrator of the property. Again, see Pascal, supra note
4, at 274‐75.
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implicit in our law which provides for management or control of one’s
property by another only through law or through his consent and makes
mandate essentially revocable. This is the basis of the general rule that
an owner in indivision may always demand a partition. This is the spirit
and principle of the prohibition against substitutions, for he who must
preserve property for another is denied the powers of disposition and
free use which belong to an owner. Nevertheless it is true that this
principle is not applied as an absolute. It is made to give way to more
important considerations under certain circumstances.
Obviously the property of minors and mental deficients must be
placed under the authority of others. Control over an insolvent’s assets
may be denied him and given to syndics or trustees to insure the orderly
discharge of his obligations to his creditors. Through the fiction of the
corporate personality, or perhaps more accurately, by recognizing a
stock share as a thing rather than a right to things, a group of non‐
owners may be given very substantial control and management of the
stockholders’ property and the individual stockholder denied the usual
right to partition. Partition may be denied to heirs for a limited time,
and it is always denied to usufructuaries as against the naked owners
and vice versa. A mandate may be regarded as irrevocable if used as a
security device. Indeed, even a substitution will be permitted for not
longer than a lifetime, though it will then be regarded not as a
substitution but as a dismemberment of ownership into naked
ownership and either usufruct, use, or habitation. 10 The question
whether the trust is to be tolerated, then, is not to be answered simply
by observing that the trust qua trust seems contrary to the basic
principle that the owner should have control over his property. Rather is
the question to be answered in terms of the advantages and
10

LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1522 (1870). It is interesting to note that Bracton regarded
the life estate—remainder disposition, which corresponds roughly to our
usufruct‐naked ownership arrangement, as a substitution. See PLUCKNETT, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 560‐61 (5th ed. 1956).
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disadvantages incident to permitting this departure from the accepted
basic principle and the manner in which it may be created. And this
question, in turn, must be answered in the light of the legitimacy of the
uses to which the device will be put.
Are There Advantages To Permitting Private Express Trusts?
Again an unequivocal answer can be given. Yes, there are
reasons for which a trust might be used very legitimately, and therefore
there is good reason to have a trust law in Louisiana. Some good uses of
the trust may be mentioned. First of all the trust often may be a better
solution than the ordinary usufruct‐naked ownership arrangement
where the purpose to be achieved is a present utilization of property by
one person and its subsequent full enjoyment by another. Without the
trust the naked owner often finds himself prejudiced by the
usufructuary’s inadequate management or upkeep of the tangible
property or his inability to return the money which he enjoyed in
imperfect usufruct. The naked owner’s lot is especially difficult if the
usufructuary has not been required to give security, or if the
usufructuary or his representatives be persons against whom he would
be reluctant to enforce his right for family or other considerations. If the
property were in trust, and the beneficiaries entitled either to the
usufruct and naked ownership or to the income and principal thereof
subject to the trust, the naked owner or principal beneficiary might be
better protected by the trustee’s lack of personal interest and his
obligation to preserve and to augment the value of the property for the
eventual beneficiary as well as to make it productive for the income or
usufruct beneficiary.
What is said here concerning the advantage of trusts in
instances of usufruct‐naked ownership dispositions applies with equal, if
not more, force to dispositions on suspensive or resolutory conditions
or on terms. Such dispositions are relatively rare in Louisiana, but
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perhaps they are rare precisely because they are inconvenient to the
owner pending their eventual outcome, and the trust would minimize
this inconvenience.
Again, ordinarily property owned in terms of usufruct and naked
ownership cannot be converted to other forms of assets or investments
without the cooperation of both parties. Neither the usufructuary nor
the naked owner may compel the other to consent to a conversion of
assets. When property is in trust, on the other hand, the trustee can be
given the power and ordinarily has the duty to convert the trust assets
into property of a kind which will best protect the interests of the
several beneficiaries. In the same connection it may be observed that
the trust also makes practicable the avoidance of one of the
consequences of imperfect usufruct, namely, the realization of all
capital gains by the party presently entitled rather than by the party
eventually entitled. To say the same thing in other words, whereas the
imperfect usufructuary benefits from capital gains, and not the naked
owner, in a trust with income and principal beneficiaries, the capital
gains belong to the principal beneficiary and not to the income
beneficiary. To change the rules of imperfect usufruct to give the naked
owner the same advantage would be possible in theory, but impossible
in practice. In order to avoid otherwise insurmountable tracing
problems it would be necessary to make the imperfect usufructuary a
fiduciary of the naked owner; and this would render his position almost
indistinguishable from that of a fideicommissarius. The trust device
simplifies the whole matter by putting the fiduciary onus on a third
disinterested party, the trustee. Of course, it is not suggested that
usufruct‐naked ownership interests should not be given subject to
trusts; indeed trusts with usufruct‐naked ownership beneficiaries have
been and are yet being written in Louisiana. Much less so is it suggested
that usufruct‐naked ownership arrangements outside of trust, including
imperfect usufruct, should be forbidden. There are times and
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circumstances in which only one of several possible arrangements may
be satisfactory, not any one of them, and all should be permitted.
Another important use of the trust would be to facilitate a
simpler and more unified management of property to be transferred to
minors or interdicts and persons of full capacity as owners in indivision.
Without the trust the only solution, and often a less satisfactory one,
would be through incorporation.
The trust can also be used wisely to provide a management of
property for minors and interdicts where it appears likely either that the
prospective tutors or curators would be insufficiently capable, or that
the rules on administration of property by tutors and curators would be
too restrictive, to assure the best employment of the property. In this
connection, however, the trust is no longer so much in need. Recent
changes in the law of tutorship and curatorship, especially on
investments by the tutor or curator, 11 do much to make the use of
trusts for the benefit of incapables unnecessary. Each situation must
receive separate appraisal.
Not to be ignored is the possibility of providing a regime of
property management for persons who may not in fact have the
aptitude for such. Widows and children are the age‐old examples. Yet,
as shall be developed below, it would be a crime against the dignity of
man to permit such a trust to be interminable by the beneficiary or, in
any event, to remain indestructible too long. A trust for this purpose
should be regarded as a suggested plan of investment and
management, to be rejected by the beneficiary, the actual party at
interest, if he or she prefers.

11

LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 4269, 4554 (1960) require the tutor and
curator to adhere to the “prudent investor rule.”
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Most significantly, the trust could be, and should be, used to
make possible dispositions in favor of unborn persons, at least in
instances in which there is a social and familial need for them. Present
law, for example, makes it impossible for a person to make a legacy to
grandchildren born and to be born. Anglo‐American experience testifies
to the troublesomeness of such donations unless made in trust. In trust,
however, they cause no difficulty, for the income from the property can
be paid to the grandchildren existing at any time and the final
determination of the shares in the principal can be made to await the
day on which the total number of grandchildren is ascertainable.
Similarly, but for somewhat different reasons, an inter vivos
disposition to one’s children born and to be born could and should be
permitted if in trust. Gift and estate tax laws encourage a person to
dispose of his property gradually during life rather than on death. The
reason is a social one, the encouragement of the distribution of wealth.
Yet outright donations to living children, for example, often would work
to the prejudice of those later born or, in Louisiana, give rise to
incidents for collation to satisfy the legitime of the later born children.
By placing the donations inter vivos in trust for the children born and to
be born the donor can satisfy his legitimate desire to treat all children
equally, and incidentally avoid collation problems. Possibly it would be
unwise, at least at this moment, considering Louisiana law’s long
prohibition against dispositions to the unborn, to permit more than
these two particular kinds of class gifts; but at least these two should be
permitted now.
What Abuses Ought To Be Avoided?
Primary Abuses: Indestructibility and Indivisibility.—From the
preceding section it is evident that the separation of control and
interest which the trust device affords can at times be of great utility
and practical advantage. Yet this separation of control and interest can
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be abusive. In the opinion of the writer it is abusive in principle
whenever the beneficiary may not terminate the trust and take
personal charge of the property of which he has the beneficial interest.
In short, the trust established for the benefit of another than the settlor
should be regarded as the establishment of an investment and
management program for the property transferred to the beneficiary,
which program the beneficiary may reject or modify as he chooses; and
the trust established by the settlor for his own benefit should always be
subject to modification or termination by him.
The general American law on trust is to the contrary, and so is
the present Louisiana Trust Estates Law. Under the generally accepted
American rule and under the Louisiana Trust Estates Law a trust is
indestructible by the beneficiary unless the settlor has given him the
power to terminate it; 12 and under the Louisiana Trust Estates Law,
though not under the rule generally prevailing in America, unless the
trust instrument so provides, the trust cannot be terminated “even
though the settlor, trustee, and beneficiary”—the only parties possibly
at interest—”so desire and consent thereto.” 13 Such rules, the writer
submits, are abusive because they violate the dignity of the human
person. Men have reason and free will. It is proper to the nature of the
human person, therefore, that he should be allowed to decide for
himself how he should live, and this living includes the use of wealth
properly appropriated by or transferred to him for his use and benefit. 14

12

SCOTT, TRUSTS §337 (1939); LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2176 (1950).
In American law the trust can be terminated if the settlor and all
beneficiaries consent. SCOTT, supra note 12, at §338. Contra in Louisiana unless
the trust instrument so provides. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2176 (1950).
14
See, for example, JOHN XXIII, Encyclical PACEM IN TERRIS (PEACE ON EARTH) issued
April 11, 1963. The following excerpts are taken from Part I, Order between
Men:
First of all, it is necessary to speak of the order which should exist
between men. Any human society, if it is to be well‐ordered and
13
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It is true, nevertheless, that application of any principle of
action should be restricted to the sphere indicated by its basis and
further limited so that due respect can be given other principles of
action. The principle of self‐determination being based on man’s reason
and free will, it is not applicable to persons in the degree in which they
lack freedom of will or the full maturity of judgment. This consideration
justifies denying minors and other incompetents authority to deal with
their property and placing it under the control of parents, tutors, and
productive, must lay down as a foundation this principle, namely, that
every human being is a person, that is, his nature is endowed with
intelligence and free will. By virtue of this, he has rights and duties of his
own, flowing directly and simultaneously from his very nature, which are
therefore universal, inviolable and inalienable.
...
Human beings have the natural right to free initiative in the economic
field, and the right to work.
...
The right to private property, even of productive goods, also derives
from the nature of man. This right, as we have elsewhere declared, is a
suitable means for safeguarding the dignity of the human person and for
the exercise of responsibility in all fields; it strengthens and gives
serenity to family life, thereby increasing the peace and prosperity of the
state.
...
The dignity of the human person also requires that every man enjoy the
right to act freely and responsibly. For this reason, therefore, in social
relations man should exercise his rights, fulfill his obligations; and, in the
countless forms of collaboration with others, act chiefly on his own
responsibility and initiative.
This is to be done in such a way that each one acts on his own decision,
of set purpose and from a consciousness of his obligation, without being
moved by force or pressure brought to bear on him externally. For any
human society that is established on relations of force must be regarded
as inhuman, inasmuch as the personality of its members is repressed or
restricted, when in fact they should be provided with appropriate
incentives and means for developing and perfecting themselves.
Those who prefer a more secularly oriented source may be referred to JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1689).
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curators; so too can it be justification for denying the minor or person of
unsound mind the right to terminate a trust in his favor.
Yet this is not the end of the affair for the trust in favor of
incapables. Though incapables may be denied some or all the control
over property ordinarily given individuals possessing mature judgment
and will, it is one thing to deny them that control according to a plan
applicable to all in like situations according to general laws and another
thing to permit the administration of their affairs to be dictated, as it
may be through trusts, by other individuals. This gives too much
authority to individuals over other individuals. Reason and free will give
rise to a right to self‐determination, 15 not to a right to determine the
affairs of others. The denial to men of their fundamental rights, even for
their own good, as in the case of incapables, should be possible
normally only through action according to law, for it is the responsibility
of government, not of individual men, to provide for the common good
and the regulation of the affairs of those incapable of caring for
themselves. Applied to trusts in favor of incapables, the indication is
that a trust scheme of management must not be allowed to interfere
with the proper management of the incapable’s affairs by his legal
representative. Therefore the legal representative should have
authority to demand that a trust be modified or terminated for the
good of the incapable. Of course, the incapable’s representative might
be made to prove that the interests of the incapable require
modification or termination of the trust before he be permitted to take
such action, just as he must make such proof before selling or
mortgaging an immovable of the incapable or compromising his claims.
What has been said above concerning termination of trusts by
beneficiaries applies with equal force to partial termination and even to
partition of the trust where the property in trust is partitionable. Thus,
15

Id.
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to give a simple example, if there are two beneficiaries, each of whom
has a fractional interest as beneficiary of income as well as of principal,
and the trust property is partitionable, either should be allowed to
demand the partition of the trust into two trusts, or to terminate the
trust as to his fractional interest. If, for any reason, however, partition
or partial termination would prejudice the other seriously, as might be
the case, for example, if one is income beneficiary and the other
principal beneficiary, then the partition or partial termination should
not be allowed except by mutual consent, for this in itself would be
forcing one beneficiary to abide by the will of another. This will be
discussed further below.
The settlor who creates a trust for his own benefit cannot be
said to suffer the indignity of having to accept a property management
scheme imposed on him by another. Nevertheless the trust which he
establishes in his favor must be subject to his modification or
termination at all times, for the right to use one’s mind and will to work
out one’s life must itself be regarded as inalienable. 16 One may, and
often must, limit his freedom to the extent necessary to achieve the
kind of cooperation which life in society demands; but he may not
ethically limit his own freedom without social need. A law which permits
him to do so is as morally wrong as that which permits another to
impose his will on him.
There are, nevertheless, instances in which the principle of self‐
determination, though applicable, must be applied in such a manner as
to give a due respect for the application of other principles as well. Thus
it is that there are instances in which the sphere of application of the
principle should be reduced. By way of example, an income or usufruct
beneficiary in trust should not be allowed to demand a termination of
the trust against the opposition of the principal or naked ownership
16

Id.
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beneficiary, or vice versa. If the income and naked ownership
beneficiaries could demand the trust’s termination by unilateral act, the
principal and usufruct beneficiaries would be compelled to assume
fiduciary responsibilities toward the others. Similarly, if the usufruct and
principal beneficiaries could demand termination of the trust, the naked
ownership and income beneficiaries would be obliged to accept an
administration of the property by the former. In any of these four
situations the principle of self‐determination would be violated by
permitting termination of the trust.
Similarly, if class dispositions are to be permitted, it may be
better normally—though not necessarily always 17 —to forbid
termination even with the consent of all living beneficiaries until all
beneficiaries are ascertained. The living always being the greatest
concern of the law, should the good of all or any of the living
beneficiaries stand to suffer more from the continuance of the trust
than the others would from its termination, then termination should be
permitted. Of course, where termination is to be allowed, partition
should be allowed where practicable, as mentioned before.
If a trust is destructible, it matters not how long it lasts; the
beneficiaries can always put an end to it. But the moral wrong inherent
in the indestructibility of trusts is increased in direct proportion to the
term for which the trust is to last. Under the Louisiana Trust Estates Law
a trust may endure for as long as any income beneficiary alive at the
creation of the trust continues to live. 18 Thus the trust may continue
indestructible for a very long lifetime if one of the beneficiaries is an
infant at the time of its creation. To add insult to injury, the Louisiana
Trust Estates Law also provides that the trust shall last for the longest
period of time allowed by law unless an earlier termination date is
17

See the reference to the English Variations of Trusts Act, 1958, at page 184
infra.
18
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1794 (1950), as amended, 1962 La. Acts 74, §1.
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provided in the trust instrument. 19 Nonetheless, there is some merit to
permitting a settlor to specify indestructibility for a very short time,
probably not more than five years. Often a trust will provide a program
of investment and management the value of which the beneficiary may
not appreciate immediately, and a few years of indestructibility may
afford him time to gain the proper perspective. The opportunity to
weigh the advantages of the trust as created may justify the short
period of indestructibility.
Related But Aggravated Abuses: Trusts Over the Legitime;
Accumulations; Spendthrift Trusts; Duration Beyond Death of
Beneficiaries
If an indestructible trust is morally wrong because it denies the
beneficiary whomsoever he be his natural right as a person to
administer his own affairs, then it is even more wrong morally to permit
an indestructible trust over the legitime, or forced share of an
inheritance, to be indestructible. The legitime has its origin in the
recognition of every man’s right to a share in the world’s goods which
he can use as he judges best. It is especially reprehensible to permit this
share to be unalterably under the control of another. Yet the present
Trust Estates Law 20 —and the Louisiana Constitution 21 —permit this. The
new Trust Estates Law need not forbid the placing of the legitime in
trust; but under no circumstances should it permit the trust over the
legitime to be indestructible or unmodifiable by the forced heir.
Similarly, if it is morally wrong to permit indestructible trusts,
then it is even more wrong to permit directions for the accumulation of
income contrary to the wishes of the beneficiary. Indeed, whereas the
19

Id.
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1793 (1050), combined with id. § 9:1794 (1950), as
amended, 1962 La. Acts 74, § 1, and id. § 9:2176 (1950).
21
LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16, as amended, 1962 La. Acts 521.
20
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indestructibility of trusts denies to the beneficiary the possibility of
gaining control and management of his capital, the accumulation of
income denies to him even its revenues. Under the present Trust
Estates Law the settlor may direct the accumulation of income—except
that derived from the legitime in trust—for as long as the trust will
last. 22 Thus it is that a beneficiary might be denied the use of all or a
substantial portion of the income from the trust during his entire life.
But the law is not heartless: if the trust is not of the spendthrift variety
he will be able to assign his interest in the income, and always he will
have the right to let it pass to his heirs by inheritance or to dispose of it
by will. Actually in either case the beneficiary’s interest is reduced to a
power or capacity to dispose of it at death, for eventual interests in
trusts usually are not readily assignable. This is hardly great satisfaction.
Through the device of accumulating the income, therefore, the first
generation can be substantially prejudiced to the advantage of the
second. It is no defense to argue that inasmuch as the income to be
accumulated is that on property outside the legitime, that is to say,
property which could have been given to another, the beneficiary
cannot be heard to complain. The root of the objection is that one is
given property but permitted neither control nor enjoyment of it. In
effect, the beneficiary of income accumulated for life is not a
beneficiary at all; he is a human conduit of an asset, a person in a much
worse position than the fideicommissarius of former times. The latter at
least had substantial control and enjoyment during his lifetime even
though he was obliged to transfer the property to a second donee at a
later date. 23 Again, however, the writer wishes to emphasize that even

22

LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2092(c) (1950) permits accumulations. The only limitations
are from the provision as to income derived from the legitime in trust, id. §
9:1793, and from that on the duration of the trust itself, id. § 9:1794, as
amended, 1962 La. Acts 74, § 1.
23
Indeed, he had a right to retain for himself a portion of the property of which
he was fideicommissarius. This was the trebellianic portion mentioned in Article
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a direction for accumulation is not objectionable if the beneficiary is
entitled to terminate it or modify it. The direction to accumulate is then
part of the plan for investment and employment of the trust funds
suggested to the beneficiary but not forced upon him.
Again, if a trust is objectionable if indestructible by the
beneficiary, it is even more objectionable if the beneficiary cannot
assign or transfer his interest subject to the trust. Yet the Louisiana
Trust Estates Law provides that a settlor may specify that the
beneficiary’s interest shall be inalienable by him. 24 In addition, the
settlor may even provide that creditors may not reach any of the
principal of the trust or any more than a certain portion of the income
not to exceed the limits established by law. 25 This last provision,
therefore, not only interferes with the beneficiary’s obligation to
discharge his debts, but violates the principle that the property of a
debtor is the common pledge of his creditors. 26
Every indestructible express private trust is to some extent an
interdiction by private act as to the property in trust; but the spendthrift
trust is the extreme form. The argument for spendthrift trusts is usually
that some persons must be saved from their own folly. The answer to
that is that men cannot be saved from their own folly without being
subject to the indignity of a kind of paternalistic solicitation that finds a
fair parallel in so‐called beneficial colonialism among nations. The price,
a failure to recognize the right of another to self‐determination, is too
high. Yet it is not to be denied that sometimes there are persons who
should be interdicted and are not, and therefore it would be
understandable to allow the settlor to impose a spendthrift trust if the
1520 of the Louisiana Civil Code as it stood before amendment by 1962 La. Acts
45.
24
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1923 (1950).
25
Id.
26
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3183 (1870).
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beneficiary would then be given the opportunity to modify the trust on
showing he is capable of managing the property in trust. If the
representative of society, and not the settlor, can make the final
decision, then a spendthrift trust will be tolerable. Thus the spendthrift
clause—or clause against voluntary or involuntary alienation—can be
permitted if a reasonable procedure is established through which the
beneficiary—or even his creditors—can demonstrate his capacity and
be allowed to alienate his interest in the trust or to terminate the trust
itself. Certainly standards for determining whether the non‐interdicted
person should be allowed to sell his interest in a trust or terminate it
can be worked out, and if there is fear of mistake here great latitude of
discretion can be left to the judge until our experience grows.
Last in the list of abuses which might be mentioned here is the
provision in the Louisiana Trust Estates Law as a result of which, unless
the settlor stipulates the contrary, a trust may endure beyond the lives
of all beneficiaries until ten years after the testator’s death. 27 The writer
fails to see the reason for such a provision, unless it be to flatter a
settlor’s vanity by assuring him this projection of will shall not be totally
defeated even if the beneficiaries are not there to enjoy it, or unless it
be to assure a professional trustee a minimum number of years of fees
from every trusteeship accepted. Certainly amicable trustees would not
want such a provision. If professional trustees need such economic
protection, then the writer suggests that some measure be taken to
insure it, but otherwise than through the device of continuing the trust
without other purpose.
Further Remarks on the Uses and Abuses of Express Private Trusts
In summary, most of the abuses tolerated under the present
Trust Estates Law stem from the fact that the beneficiary may be—and
in practice usually is—denied authority to modify, partition, or
27

LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1794 (1950), as amended, 1962 La. Acts 74, § 1.
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terminate the trust. Were the beneficiary given, in principle at least, the
right to modify, partition, or terminate the trust he would be master of
his property, and there could be no objection of a moral nature.
The indestructibility of express private trusts is an American
invention. 28 The English have never tolerated it, and have always
permitted the termination or modification of the trust by agreement of
all beneficiaries sui juris, provided their interests were absolute. Thus
according to Underhill’s Law of Trusts and Trustees, a trust may be
terminated
. . . even where the settlor has contemplated and
intended that the trustee shall have the control of the
property, if the sole party beneficially interested, or the
parties collectively if there are several of them, are
unanimously in favour of ‘breaking the trust,’ and all are
sui juris. For a trust is the equitable equivalent of a
common law gift, and, when once declared, the settlor,
like the donor of a gift, has no further rights over the
property. . . 29
This rule is applied to successive as well as to simultaneous
beneficiaries. 30 Just as they may terminate the trust they may modify it,
though they may not compel a trustee to accept new duties involving an
exercise of discretion. 31 Even a mortgagee of the beneficiary’s interest
may demand a termination if the mortgage absorbs all equity in the
property, for then the beneficiary has no interest to be protected. 32

28

SCOTT, supra note 12, at §337.
UNDERHILL, LAW RELATING TO TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 444 (11th ed. 1959).
30
Id. at 448.
31
Id. at 450.
32
Id. at 449.
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Ordinarily in English law a trust may not be terminated where
there are future interests yet unvested, but even here there are
exceptions. Thus a class entitled in the discretion of a trustee may act
together, though not individually, to terminate the trust; 33 and one of
several beneficiaries may terminate the trust as to him if no one is
injured by his action. Thus a trust to apply income for a beneficiary’s
maintenance entitles the beneficiary to the income absolutely, though,
not having an interest in the remainder, he would not be entitled to
modify the trust in other respects. 34 More significantly, under the
recent Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 35 the English have moved
substantially in the direction of permitting a judicial modification or
variation of trusts in the interests of beneficiaries not sui juris, and this
whether their interests be direct or indirect, vested or contingent. 36 The
act allows the court to approve of any plan “varying or revoking all or
any of the trusts or enlarging the powers of the trustee of managing or
administering any of the property subject to the trusts,” submitted by
co‐beneficiaries or any other persons, if it be to the incapable’s
advantage. 37 Today, therefore, even a trust in which an incapable is a
beneficiary may be modified or varied if it is to the benefit of such a
beneficiary to do so.
Thus it is that in the native home of the trust the beneficiaries
may in principle always terminate or modify it. Nevertheless the English
permit of some devices in trusts which have some of the obnoxious
features of indestructible trusts and most of those of spendthrift trusts.

33

Id. at 445.
Id. at 452.
35
Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53. This legislation, the general
American law, and the very strict Louisiana law are compared in Camp, The
Variation of Trusts Act, 1958: A Departure from Traditional Principles of Trust
Law, 34 TUL. L. REV. 87 (1950).
36
Variation of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1(1).
37
Camp, supra note 35.
34
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Thus the English, while insisting that every absolutely vested interest be
subject to the control of its owner, have nevertheless tolerated gifts
over in the event of bankruptcy or the attempt to alienate and
dispositions in which the interests of a beneficiary are determined by
the trustee in his discretion. 38 It seems to the writer that it is little
consolation to the beneficiary that he may not control his interest
because it is not vested absolutely, when the purpose for not giving it to
him absolutely is to deprive him of control. The one is as obnoxious as
the other.
Why has American law generally, and Louisiana law in
particular, permitted indestructible trusts and its dependent devices,
indestructible directions to accumulate income and spendthrift trusts?
And why has English law permitted some of the same effects through
other devices? The only persons pleased by such devices are settlors
and trustees. And yet, what is their claim of right? Certainly the trustee
should have none. And should settlors have a claim of right? It is no
argument that the property placed in trust is that which at the time of
the creation of the trust belongs to them. Property ceases to be that of
a transferor—or should—immediately upon his transfer of it to another,
whether absolutely or subject to a trust. Indeed, the most vocal
proponents of trusts insist that the trust property should not be subject
to the settlors’ control after the creation of the trust, so that the trust
capital will not continue to be considered theirs under the gift and
estate tax laws. 39 But does it not really remain theirs in part if their
schemes for its administration, investment, and employment—products
of their wills—remain fixed for long periods after they have divested
themselves of any personal benefit, even for long periods after their
deaths? Very obviously through such trusts the law has permitted
38

See generally UNDERHILL, supra note 29, at 85‐90.
The tax implications of the proposals made in this article are considered
briefly at page 195 infra.
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individual persons to be placed in partial and private economic
dictatorships by other individual persons.
We in Louisiana, so long free of this insult through law to human
dignity, finally succumbed to it in increasing doses. The very general
trust legislation of 1920 40 was severely but insufficiently restricted by
Article IV, Section 16, of the Constitution of 1921. Under that section
the trust could not last longer, as to a natural person beneficiary, than
ten years after the death of the settlor unless that beneficiary were a
minor at the time of the creation of the trust; in that event the trust
could last, as to that person, until ten years after his majority. The
maximum duration period specified in the 1938 Trust Estates Act as
originally enacted adhered to this limitation. 41 In 1952 the permissible
duration of the trust as to any natural person beneficiary was increased
to his death or ten years after that of the settlor, whichever was the
longer period. 42 And in 1962 the law was changed to the effect that the
trust could last as to all beneficiaries until the death of the last surviving
income beneficiary, or if the settlor specifically so provided, for ten
years after the settlor’s death, whichever was the longer period. 43
Similarly, spendthrift trusts, or prohibitions against voluntary or
involuntary alienations by the beneficiary, originally were allowable only
as to the income, and not as to the principal, of a trust. 44 In 1944,
however, the permissibility of such prohibitions was extended to cover
the principal as well as the income interest of a beneficiary. 45 There was
40

1920 La. Acts 107.
1938 La. Acts 81, §4, later designated as LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1794 (1950).
42
LA. CONST, art. IV, § 16, as amended, 1952 La. Acts 208; LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1794
(1950), as amended, 1952 La. Acts 209.
43
LA. CONST, art. IV, § 16, as amended, 1962 La. Acts 521, does not contain any
limitation on the duration of trusts. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1794 (1950), as amended,
1962 La. Acts 74, prescribes the limits given in the body of the article.
44
1938 La. Acts 81, §28, now LA. REV. STAT. § 9:1923 (1950).
45
1938 La. Acts 81, § 28, as amended, 1944 La. Acts 290, now LA. REV. STAT. §
9:1923 (1950).
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no specific amendatory legislation on accumulations, but with each
extension of the duration of the trust the evil of accumulations was
extended.
Strangely, few voices have been raised against all this, either in
America generally or in Louisiana in particular. Perhaps it is because
beneficiaries do not have a lobby, but settlors and professional trustees
in effect do. Those who wish to project their wills over their property—
and over their transferees—after they have given up beneficial interests
in it of course want “liberal” trust legislation. Attorneys’ naturally want
to satisfy the desires of their clients, and in practice this means the
desires of would‐be settlors and professional trustees, not of those who
become beneficiaries. Settlors tend to like, and professional trustees
stand to gain, from “liberal” trust legislation, legislation which will give
the settlor the opportunity to do what he wishes. Professional trustees,
too, over the nation, have long had well‐organized advertising or “public
relations” programs. And there is no doubt most of these persons and
entities are of the utmost good faith, seeing only the good they do and
failing to notice the harm. The harm is, after all, mostly of a kind which
is not readily apparent: injury to personal dignity; lost opportunities for
self expression and development of the individual beneficiary; and, as
will be mentioned below, unwholesome economic effects.
There are murmurs against all this and, though they be few,
they shall probably increase. Thus in the February 1963 issue of Trusts
and Estates, one trust officer complained that beneficiaries often
suffered from unalterable schemes of settlors, well intentioned though
they might have been. 46 And in December 1962, at the annual meeting
of American law professors, the subject of a round table on property
law was the adverse economic effect of the control of property by
persons without beneficial interest, and much of the discussion was
46

Barclay, Should a Trust be Indestructible?, TRUSTS & ESTATES 138‐39 (February
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related to or applied to express private trusts as well as to other forms
of trusts. 47 Certainly it does not take a trained economist to understand
that an extensive use of trusts will shift much capital to investments in
Grade A common stocks and away from investments in smaller
enterprises and consumer spending. One possible effect which
Louisiana should consider is that much capital will be placed in
investments which will produce most of their economic good outside
this state. Unfortunately, the writer knows of no studies which might
supply accurate data on such economic conditions and effects
attributable to private trusts.
It would be well, therefore, for those revising our trust
legislation to solicit not only the aid of lawyers, but also that of
moralists (philosophers and theologians), economists, and sociologists,
before deciding on the proper content of a Trust Estates Law for
Louisiana. Legal experts must be relied upon to supply advice regarding
the form of the trust legislation once a decision is made as to its proper
content or substance; and whereas legal experts no doubt will be able
to offer much even as to the substance of the law, they are not, by
reason of legal training at least, equipped to do the whole job.

II. THE TECHNICAL FORMULATION OF THE TRUST
In the terms of its historical derivation, the Anglo‐American
private trust is an institution in which the owner at law of property is
obliged in equity to deal with it for the benefit of another. The almost
47

Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Chicago, Illinois,
December 28‐30, 1962. Round Table on Economic Power and Property.
Professor James F. Hogg of the University of Minnesota Law School, then
visiting at the Columbia Law School, spoke on “The Independence of Trustees
from Beneficiaries.” The Rev. Paul P. Harbrecht, S.J., of the University of Detroit
Law School and Consultant to the Twentieth Century Fund, spoke on “Trustee
and Other Non‐Beneficial Ownership of Productive Capacity.”
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complete disappearance of separate courts of law and equity leads to
the rephrasing of that definition to read that the trust is an institution in
which one with legal title to property is obliged equitably (or in
accordance with the principles developed in equity) to deal with it for
the benefit of another. There is no reason to quarrel with this
historically oriented definition, even though the trustee’s “legal title” in
Anglo‐American law now means nothing more than that he is a person
endowed with well‐defined duties and powers to deal with the trust
property for the benefit of another. The trustee has no rights, only
duties toward others. Over the centuries the trustee’s “legal title” has
been transformed from an ownership at law (which itself gave him the
powers which equity required him to use for another rather than for
himself) to a fiduciary capacity with obligations and responsibilities. The
Anglo‐American lawyer now reads “fiduciary” where his forebears read
“legal owner” or “owner at law,” and he is not confused:
The English comparatist Lawson, for example, in his Introduction
to the [English] Law of Property, recognizes all this in very clear
language:
Fragmentation [of ownership] takes place in several
different ways . . . through the operation of tenure
between landlord and tenant, by co‐ownership, by a
peculiar way of looking at rights to successive
enjoyment, by the creation of rent charges, by the
detachment of powers of alienation or appointment
from enjoyment, and by the use of trusts as a means of
divorcing the management from the enjoyment of
property. 48 [Emphasis added.]
. . . If property is given to trustees to hold in trust for
beneficiaries the trustees are said, now mainly for
48

LAWSON, supra note 5, at 9.
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historical reasons, to have the legal estate, and the
beneficiaries the equitable interest. The former is
merely a way of explaining that the trustees are the
managers of the property and can act commercially as
owners of it, enjoying wide powers of alienating it in the
market; while the latter means that the beneficiaries
have the beneficial ownership, which implies that they
can enjoy the use and possession of it and draw an
income from it. 49 [Emphasis added.]
Again,
[T]here must be some personal relation between the
manager and the beneficiary, under which, the former
may be made liable to the latter if he wrongfully
mismanages the property. That relation is in English law
called a trust. The manager is trustee for the
beneficiary. But the question still remains, what are the
relations of trustee and beneficiary to the thing held in
trust? It would have been possible to say either that the
trustee owns the property but is under a duty to
manage it for the benefit of the beneficiary, who has
nothing more than a correlative personal right against
the trustee, or on the contrary that the beneficiary
owns the property but gives full powers of management
to the trustee, who stands in no direct relation to the
property but acts merely by delegation of property
rights vested in the beneficiary. English law has taken
neither course, but has in effect said that both trustee
and beneficiary own the property in different ways, or,
more accurately, that neither owns the property in the
strict Roman sense of the term ownership, but each
49

Id. at 10.
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owns a different interest in it, called respectively the
legal estate and the equitable interest. It says that to
ask in such a situation who owns the physical object is
an improper question, just as it would be improper to
ask whether a tenant for life or a person entitled to the
land after his death owned the land itself. 50 [Emphasis
added.]

Thus English legal science recognizes the difference between
the substantive nature of the trust and its historical and technical
formulation or definition. At the same time it recognizes that there is no
need to depart from that formula in English law, and what is said of
English law may equally well be said of American law. But justification
and excuse for the retention of that formula for the trust in Anglo‐
American jurisdictions is not of itself justification for its use in Louisiana
law. Thus the question is whether the new trust legislation should retain
that formula. Admittedly several arguments for its retention might be
made. It is already in our law, and it has been in our law at least since
1938. The Anglo‐American literature which Louisiana lawyers no doubt
will use reflects this concept of the trust. Anglo‐American lawyers would
be able to understand our trust law more easily if it were written in
terms already familiar to them. Conflict‐of‐laws trust problems might be
minimized. Each of these arguments has some merit in fact, but the
writer submits that it would be both possible and wiser to avoid the
Anglo‐American trust formula.
It is not difficult to define the trust in functional rather than
traditional Anglo‐American terms. 51 If the trustee is only a fiduciary,
why not simply say so? In the private trust it is the beneficiaries who
50

Id. at 77.
Ample support of this is to be found in the writer’s previous articles: Some
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have the real present and future interests in the property in trust. Why
not recognize them as owners of the present and future interests in the
property subject to the trustee’s administration, management, and
control under the terms of the trust?
The absence in our law of separate divisions known as law and
equity is sufficient reason to avoid the Anglo‐American trust formula.
Louisiana legal science should be knowledgeable enough, and brave
enough, to do it. Our “laboratory of comparative law” can continue to
be an object of pride only if it is productive. It is not a work of legal
science to import an institution into our law in such a form that its
components cannot be absorbed into the existing legal structure. But
admittedly this is a plea largely for the sake of our as yet justifiable
pride as bi‐cultural jurists. Probably we could get along with the Anglo‐
American definition of trusts, but we would sacrifice our right to
consider ourselves astute in legal technology. We would, too, miss an
opportunity to offer an example to other civil law jurisdictions who as
yet have difficulties introducing the trust in such a form as to avail
themselves of its beneficial uses without sacrificing the coherence of
their legal systems.
Beyond the interest of legal science, or legal technology, there
is also the practical interest in facilitating the understanding of the trust
by our own practitioners and judges. Admittedly we will be able to get
along with the Anglo‐American definition, but getting along is not the
same as living well. Admittedly, too, the greatest difficulty which
Louisiana lawyers have had with the Anglo‐American trust definition has
been in connection with our former constitutional prohibitions against
fidei commissa and substitutions. 52 Some members of the bench and
bar were inclined to think of any trust as a fideicommissary substitution
because the trustee was given “title” (which they mistakenly equated
with “ownership”) subject to the obligation to transfer the property to
52
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another at the end of the trust. 53 Since 1962 substitutions may be
contained in trusts to the extent authorized by the legislature, 54 and
hence no longer can a trust permissible under the legislation be
objectionable because it is thought, rightly or wrongly, to contain a
fideicommissary substitution.
But rendering a situation lawful does not in itself insure
understanding of the nature of that situation, and in the future there
may arise further instances of confusion not connected with
fideicommissary substitutions. Some Louisiana lawyers, too, find it
preferable to avoid the Anglo‐American formula in creating trusts and
transfer property to one person subject to a trust of which a certain
person is named trustee. This practice, after all, not only is more
realistic, but makes the trust more understandable to both the civilian‐
oriented lawyers and their laymen clients. And this in itself is a factor
not to be ignored, for many Louisiana lawyers admit to being baffled by
the Anglo‐American concept. Perhaps this in itself is a reason why the
trust has not been used more widely in Louisiana.

III. A WORD ABOUT TAXATION
What would be the tax consequences of a trust estates law
based on the principles espoused in this article? First, neither defining
the trust in functional rather than traditional Anglo‐American terms, nor
giving the beneficiaries the power to terminate it, would deprive the
settlor of estate tax savings presently achievable through trusts. Those
savings would be lost, then as now, only when the settlor retained

53

See Succession of Guillory, 232 La. 213, 94 So. 2d 38 (1957) and Succession of
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control of the trust or of the property placed in trust. 55 Secondly,
defining the trust in functional terms compatible with our property law
would not of itself result in the income from the trust being taxed to the
beneficiaries. Not “legal title,” but economic power, or substantial
control, is the principle according to which the tax laws and regulations
are written, interpreted, and applied. 56 A trust indestructible by the
beneficiaries, therefore, though defined in functional terms, would
produce the same tax consequences as one defined in Anglo‐American
terms.
But what of the trust, whether defined in functional or Anglo‐
American terms, which might be terminated, or the income therefrom
demanded, by the beneficiaries? Here, apparently, it is necessary to
take Section 678 of the Internal Revenue Code into account. That
section reads in part:
(a) General rule. A person other than the grantor shall
be treated as the owner of any portions of a trust with
respect to which:
(1) such person has a power exercisable solely by
himself to vest the corpus or the income therefrom in
himself . . . 57
55

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038(a) (1).
See, for example, Rev. Rul. 154, 1959‐1 CUM. BULL. 160, which emphasizes
that no legal title under local law, but control, determines the taxable entity.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 itself clearly implies this principle in § 678,
discussed hereafter in the text, when it taxes the beneficiaries of an Anglo‐
American trust if they in fact have control over the property, or its income, and
also in §§ 671‐677, in which the settlor is taxed if he retains control over the
trust or the property subject to it.
57
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 678. Under another provision of the Internal
Revenue Code, § 622, trust income is not taxable to the beneficiary unless
‘‘paid, credited, or required to be distributed” and “whether distributed or
not.” In the light of § 678, however, this provision must not be available to the
beneficiary who can terminate the trust or demand the accumulated income.
56
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Inasmuch as the principles espoused in this article would lead to
a rule permitting each ascertained income or usufruct beneficiary to
demand his share of the trust income even if the settlor has stipulated it
should be accumulated, the income from all trusts would, in the writer’s
opinion, be taxed to the beneficiaries. Thus the income tax savings
presently available to beneficiaries 58 of indestructible trusts would
disappear. But this, after all, is exactly as it should be. No one with the
same income in fact as another should be permitted to enjoy
preferential tax treatment. 59

58

One income tax advantage, nevertheless, would result from the creation of a
trust even though the beneficiaries could terminate it or demand the income.
By shifting revenue‐producing property from the settlor’s patrimony to that of
another, the combined income taxes of the settlor on his remaining income
and of the beneficiary on his income might be less than that which would
otherwise be payable by the settlor. This facet of the income tax laws, like the
estate tax laws, encourages the distribution of wealth.
59
Indeed, present tax laws permit the separate taxation of the income from a
trust not distributed, credited, or required to be distributed to a beneficiary
precisely because such a beneficiary does not in fact enjoy the benefits of his
alleged right to it. But this well‐intentioned rule encourages those who would
effect tax savings to create indestructible trusts with directions to accumulate
income, and thus to deprive their beneficiaries of fundamental human rights.

PART 3
A MAN OF DIVERSE SCHOLARSHIP

Updating Louisiana’s Community of Gains 
The nineteen seventies were a decade of militant action
on the part of women’s organizations to remove all
differences between the legal rights and obligations of
men and women. I was a member of the committee of
advisors to the Louisiana State Law Institute’s Reporter
on the revision of matrimonial regimes law until 1976,
when the Louisiana legislature refused to consider the
Law Institute’s proposal, ordered the Institute to
prepare an “equal management” law, and the Institute,
contrary to its then purpose to propose improvements in
legislation to the Louisiana legislature, not to do its
bidding, proceeded to conform to this demand. I
continue to have the views on matrimonial regimes law
expressed in the article below.

The updating of the community of gains and other Louisiana
matrimonial regimes is imminent. The Louisiana State Law Institute, 1
invited by the Louisiana legislature to prepare a revision of the Civil



Originally published in 49 TUL. L. REV. 555 (1975). Reprinted with the
permission of the Tulane Law Review Association, which holds the copyright.
1
1938 La. Acts 166 (compiled at LA. REV. STAT. § 24:201‐05 (1950)), established
the Louisiana State Law Institute as the official state law revision and reform
agency.
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Code, has named a Reporter 2 to prepare observations and drafts for its
consideration and has appointed a Committee of Advisors 3 to assist her
in her deliberations. Even if this process had not begun, the re‐
evaluation of Louisiana matrimonial regimes laws would be timely.
There are some inequities under the legislation itself, other inequities
have resulted from judicial misconstructions and misapplications, and
both professional and lay misunderstandings abound. In addition, the
women’s rights movement has questioned the fairness and even the
constitutionality of some aspects of Louisiana matrimonial regimes. The
writer, as a professor of law seeking to contribute what he can to clarity
of thought in this area of his presumed competence, will attempt to
state the essentials of the law of matrimonial regimes in general and of
the community of gains in particular, identify the major roots of
dissatisfaction, and suggest the principles on which reforms should be
based. 4
GENERALITIES OF MATRIMONIAL REGIMES LAW
Matrimonial regimes 5 are those plans of order between
husband and wife particularizing the manner in which they shall share
2

Professor Janet Mary Riley, Loyola University, New Orleans.
The advisors are all Louisiana professors of law, members of the bar, or
judges.
4
The author is a member of the Louisiana State Law Institute’s Committee of
Advisors to the Reporter on matrimonial regimes law revision, but his opinions
are not to be attributed to the Reporter or to other members of the
committee. Often their views are opposed radically to the ideas expressed
here.
5
The term “matrimonial regime” is not to be found in Louisiana legislation. The
Civil Code uses “conjugal association.” LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2325 (1870).
“Matrimonial regime,” nevertheless, is in common doctrinal use in Louisiana
and other Romanist jurisdictions and will be used in this article. The two terms
refer to the same institution; but, whereas “matrimonial regime” emphasizes
the plan of order (regime) itself, “conjugal association” connotes also the
agreement between the spouses which is the regime’s legal cause.
3
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(if at all) and control their assets and liabilities. Since 1825, all Louisiana
matrimonial regimes that might arise upon marriage have been
contractual. Under the Digest of 1808, 6 every marriage subject to
Louisiana law entailed “of necessity,” or as a matter of public order, the
community of gains as specified in the legislation. 7 Neither a complete
separation of property (assets and liabilities) nor a modification of the
community of gains could be stipulated by marriage contract; but the
spouses could thereby make provisions for donations to each other,
donations from other persons to either or both of them and the
children to be born of the marriage, a dowry, or any other patrimonial
arrangement which did not contradict the community of gains, other
imperative laws, or principles of public order or good morals. 8 The Civil
Code of 1825, however, permitted the spouses to modify the
community of gains in any way and even to exclude it entirely, leaving
them free to enter into a marriage contract specifying any patrimonial
arrangement they might confect so long as it did not offend minimal
provisions for good public order and morals. 9 The law remains the same
today. 10 The community of gains is “superinduced” by every marriage
subject to Louisiana law only if the spouses either have not entered into
a marriage contract, or have entered into one which does not modify or
reject that community regime. 11 This freedom to modify and reject the
community of gains changed the character of that regime from one
imposed by law into one essentially conventional. Thus, spouses must
be deemed to have contracted tacitly the community of gains to the
extent they have not contracted expressly against it.

6

A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY
[hereinafter cited as Digest of 1808].
7
Digest of 1808, 3.5.10, 63.
8
Digest of 1808, 3.5.1, .3, .4, .15, .16 et seq.; 3.2.219 et seq.
9
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2305‐07, 2393, 2394 (1825).
10
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2325‐27, 2392, 2424 (1870).
11
Id. arts. 2325, 2332, 2399.
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From the essentially conventional character of Louisiana
matrimonial regimes follows a consequence of supreme importance: a
matrimonial regime can have direct effects only between the spouses
themselves; third persons cannot know a community of gains or any
other matrimonial regime either as a subject of rights or as a
patrimonial mass against which they can allege rights of their own. The
matrimonial regime, on the other hand, can affect third persons
indirectly through its consequences for the patrimonies of the spouses.
Creditors of either spouse may look to that spouse’s total patrimony for
satisfaction of that spouse’s obligations to them. Third persons, in other
words, may have legal relations with the spouses as individuals and avail
themselves of each spouse’s patrimony as affected and constituted by
the matrimonial regime; but third persons do not have legal relations in
their favor by the direct effect of a matrimonial regime established by
marriage contract. This is why, for example, the Civil Code does not
contain a single provision for the ranking of privileges between
“community” and “separate” creditors of a spouse. They are all
creditors of the spouse, on an equal footing before the law on
privileges. An appreciation of this aspect of matrimonial regimes law is
essential, particularly in understanding the laws on the community of
gains.
A second consequence of importance stemming from the
conventional character of Louisiana matrimonial regimes is that no
matrimonial regime already in existence between particular spouses
may be changed by the effect of law without violating the traditional
constitutional prohibitions against the impairment of obligations of
contract. This does not mean that legislation might not be enacted
authorizing married persons to agree to a change in their matrimonial
regimes, whether contracted tacitly or expressly, but here the efficient
legal cause of the alteration would be the contract of the parties and
not the law itself. None of the amendments to Louisiana matrimonial
regimes laws, however, has provided for such acceptance by spouses
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already married. The matrimonial regimes of parties now subject to
Louisiana matrimonial regimes laws, therefore, are governed by the
laws as they were at the times those regimes were contracted.
An express marriage contract, by general rule, may be entered
into only before marriage. 12 Since 1910, however, spouses moving to
Louisiana after having been domiciled elsewhere as married persons
may enter into an express marriage contract within one year of their
arrival. 13 Partially because of the merits of the community of gains itself
and partially because of general ignorance of the rules just mentioned,
marriage contracts are extremely infrequent in Louisiana. Most couples
subject to Louisiana law, therefore, live under the “legal” community of
gains, that is to say, the community of gains as specified in the
suppletive (presumed‐intent‐supplying) legislation of the Civil Code and
the Revised Statutes and tacitly accepted by the spouses on their failure
to contract against it.
Besides regulating the “legal” community of gains, 14 the Civil
Code details the rules of three matrimonial regime “clauses” which
might be the subject of express marriage contracts: dowry, 15
paraphernalia—the nondotal separate property of the wife under
matrimonial regimes which include either a dowry or a community of
some kind 16 —and the separation of property by marriage contract. 17
The Civil Code also specifies the rules of the marriage regime which
results, as a matter of law, when the spouses are separated from bed
and board or when the wife has obtained a judgment terminating the
12

Id. art. 2329. The constitutionality of this article under the full faith and credit
clause of the federal Constitution is questioned by the author, but not argued
here.
13
Id., as emended, 1910 La. Acts 236.
14
Id. arts. 2334, 2386, 2402‐23.
15
Id. arts. 2337‐81.
16
Id. arts. 2383‐91.
17
Id. arts. 2392‐96.
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conventional regime for causes predetermined by law. 18 This article,
however, will concentrate on the community of gains and refer only
incidentally to other regimes.

THE ESSENTIAL CHARACTER OF THE COMMUNITY OF GAINS
AS DESCRIBED IN THE LEGISLATION
At the very outset it should be noted that the community of
gains is only a part of a matrimonial regime. Only certain gains of the
spouses during marriage, principally revenues of their capital and
products of their labor and industry, ever enter into it; 20 and only
certain “debts contracted during the marriage” are, as between the
spouses, dischargeable from those gains. 21 The capital of each spouse at
the time of marriage and that acquired by either spouse after marriage
by inheritance or by donation do not form a part of the community
assets; 22 and debts owing at the time of marriage or incurred during
marriage by or in the interest of one spouse alone are, as between the
spouses, payable from the separate assets of the debtor spouse. 23 The
regime known as the community of gains, therefore, could be described
more accurately as a regime of separation of property modified by a
“clause” for a community of gains. 24 A name is not important, perhaps,
19

18

Id. arts. 155, 2425‐36.
Id. arts. 2334, 2386, 2402‐23.
20
Id. arts. 2334, 2386, 2402.
21
Id. art. 2403. This article, however, demands construction in the context of
other articles on the subject. See text at notes 25‐30 infra.
22
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870).
23
Id. art. 2403. See supra note 21.
24
The Civil Code refers to the articles on donations by marriage contract,
dowry, and separation of property as provisions on “conventions” or “clauses”
in marriage contracts. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2331, 2333 (1870), and the title to
Book III, Title VI, Chapter 2, Section 4. Had the community of gains been
conventional in 1808, the Digest of that year, and the Civil Codes of 1825 and
19
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but a concept can have consequences of importance for the
construction of the total law on the subject.
The Civil Code’s provisions, moreover, do not convey clearly the
nature of the community of gains. The articles must be construed
against one another in a careful exegesis carried on in the light of the
Spanish law from which it was mainly derived. 25 Thus, from an initial
reading of articles 2402‐09 it would appear that the contract of the
spouses is for a regime under which there will be, during marriage: (1) a
pooling of certain revenues of their capital, the products of their labor
and industry, and certain acquisitions, into a common fund; 26 (2) the
management of this fund and its revenues by the husband; 27 (3) the
payment from the common fund of “debts contracted [but by whom?]
during the marriage;” 28 and, on dissolution of the regime, (4) a partition
of the common assets 29 and (5) a sharing equally of the “debts
contracted during the marriage” and yet unpaid. 30 Aside from the
question of which “debts contracted during the marriage” are to be
discharged from the common fund, the articles could be accepted as
1870 as well, probably would have referred to the community as a
“convention” or “clause” in a marriage contract.
25
An explanation, and to some extent an excuse, for the inadequacy of the
articles on the subject may be as follows. The Spanish community of gains was
so different from the French community of movables that, for the most part,
the drafters of the Digest of 1808 could not use French legal works, as they did
for many subjects in the Digest, as sources of ready‐drawn provisions
accurately descriptive of the Spanish law they were to digest. The drafters of
the Digest, therefore, were required to derive their inspirations from various
documents on the uncodified Spanish law and draft such provisions as they
might without delaying unreasonably the completion of the Digest as a whole.
That in any event they failed to describe accurately the Spanish community of
gains then in force, however, is a fact.
26
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870).
27
Id. art. 2404.
28
Id. art. 2403.
29
Id. arts. 2406‐08.
30
Id. art. 2409.
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clear. The exegesis cannot stop here, however, for subsequent articles
introduce ideas incompatible with the apparent meaning of articles
2402‐09.
Articles 2410, 2411, and 2423 allow the wife or her heirs or
other successors in interest “to exonerate themselves from the debts
contracted during the marriage” by renouncing her right to the
community of gains, that is to say, her right to one half of the assets in
the common fund. Now, under general rules of Louisiana law, one may
renounce his rights but not his obligations. 31 Hence there is reason to
suspect that the obligations spoken of as “debts contracted during the
marriage” in articles 2403 and 2409 must be limited to the debts of the
husband. Were the wife the principal obligor of half these debts, she
could not renounce them. 32 The creditors of those obligations would
have the right to enforce their credits even against her separate
assets. 33
The conclusion is made more certain by subsequent articles of
the Civil Code and by provisions of the Revised Statutes under which the
wife or her heirs or her successors in interest are given rights very
similar to those of succession heirs and their heirs or successors in
interest. Articles 2412, 2417, and 2418 evidence that the wife who has
acted as if she had a right to a portion of the community assets, or who
has allowed a judgment for debts originally payable from community
assets to be rendered against her, may not renounce the share of the
community assets and liabilities which she was entitled to accept. Under
article 2415, her renunciation must be made before a notary public and
two witnesses. And under La. R.S. 9:2821, she is extended the right,
31

Id. arts. 3182, 3183.
At first reading, article 131 may appear to contradict the conclusion reached
here. On the contrary, however, the article lends support to the conclusion. See
discussion of article 131 at pages 228‐229 infra.
33
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 3182, 3183 (1870).
32

COMMUNITY OF GAINS

207

similar to that of one of several heirs, to accept her share of the
community assets and liabilities under benefit of inventory. These
provisions lead to the conclusion that not only must the “debts
contracted during the marriage” be limited to debts incurred by the
husband, but also that the assets in the community or common fund are
really a part of the patrimony of the husband as long as the regime
continues. Whereas the wife has an absolute right under the marriage
contract to take half those assets if she will accept personal liability for
half the debts which, as between her and her husband under the
marriage contract, are dischargeable from the common fund, before
dissolution of the regime those assets and liabilities are not to be
considered part of her patrimony. Accordingly, during the existence of
the community of gains, the wife’s patrimony can consist only of her
separate assets and of liabilities incurred by her personally. On the
other hand, during the marriage the husband’s patrimony includes his
separate assets and liabilities, the community assets, and “debts
contracted [by the husband] during the marriage.”
Now it becomes evident also that “debts contracted [by the
husband] during the marriage” can be a reference only to those debts
“contracted” by him in a matter of common concern to the spouses
under the community of gains. It may be regarded as certain that the
Civil Code does not consider debts incurred for the separate concerns of
the spouses properly payable, as between them, from the common
fund. The principle underlying article 2408 would be contradicted in
that case, for that article requires each spouse, on dissolution of the
regime, to reimburse the other spouse half the value added to his
separate assets through the utilization of common funds or energies.
From the exegesis thus far the community of gains emerges as a
marriage contract under which the spouses agree that certain of the
revenues of each spouse, the products of their labor and industry, and
certain of their acquisitions shall form a special mass within the
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patrimony of the husband and subject to his control. From this mass the
debts that he contracts during the marriage in relation to their common
concerns are, as between them, to be discharged. Finally, on dissolution
of the regime the wife or her heirs or successors in interest shall have
the right to take half the assets in the special mass, if either she or they
will accept personal liability in full for half the debts dischargeable
therefrom according to their marriage contract or if she will accept
liability for those debts under benefit of inventory. 34
One note of clarification remains. Because the community of
gains has the effect, as long as it lasts, of making all common assets part
of the husband’s patrimony, before dissolution of the community the
husband’s creditors of every kind may enforce their rights against the
community assets or the husband’s separate assets; on the other hand,
because the wife’s patrimony consists only of her separate assets and
her separate liabilities, her creditors, who are all her separate creditors
as long as the regime lasts, may enforce their rights only against her
separate assets. This conclusion is in conformity with the Spanish
community of gains in force in Louisiana in 1803. 35
If the community of gains, as described in this exegesis, is
examined in the light of traditional notions of the roles of husbands and
wives, it stands out as a splendid institution. Even the wife who
34

Thus, the community of gains, as article 2807 states clearly, is not a
partnership. Unfortunately, the translators of the Digest of 1808 and of the
Civil Code of 1825 used that term to translate the French text’s société, the
connotation of which in the articles on the community of gains was
“association” and not “partnership.” The one place in which the translators
correctly used “association” rather than “partnership” is the translation of
société appearing in article 2325, where the phrase “conjugal association” is
found.
35
Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1808, 80 LA. L. REV. 1, 21‐22 (1969),
emphasizes the lack of sources directly on the point, but notes that the wife’s
separate creditors could not have reached community assets because of the
husband’s control of them. But see, 29 La. L. Rev. 409, 412‐13 & n. 18 (1969).
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contributes no patrimonial assets to the community of gains receives
recognition for her cooperative efforts as wife, mother, and principal
attendant to the family’s cultural needs, its social life, and its obligations
in kind for works of mercy and societal concern. In return for her efforts
she is given the opportunity to share in her husband’s gains during
marriage without running the risk of losing, through her husband’s
misfortune or inadequacy, the capital which she had at marriage or
acquired thereafter by succession or donation to her particularly. On
the other hand, should she decide for any reason to engage in activities
for gain, it is only right that she should contribute those gains, as the
husband must, to the general family fund. The system has the wisdom
of centuries to recommend it. The question is whether modern women
remain sufficiently attuned to the ancient wisdom to permit the
community of gains to remain the “legal” matrimonial regime without
alteration of its basic structure.

THE ROOTS OF DISSATISFACTION AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES
The roots of dissatisfaction and possible remedies may be
divided for discussion into four topics: the historic, basic concept that
the community of gains, during its existence, is part of the husband’s
patrimony alone; the immutability of the regime; other roots of
dissatisfaction stemming from the legislation proper; and difficulties
resulting from misunderstandings of the laws on the subject.

The Community as Part of the Husband’s Patrimony and its Alternatives
Women of late have objected strenuously to several aspects of
the community of gains which have their common basis in the idea that
the community is part of the husband’s patrimony. They have objected
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that no disbursement of community funds can be made by the wife
except as the husband’s mandatary; 36 that separate creditors of the
wife may not enforce their rights against community assets; that
nevertheless the husband may employ community funds and other
assets as he pleases, even for his separate interests, subject to the
necessity of the wife’s consent in only a few instances; 37 and that even
the husband’s separate creditors may enforce their rights against the
community assets as long as the regime lasts. 38 Many women take the
position that these aspects of the community of gains violate the
fourteenth amendment and the Louisiana Constitution’s Bill of Rights,
and would violate the Equal Rights Amendment to the United States
Constitution were it to be adopted. The author disagrees. The proposed
Equal Rights Amendment does not forbid contracts between husband

36

LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 designates the husband as “head and master” of the
community of gains, “administrator” of its effects, and “disposer” of its
revenues. Although sometimes the wife’s consent is required, no provision is
made whereby the community of gains may be affected by the wife acting
without consent of the husband. See also LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 131, 1786, 2334
(1870).
37
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2334 and 2404 list most of the instances in which the
wife’s consent must be obtained: donation of immovables or of the whole or
“quotas” of the movables except to establish children of the marriage; sale or
mortgage of immovables or movables standing in the wife’s name only—
apparently to prevent disposition of the wife’s separate assets by the husband;
sale, mortgage, or lease of immovables standing in names of both spouses if
the wife has recorded a declaration that her consent will be required; and, by
construction, lease of a community immovable standing in name of the wife
alone if the wife has recorded the above declaration. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2801‐04
(1950) also forbids the alienation or encumbrance without the wife’s consent
of a community immovable which has been registered as the family home.
38
This was always true in the Spanish tradition and in Louisiana until United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Green, 252 La. 227, 210 So. 2d 328 (1968),
muddied the waters. Green, however, was overruled in Creech v. Capitol Mack,
Inc., 287 So. 2d 497 (La. 1973), restoring consistency between the decisions of
the Louisiana Supreme Court and tradition.
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and wife, 39 and the community of gains is contractual. 40 Even if the
regime were not conventional, it would not violate either the
fourteenth amendment as construed 41 or the Louisiana Constitution’s
Bill of Rights. 42 These forbid differences in the law’s treatments of men
and women which are “unreasonable,” “arbitrary,” or “capricious.” 43 An
institution which is of such tradition cannot be termed arbitrary or
capricious. Nor can it be considered unreasonable for the law to have
provided for a regime which so much honors the traditional roles of
husband and wife. Yet, given the present highly individualistic state of
women’s attitudes—one which places the woman in competition with
her husband, or at least in a dollars‐and‐cents bargaining position with
him as if theirs were a commercial partnership rather than a union in

39

The proposed Equal Rights Amendment is directed at laws imposing
differences in treatment on men and women: “Equality of right under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of sex.”
40
See text at notes 9‐11 supra.
41
Professor George L. Bilbe contends that previous constructions of the
fourteenth amendment indicate that a presumption of tacit marriage contract
accepting the community of gains would be unconstitutional because couples
in fact usually are ignorant of the features of the community of gains and of the
availability of express marriage contracts to modify or reject the community.
Bilbe, Constitutionality of Sex‐Based Differentiations in the Louisiana
Community Property Regime, 19 LOY. L. REV. 373 (1973). The argument has
weight, but the writer does not consider it conclusive. Nor does the author
consider convincing the arguments based on Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971),
and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), in which husband‐wife
relationships were not involved. It may be unreasonable to give preference to a
male when it comes to administering a third person’s succession (Reed) or not
to presume the husband is dependent on the wife, when the wife is presumed
dependent on the husband, for military allowance eligibility purposes
(Frontiero), but in any event neither case involved a division of authority
between husband and wife for good order.
42
LA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (1974): “No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unreasonably discriminate against a person because of . . . sex . . . ”
43
Id.
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which each seeks the maximum fulfillment of both through a division of
interests and efforts compatible with the traditional roles of husband
and wife—the legislator must take these objections into account and
modify the structure of the community of gains. The question, then,
becomes one of determining how the basic structure of the community
of gains shall be modified to meet these demands in fact.
Rejecting the community of gains entirely and accepting an
absolute separation of assets and liabilities as the legal regime would
have the very salutary general effects of increasing to the highest
degree possible the security of transaction third persons might have in
dealing with either spouse, of giving husband and wife each undisputed
separate control of his or her assets and revenues, and of insulating
each from loss resulting from the other’s mismanagement. The very
great disadvantage of this regime as a legal regime, however, would be
that it would require revision of the laws on succession between
husband and wife if Louisianians were to continue to enjoy on intestacy
anything resembling the effects of the combination of the present laws
on the community of gains and successions. This would be difficult to do
without destroying in large measure the great solicitude the law has had
for providing for the surviving spouse out of community assets and
thereby eliminating, in the usual case, the surviving spouse’s inheritance
of a share in effects in which the blood relatives of the deceased may
have an interest. The author, at least, considers this effect of prime
importance for preserving peace among in‐laws. No doubt, too, if
separation of property were accepted as the legal regime, some
provision would have to be made for the spouse of insufficient capital in
instances of separation from bed and board and divorce. A legislated
scheme would present the same, if not aggravated, problems of
intestate succession provisions, and the author, at least, does not
believe that discretion should be placed in the judiciary in a matter of
this kind. No one, however, seems to be urging an abandonment of a
regime based on the idea of a community of gains, not even women’s
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rights advocates, who realize full well that ordinarily it is the man who
accumulates most in patrimonial matters. Thus, they wish to preserve
the idea of a sharing of gains. The writer agrees, even if perhaps for
different motives.
The alternatives presently being urged for changing the
structure of the community of gains appear reducible to four distinct
kinds.
The first, very simply, would give to each spouse severally full
power to administer and control the community assets. This change
would place the whole of the community assets in the patrimony of
each spouse, thus affording the creditors of each spouse, whether
antenuptial or postnuptial, separate or community creditors, the right
to obtain satisfaction out of any and all community assets as well as out
of the separate assets of the debtor spouse. Under this plan, neither
spouse could be allowed to renounce the community of gains.
The second alternative is to require the joint action of the
spouses (or at least the consent of the spouse not the mover in the act)
for any matter affecting the community of gains, both as between the
spouses and as between the spouses and third persons. In the event of
joint action, both spouses would be obligated personally toward the
creditors, and the creditors could enforce their rights out of the
community assets or the separate assets of either spouse. In the event
one spouse acts with merely the consent of the other, the creditors of
the acting spouse could reach the community assets and that spouse’s
separate assets, but not the separate assets of the merely consenting
spouse. Whether joint action or action with consent of the other spouse
were involved, however, neither spouse could be allowed to renounce
the community of gains. Whether the separate creditors of one spouse
whose credits originated without the consent of the other spouse (for
example, an antenuptial creditor, or the creditor of a debt inherited or
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contracted during marriage without the consent of the other spouse)
should be allowed to enforce his right against the community assets
could be settled either way.
The third alternative is to leave the community of gains
essentially as it is except (1) to require the spouses to designate before
marriage who shall control it or (2) to permit the spouses to
redetermine after marriage which spouse shall have control. The
possibility of a renunciation of the community by the noncontrolling
spouse could be retained in the first instance, but probably not in the
second.
The fourth alternative, which the author recommends, would
give each spouse, during marriage, full control over those community
assets acquired by him, and sole liability for those community debts
incurred by him, so long as the regime lasted; but would give each
spouse, on dissolution of the regime, the right to accept or renounce
half the community assets and liabilities acquired or incurred by the
other spouse. The author believes this regime would have all the
advantages of a separation of property during marriage and yet
preserve the possibility of each spouse’s sharing in the other’s gains
during marriage without either depriving him of maximum freedom to
act during marriage or subjecting him to personal loss from the other’s
economic misfortune.
Evaluation of the Alternatives for Reform
The first proposal, that to give each spouse separate and
identical powers to deal with community assets and incur obligations
which his or her creditors could enforce out of all community assets, is
the ideal regime for the ideal couples who will be realized en masse by
society, if at all, only in millennia to come. How noble and charitable it is
to attribute to each spouse common goals in life, unison of mind on the
details of their execution and realization, and complete acceptance by
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each of whatever may be done by the other! Spouses who have the
spiritual assets to cope with the demands of this regime should be
urged to contract it specially—indeed, they should be urged to enlarge
it to include all assets and liabilities of the spouses whenever and
however acquired, before as well as during marriage. But to make this
the legal regime in the absence of sufficiently widespread utopian virtue
would require couples who wish to look forward to marriages with
some degree of permanency to enter into marriage contracts
denouncing it. The legal regime should be that which fits best the vast
majority of the people, whatever their virtue or lack of it.
There is danger, nevertheless, that a legislature might be moved
to adopt such a regime as the legal regime. 44 Some militant women’s
rights advocates wish to give the wife the same credit husbands have
enjoyed up to now to buy luxuries beyond the family’s means, and
legislators fear their political power. Another reason is that the
suggested regime would coincide, at least temporarily, with the
economic advantage of merchants and other professional extenders of
small credit. They would be able to extend credit to a wife and collect
from her husband, not simply for ordinary family requirements, but for
anything at all. Extenders of major credit might be expected to become
more anxious to have themselves provided with real or at least
44

Arizona, California, Idaho, and Washington have now amended their
community regimes in directions which approach this plan. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25‐214 (Supp. 1973); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125 (Deering Supp. 1975) ; IDAHO
CODE § 32‐912 (Supp. 1974); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1973). The
various laws have different formulae and variations in substantive detail, but in
general all give each spouse the power to incur obligations enforceable out of
all community assets and the power to alienate community movables for value.
In general, the acquisition, disposition, or encumbrance of an immovable
requires the action of both spouses. All these provisions are very new,
Washington’s having been enacted in 1972, Arizona’s in 1973, Idaho’s in 1974,
and California’s in 1973 to take effect in 1975. Experience with them, therefore,
has been limited.
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nonspousal personal security. Unsecured loans to husbands in business
would be far fewer, for the wife’s capacity to deprive her husband’s
creditor of the security afforded by the community assets would be all
too great. No doubt credit generally would become more difficult and
more expensive.
Advocates of this deceptively simple, but at the same time the
most radical, departure from the community of gains’ traditional
structure, have urged that it is the only way to recognize fully woman’s
contribution in marriage and to keep her out of the employment market
in the interest of the family. The observation implies a recognition of
different roles for men and women during marriage, but it also implies
that married women in general may be more concerned today with
financial partnership than with giving the family that kind of
cooperation in life only the woman can give so well. Such an attitude, it
seems to the author, is precisely what causes the present community of
gains to be distasteful to some women and what necessitates its
change. But one can suspect that men will not accept gladly a regime
which gives the wife control of all their gains, and one can suspect, too,
that in those rarer instances in which the woman provides the greater
portion of the gains, the wife will not be so anxious to give her husband
the same authority she has to control them. Human nature must be
taken into account by the law.
The second alternative for reform, providing for joint control of
the community of gains, is ruled out by its cumbersomeness and its
fundamental premise of mutual distrust. A marriage cannot survive if
action on the part of each spouse is dependent totally on the other’s
concurrence. Each spouse remains a separate person in fact in spite of
marriage; differences of opinion between them are bound to arise, and
these differences will encumber free action. Couples may be able to
tolerate joint control in rare, important transactions, such as the sale of
a family home, but not for everyday events of the market place, or in

COMMUNITY OF GAINS

217

ordinary business transactions. It is to be suspected that differences of
opinion on such occasions might easily lead to quicker dissolutions of
the marriages than otherwise would have occurred. Probably only those
marriages in which the spouses provided each other or at least one of
them with a mandate to act for both could survive. If that is so, the first
alternative plan would seem better than this one as the legal regime.
Third persons wishing to deal with either spouse would have to obtain
the cooperation of the other or at least a copy of the mandate to the
acting spouse in order to protect themselves, increasing the red tape of
commerce. Being married must not be made an occasion for
inconveniencing third persons in their normal dealings with husbands
and wives in daily life.
The third plan leaves the community of gains essentially as it is,
except that it requires or permits the spouses, either before marriage
only or at any time during marriage, to decide which of them shall
control it. To a greater degree than the second plan it would place third
persons in the position of having to ascertain which of the spouses has
the authority to act. In the author’s opinion, the spouses should present
as simple a legal posture as possible in the presence of third persons in
order to provide for the greatest security of transaction. In addition, if
change of control by mutual consent were permitted during marriage,
serious disputes leading to family disintegration could be anticipated.
The author considers this proposal to be the worst of all possible plans,
both from the point of view of third persons dealing with the spouses
and from that of the spouses in relation to each other.
The fourth alternative is that recommended by the author.
During marriage, control over community assets and liability for
community debts would be divided between the spouses as follows:
Each spouse would have, as part of his patrimony, those community
assets and those community liabilities acquired and incurred by him. His
act alone would suffice for acquisition of an asset. A community liability
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incurred by him alone would be enforceable only out of the community
assets under his control and out of his separate assets. One spouse’s
creditors could not enforce their rights out of the community assets
under the control of the other spouse or against the other spouse’s
separate assets. As against all third persons, each spouse would be as
independent of the other in assets and liabilities as are spouses
separate in property. Each could contract community obligations
toward third persons or toward the other spouse as if he were a
stranger. Together they could incur obligations toward others jointly or
solidarily as if strangers. They could acquire community assets as co‐
owners in indivision and demand partition thereof against each other,
and the creditor of each could demand satisfaction out of his debtor
spouse’s undivided interest, all as if the spouses were unmarried co‐
owners. Never would a single thing acquired by the act of both, even as
a community asset, be other than one acquired in indivision, so far as
third persons are concerned. Never would any asset acquired by both
fall under the control of one only, or be placed beyond the reach of his
creditors. In all things, so far as the public is concerned, the spouses
would appear as if single persons, each having his own patrimony. Yet,
as between the spouses, there would be a community of gains. Each
spouse’s patrimony would include his separate assets and liabilities and
the community assets and liabilities acquired or incurred by him. On
dissolution of the regime, each spouse would have the right to
renounce his right to share the community assets and liabilities acquired
or incurred by the other spouse, thus both preserving the fundamental
notion of a sharing of gains at the termination of the regime and also
extending to the husband a right which the wife alone has under the
present law, that of renouncing a community mass which one has no
power to control and whose liabilities exceed its assets. Another way of
looking at the plan is that each spouse’s patrimony would function, both
as to third persons and as between the spouses themselves, like the
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patrimony of the husband when the wife has not contributed any gains
to the community.
The author has not been able to discover a defect in this plan. It
preserves a community of gains. It affords each spouse sole control of
what comes to the community through his hands—fruits and revenues
of his separate assets, fruits and revenues of community assets already
acquired by him, products of his labor and industry, donations to him
made as community assets, and all things acquired by him with these
things. It would enable the unmarried but marriageable woman to
obtain more credit, for her antenuptial creditors could rely on her
future gains even though they were to become community assets. It
insulates each spouse against personal liability for debts originating with
the other. It affords third persons the same security of transaction in
dealings with either spouse that could be achieved with a separation of
property. Third persons would never have to inquire whether an asset
was a separate asset or a community asset, as long as it was found in
the acting spouse’s patrimony. No inquiry would have to be made in
extending credit except as to that spouse’s actual or potential
patrimony. Neither before third persons nor between the spouses
would there be a “head and master” of the community. Each spouse
would be equal before the other under the marriage contract. Yet,
regardless of who acquired the most or who spent the most, there
would be a sharing of gains as they existed at the end of the regime,
reflecting the understanding that each should share the other’s good or
poor fortune.
The suggestion, to be certain, would not meet the demands of
those who insist that the “houseperson,” male or female, should have
as much control over the “earningperson’s” earnings as the
“earningperson” himself. Nor would it satisfy completely the extenders
of small credit, for they would like to have their business opportunities
expanded even more by being given the right to extend credit to the
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wife against the husband’s present and future acquisitions. But it will
satisfy the reasonable demands of women to control those community
assets acquired by them without depriving their husbands of the credit
usually extended them on the basis of their present assets and
prospects for future gains. Few extenders of credit to husbands have
relied in fact on the wife’s earning potential simply because those
earnings fell into the community of gains.
Advocates of the first proposal, which the author rejects, point
out that only that concept of the community of gains would assure the
revenueless wife of a source of finances that she deserves as a matter of
human dignity. That she should have some income to use as she sees fit
is agreed, and most emphatically so. The woman who must or chooses
to leave finances entirely to her husband and who has no other source
of revenue must be assured of a portion of his income which she might
spend or obligate as she herself decides. The same is true of a man who
depends on his wife’s income. This objective, however, should be met
not by matrimonial regimes law, which is the subject of contract, but by
the law of marriage, which is not. Provision for an allowance for the
spouse without revenue—or whatever one may call it—should be by a
law applicable between the spouses as a matter of public order,
whatever the spouses might agree in their marriage contract.
The author is not certain of the precise form a rule to that end
should take. Possibly the only method is to require that the spouse
having less than a certain percentage, perhaps 20 per cent, of the
combined incomes of both be entitled to demand enough from the
other to raise his total income to that percentage. The funds transferred
would remain community assets if taken from community assets, but
would be subject to the complete control of the payee spouse. That the
rule would be an empty gesture in some instances if it were not
enforceable by suit, is clear. That even the availability of suit would not
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suffice in some instances, also is clear. But the law can do very little to
enforce rights between spouses at odds with each other.
It may be noted, finally, that nothing has been said in any of the
discussion above about the right of either spouse to pledge the credit of
the other in making purchases for the normal, ordinary demands of
family life. The reason is that this, too, should not be satisfied through
matrimonial regimes law, which is contractual and may be varied by the
parties in entering into their marriage contract, but by the
conventionally unalterable public order law of marriage. Up to now,
Louisiana has lived with what the author would like to consider a true
custom, given popular approbation, that the husband is presumed to
have authorized his wife tacitly to incur in his name obligations for such
requirements of the family’s usual life as husbands in Louisiana
ordinarily expect their wives to procure in their husband’s names. 45 In
the opinion of the author, the law of marriage could be amended to
obligate husband and wife solidarily, so far as their creditors are
concerned, for all such obligations. Extenders of credit for such things
should not have to inquire into the authority of the husband or wife
with whom they deal. As between the spouses themselves, however,
liability for such obligations should be left to the spouses’ marriage
contract or, failing a stipulation on the point, be divided between them
in proportion to their respective incomes.
Conventional Immutability
Never in Louisiana have the spouses been able to modify their
matrimonial regime once the marriage has taken place. A separation of
goods and effects might occur on separation from bed and board 46 or
on a judgment of separation of property obtained by the wife for

45
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See ROBERT A. PASCAL, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE § 6.8 (1973).
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 155 (1870).
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cause, 47 placing the spouses under a legally imposed regime of
separation of property; 48 but never could spouses use the contract form
to vary the regime which they had contracted expressly or tacitly at
marriage. 49 Today there is some clamor for an abandonment of this
rule, not simply by women’s rights advocates who see the rule as a male
chauvinist trick, but also by others who do not believe that any
contractual arrangement between persons should be beyond review
and revision by mutual consent. There can be no doubt that one or both
spouses to a marriage may come to regret their marriage regime.
Louisiana attorneys will testify that occasionally spouses are so
dissatisfied with their regime that they obtain separations from bed and
board only to put an end to the existing regime and then become
reconciled and continue to live under the then legally imposed regime
of separation of property. It is also true that even the French, long
enforcers of the immutability rule, have made possible the conventional
amendment of matrimonial regimes under judicial supervision in
instances of family advantage. 50
The author indicated once before in this article that the
possibility of allowing the spouses to designate one or the other of
themselves as administrator of the community of gains by conventional
act during marriage probably would lead to incessant discussions on the
point and eventually to the disintegration of marriages that otherwise
would have succeeded. The same might be said of the possibility of
making other changes in a matrimonial regime by convention. No doubt
a husband who had accepted a community of gains sometimes might
come to wish he had insisted on a separation of property, or a wife who
had consented to a separation of property might come to desire a
47

Id. art. 2425.
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community of gains. The spouse who conceived of a selfish advantage
would be tempted to demand a change and the other would tend to
resist. Business partners can afford to risk dissolution of the partnership
when one partner decides to strike for himself alone, but married
persons and their children cannot. Anything which can be the cause of
friction—an envisioned gain realizable only with the other spouse’s
consent—must be eliminated. Each spouse must understand that talk of
change of regime is useless. If change of regime is possible, inter‐
spousal discord will occur and all too often end either in family
disintegration or in one spouse’s acceptance of unjustifiable personal
loss in order to hold the family together. The proper remedy is to make
certain each spouse understands before marriage what the legal regime
is and how it may be modified or rejected in favor of another, 51 and to
make the legal regime one that will minimize interspousal
dissatisfactions.
Other Dissatisfactions and Difficulties Caused by the Legislation
If Louisiana men always have been “male chauvinists,” they also
have been most chivalrous. Thus, Civil Code article 2386 and its
counterparts in the Digest of 1808 and Civil Code of 1825 have allowed
the wife who administered her paraphernal assets to keep their fruits—
even those produced by her labor, for example, crops—as part of her
separate property. Fruits of the husband’s separate assets, however,
invariably form part of the community of gains. Articles 2334 and 2402
provide that actions for damages for personal injuries to the wife are
her separate assets, but that those for personal injuries to the husband
are community assets except when he is injured while living separate
from her by reason of fault on her part sufficient for separation or
divorce. And article 2334 allows the wife living separate and apart from
51

S. 314, introduced in the 1974 Louisiana legislative session by Senator
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her husband, whomsoever’s may have been the fault, to keep her
earnings as separate assets, although the husband’s earnings always
constitute gains. 52
These inequalities should and can be eliminated easily. All or
none of the fruits of separate assets should be community assets. If they
are to constitute community assets, then it should be legislated that
only the net fruits enter the community. The latter rule would simplify
accounting and minimize commingling problems by focusing the
community rights on identifiable values or credits rather than on gross
fruits against which the costs of production would have to be
considered community obligations. All damages for personal injuries,
and even for loss of earning capacity, should be considered separate
assets. It is true that the products of “the industry and labor” of the
spouses belong to the community of gains, but it is also true that in this
day marriages often are shortlived, especially when the badly injured
husband recovers a sizeable amount for personal injuries and the wife
realizes that, through separation or divorce, she can both free herself of
him and obtain, as her own, one‐half his recovery. 53 It would be better
52

LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334, as amended in 1912 and thereafter, also treats the
earnings of the wife in a trade, occupation, or profession “separate” (i.e.,
different) from her husband’s as her separate assets. The Louisiana Supreme
Court, however, construed the provision as repetitious of that making the
earnings of the wife while living separate from her husband her separate
assets. Houghton v. Hall, 177 La. 237, 148 So. 37 (1933). Popular acceptance
and reliance on the decision gave rise to a custom contra legem which was
confirmed by implication by an amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure. LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 686 (1960), as amended, 1970 La. Acts 344. The article,
designating the proper party plaintiff to enforce rights forming part of the
community of gains, was amended to name the wife proper party plaintiff to
recover her earnings.
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See Chambers v. Chambers, 259 La. 246, 249 So. 2d 896 (1971), and cases
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future earnings.
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to allow the injured spouse to retain the damages as his. Any
community, of any marriage, could expect to be enriched by the fruits
produced by the recovered damages, and, in any event, each spouse
must be required to contribute to the expenses of the existing marriage
out of all his income, community or separate. Earnings while spouses
are living separate and apart should be classed as community assets;
but, whatever the community regime, during a period of separation in
fact the earning spouse should be allowed to retain control of his
earnings and of the fruits of his separate assets. If the author’s
recommendation for the structure of a community of gains were
adopted, of course, that result would not have to be provided
specifically for that particular regime.
It would also be well to reconsider two general provisions: the
“omnibus clause” of article 2334 and the presumption under article
2405. Under the “omnibus clause,” all things acquired during marriage
by either spouse are community assets unless legislation has declared
them to be separate assets. This rule is much too sweeping. Its literal
application requires a thing not labelled a separate asset by the
legislation to be treated as a community asset even if to do so would
violate the principle of the community of gains evident from article 2402
and the major portion of 2334, that gains include only fruits of assets,
products of labor and industry, donations received as community assets,
and things acquired in exchange for community assets. It was the
“omnibus clause,” for example, that brought about the first decisions
holding that recoveries for personal injuries entered the community. 54 A
more reasonable conclusion would have been that such damages
replaced a personal and therefore separate value, one’s bodily integrity.
The community scheme may give the other spouse a right to the
products of one’s body, but not to one’s body as such. Life insurance
54
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proceeds were left out of community assets because the judiciary was
able to take the view that they were donated funds, though the
donations had to be declared to be of a special kind, free of the rules on
ordinary donations. 55 Today the “omnibus clause” seems to be one of
the motives for classifying most rights to retirement benefits as
community assets, and yet there are good reasons to suggest that many
of these rights (as distinguished from their proceeds when paid) should
be considered intensely personal and therefore as separate assets, in
spite of their being to some extent the products of labor and industry. If
the clause were eliminated, doctrine and judicial opinion could guide
the proper characterization of new rights as community or separate in
accordance with the basic principles of the regime.
Article 2405 declares that upon dissolution of the regime all
things possessed by either spouse are presumed community assets until
the contrary is proved. Although such a presumption might be fair in
those instances in which the spouses have been married many years or
in those in which it can be shown generally that the spouses’
acquisitions were largely through gains after marriage, it is often a
vicious rule when applied to marriages recently contracted, or when the
general situations of the spouses at marriage or at death would seem to
render the contrary presumption a more reliable indication of the true
facts. Although the present rule facilitates the quick disposition of
successions and even of partitions after separation and divorce, it
probably does so at the expense of justice in many instances. The
author would abolish the presumption and in its place substitute the
general provision that if the spouses or their successors in interest
55
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cannot agree on the characterization of a thing, its characterization
should depend on a preponderance of evidence, giving due regard to
the nature of the thing, the time of its acquisition, the general
configuration of the patrimonies of the spouses, and all other factors
which may be shown to be relevant and probative.
Two definite defects in the law of marriage relevant to
matrimonial regimes are, first, the absence of a requirement that the
spouses disclose fully to each other, at all times, the states of their
patrimonies, and second, the prohibition of suit between spouses. Full
disclosure of the spouses’ patrimonies is essential not only under the
community of gains, but also under any other regime, for, whatever the
regime, the spouses should be required to contribute to the expenses of
the marriage in the manner specified in the marriage contract or, failing
such specification, in proportion to their respective incomes. 56 The
requirement of disclosure would become especially important if the
author’s suggestion that a revenueless spouse should be able to claim a
minimum allowance from the other were adopted.
Presently, Louisiana legislation forbids wives to sue husbands
except for separation from bed and board, divorce, (nullity of marriage),
separation 57 of property, and return of paraphernalia. No legislation
forbids husband to sue wife, but the jurisprudence seems to suggest
that such a suit will not be allowed the husband except in instances
similar to those in which the wife might sue him. 58 These prohibitions,
legal and factual, seem inconsistent with present modes of thought and
certainly have caused inconveniences. The wife needing alimony during
marriage, for example, has been forced either to file suit for separation
56
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from bed and board or to charge her husband with criminal neglect of
family, even though she has not been left in “destitute or necessitous”
circumstances. Neither spouse has been able to prove his right to
recover from the other for delict while the evidence was available
unless he first obtained a separation from bed and board. In addition, if
the author’s plan for a community of gains were accepted, with its
treatment of the spouses as if they were strangers to each other’s
patrimonies even during marriage, it would be well to allow suit
between them generally for any cause of action.
Another problem needing attention arises from article 131 of
the Civil Code. That article declares that the wife who is a public
merchant obligates herself and, if there is a community between them,
her husband personally as well. The article never was intended to mean
that the wife might obligate the husband personally without his consent
to her acting as a public merchant. This is made abundantly clear by
article 1786, which restricts the husband’s liability for the wife’s acts in
trade to instances in which he has permitted her to act as a public
merchant. His consent, in other words, renders her act his if there is a
community between them, for her activity is a type which produces
revenues which should fall into the community of gains.
There is, nevertheless, dictum in two cases 59 and some popular
opinion that, as a result of the married women’s emancipation
legislation, 60 the married woman may be a public merchant without the
permission of her husband and that in so acting she obligates not only
herself, but her husband personally as well. If so, the married woman
has, in her activity as a public merchant, the same capacity as the
husband to incur debts which enter the community of gains and, in
addition, may do something which the husband as manager of the
59
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community of gains may not do, obligate her spouse personally to her
creditors without his consent. The result could not have been intended,
certainly, and was not. If the married women’s emancipation legislation
has this effect, it has modified the laws on the community of gains, and
La. R.S. 9:105 states explicitly that nothing in that legislation is intended
to modify the community of gains. Under the present law, therefore, it
may very well be concluded that the married woman, though relieved of
the “incapacities” and “disabilities” of a married woman “as such” by
that legislation, either (1) may not be a public merchant if forbidden by
her husband, or (2) may be a public merchant against his prohibition,
but in that case without affecting either the community of gains or her
husband personally.
The niceties of the present effect of article 131, however, need
not be dwelt upon unless the management provisions of the community
of gains are retained substantially as they are today. Of the four general
types of suggested reforms mentioned in this article, only that in which
the community would remain as it is, subject to the right of the spouses
to decide who shall manage it, would not necessarily repeal article 131
by implication. If that were the regime adopted as the “legal” regime,
then the author would recommend, at a minimum, that article 131 be
amended to eliminate the personal liability of the managing spouse for
the acts of the nonmanaging spouse who is a public merchant. It would
be preferable, however, that the activity of the nonmanaging spouse
who is a public merchant affect his separate patrimony only.
The final source of dissatisfaction is the manner in which the
wife is protected against inter vivos acts of the husband to the prejudice
of her interest in the community of gains. Donations of immovables or
of the whole or a quota of the movables, except those to establish
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children of the marriage, appear to be declared null. 61 Suits to have
such donations declared null before dissolution of the regime, however,
are not known. The husband is permitted to make donations of
particular movables unless he can be said to have acted with the
intention to defraud his wife. Even then the act is not null, the wife
having only an action in damages against the husband or his heirs at the
dissolution of the regime. 62 Other alienations made to defraud the wife
give rise to the same remedy only. Proof of intent to defraud the wife is
difficult in any case, and years after the event it may be impossible or
useless. No matter what plan for revising the community of gains is
accepted, it would seem desirable that the nonmanaging spouse be
given more protection of his eventual right to share the community
assets. An adequate remedy or preventative, however, is difficult to
devise except in the instances of immovables or registered movables.
There, a requirement of concurrence or written consent might be
enforced easily. But it is questionable that written consent of the
nonmanaging spouse should be required for other than gratuitous acts,
except possibly the alienation or encumbrance of the family home. Any
other rule increases the difficulty of dealing with third persons and
makes transacting business too inconvenient. The author, therefore,
would prefer to adhere to the present rule, even if it cannot always
provide an adequate remedy, but would extend it by giving the
aggrieved spouse the right to sue immediately either the acting spouse
or any third party who has received the asset with knowledge of the
intent to defraud the aggrieved spouse.
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MAJOR MISCONSTRUCTIONS AND MISAPPLICATIONS
Purchases with Separate Funds
The jurisprudence has treated acquisitions by the husband with
separate funds differently from similar acquisitions by the wife. The
husband’s acquisitions have been designated community assets if the
husband failed to state in the act of acquisition both that he was making
the purchase with separate funds and that he intended the thing
purchased to be his separate asset. 63 The wife, on the other hand, has
been allowed to show at any time that a purchase was made with
separate funds and the proper intent. 64 It will be noted that the
jurisprudential rules imply that a purchase with separate funds can be a
community asset, and that whether it is or not depends on the intent of
the purchaser. Yet article 2334, as amended in 1912, declares that a
thing purchased with separate assets is itself a separate thing, and
article 2334 does not require any particular mode of proof to establish
the separate character of the purchase money. Nor does any article of
the Civil Code suggest that during marriage, or otherwise than at
dissolution, 65 a thing is to be presumed a community asset until the
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contrary is proved. Whatever the new community regime, care must be
taken to negate and avoid such unauthorized and unwarranted judicial
legislation. The community of gains is, as mentioned earlier in this
article, not a complete matrimonial regime. The spouses are separate in
property as to part of their patrimonies and in community as to part.
There is no reason to establish strong presumptions in favor of
community characterization. The spouses have as much right to be
protected in their separate assets as they have in their community
assets.
The “Ownership” of the Community Assets
Much concern was caused by the United States Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Mitchell, 66 which held that a wife was
obliged to file an income tax return and pay income tax on one‐half the
income of the community of gains although she had had no control over
the income and had no way to compel her husband to furnish her with
information sufficient to make the return or with the money with which
to pay the tax. Certainly the decision was in error, for the general
principle of income tax liability is economic power, whatever the
phraseology of the statute. The Supreme Court, however, used the false
concept of the wife’s ownership of one‐half the community of gains,
made prominent by Phillips v. Phillips 67 in 1926, in reasoning that the
tax statutes imposed liability on the owner of the income and that
under Louisiana decisions the wife was owner of half the community
income even if she could not control it. The Phillips decision has been
overruled on this point by Creech v. Capitol Mack, Inc., 68 and hence

though the 1912 amendment to article 2334 had rendered all purchases with
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there should be no difficulty in arguing the incorrectness of Mitchell and
avoiding its pronouncement in the future.
In any event, a change in the structure of the control over the
community of gains may alter the income tax liability of the spouses.
The first alternative plan discussed previously might very well be
construed to render each spouse liable for the whole tax due on all
community income, for each spouse severally would have the right to
control the whole community income. Under the second plan, that of
joint control, it would seem that each spouse should be liable for only
half the tax, for neither might act alone to control the community
assets. Under the third plan, that of a single community administered by
the spouse chosen by the mutual consent of both, any attempt to assign
a half interest to the non‐managing spouse might result in a legal
situation similar to that described in Mitchell. Under the plan advocated
by the author, however, it would seem reasonable to conclude that
each spouse could be held liable for only that tax due on the community
income coming into his hands, unless the revised laws on the
community unwisely attempt to declare each spouse “owner” of one‐
half the community of gains during its existence. The author, therefore,
recommends that any such definition of the interests of the spouses in
the community of gains be avoided. The term, after all, is merely one of
art. The actual rights and powers of the spouses with regard to
community assets and liabilities are the more important considerations.
The “Entity” Notion and its Ramifications
The Civil Code does not treat the community of gains as a
separate “entity” or fund with elements of legal personality, but the
bench and bar have thought about it in this fashion since the first part
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of the 19th century. 69 This kind of thinking led to many false
conclusions. Sometimes on the death of the wife the husband or his
heirs were deemed to have the right to “administer” the community of
gains for its “liquidation,” thus reducing the right of the wife or her heirs
to a surplus in value. Yet under the Civil Code, each spouse or his heirs is
entitled to a partition immediately on dissolution of the regime in order
to realize his interest in terms of half the assets rather than a half
interest in all of them. 70 This is true even if there is acceptance of the
community with benefit of inventory, for the benefit of inventory
properly understood operates only on the share of the spouse so
accepting. 71 Yet in instances of acceptance with benefit of inventory the
tendency was to place the entire community in administration, perhaps
much to the prejudice of the desire of the other spouse or his heirs to
realize the ownership of particular items through partition. There are
decisions with better foundations and better results, to be sure, but the
popular misconception persists among members of the legal
profession. 72
The same tendency to regard the community as an entity to be
administered and liquidated by the husband on dissolution led to the
practice of including that administration as a part of the deceased
husband’s succession, quite contrary to the Civil Code’s requirement
that the community be partitioned so that the assets in the succession
of the deceased might be ascertained. 73 The 1960 Code of Civil
69

For a fall review of the subject see especially Comment, The Fictitious
Community and the Right to Partition, 30 LA. L. REV. 603 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Fictitious Community].
70
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2406 (1870).
71
Id. art. 1047, rendered applicable to the wife’s acceptance under benefit of
inventory by LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2821 (1950), is abundantly clear on the point.
72
See, e.g., Edwards v. Edwards, 268 So. 2d 686 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Lester
v. Lester, 245 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
73
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1135 (1870), unfortunately repealed by 1960 La. Acts 30, on
adoption of the 1960 Code of Civil Procedure.
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Procedure compounded difficulties by seeming to say, at least, that the
surviving spouse was to be placed in possession of that half of the
community of gains which is his right under matrimonial regimes law in
the succession proceedings and after any administration therein. 74
Similarly, the tendency to personify the community of gains led the
judiciary to speak of the community creditors’ preference over a
spouse’s separate creditors to reach community assets for satisfaction
of their rights. 75 There is, however, no justification for this preference in
our legislation, for preferences exist only by legislation, and there is no
legislation creating any such preference. All creditors of a spouse have
rights against all assets of the spouse on the same basis, whether those
assets are or were community assets or separate assets.
The author suggests that any legislation revising the com‐
munity of gains should specify clearly the purely conventional character
of the community of gains, the nonexistence of a community entity, and
the absolute right of either spouse to demand a partition upon
dissolution as long as he or she accepts the community simply or with
benefit of inventory. The right of each spouse or his heirs to half the
specific things in the community, as opposed to a half interest in surplus
assets after an administration to pay debts, should be preserved. A
surviving spouse or the heir of a deceased spouse may well prefer to
preserve his right to a particular asset even if he has to use separate
funds to discharge community debts. This refinement of the traditional
law should not be abandoned for a concept that both reduces all goods

74

LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 3001‐08, 3031‐35, 3061, 3062 (1960). See Pascal, The
Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1968‐1969 Term—Matrimonial
Regimes, 30 LA. L. REV. 171, 222‐23 (1969). The author’s comments are correct
with the exception of his statement concerning the effect of acceptance with
benefit of inventory. The author had not yet penetrated through the usual lore
to the true plan of the Civil Code. See also Fictitious Community, supra note 69,
for criticisms of the above cited articles of the Code of Civil Procedure.
75
Thompson v. Vance, 110 La. 26, 34 So. 112 (1903).
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to simple money values and demonstrates a creditor orientation that
ignores personal sensibilities concerning the assets which have formed a
part of one’s life or that of one’s spouse, parent, or other relative. At
the same time, the apparently inconsistent articles of the 1960 Code of
Civil Procedure should be corrected by amendment.
Legacies of Community Assets
The failure to understand that the community is not an entity to
be liquidated and, further, that the spouses each have upon its
dissolution an absolute right to one‐half the particular assets in the
community of gains as distinguished from a mere half interest in each
asset as owners in indivision, has given rise to the common assumption
that the spouse dying first cannot make a legacy of a community asset,
but only a legacy of his half interest in any or all of the community
assets. There is no reason, however, why a spouse’s legacy of a specific
community thing should not be upheld as valid subject to either of two
conditions: (1) that the thing falls to the deceased’s lot in the partition
in kind, that being possible, or (2) that the survivor consents to the
legacy in return for the right to take full ownership of other community
assets of equal value for himself. If a unitary community mass is
continued under such revision of the laws as may come, then the rule
suggested above should apply to all community assets. Should the
author’s suggestion for a community regime be accepted, however,
then each spouse’s right to make legacies of particular community
assets should be limited to those community assets which have been in
his patrimony and subject to his control.
Commingling of Assets
Commingling is the community’s bane of existence, but
legislation can do nothing to eliminate it. Spouses who have both
separate assets and community assets in their possession and control
will commingle them. The only way to avoid commingling is to have an
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absolutely universal community of all things which the spouses have
and may acquire, or, in other words, commingle all as a matter of law.
It is unnecessary and unfair, however, to label as a community
asset everything or every mass of things which results from
commingling. Not even the presumption under article 2405, that on
dissolution all things possessed by the spouses are deemed community
assets until the contrary is proved, requires this conclusion. The
ordinary principles of accession should come into play once it can be
ascertained that the commingled mass has been constituted of separate
and community things. If the value of the separate element exceeds the
value of the community element, it would seem more reasonable to
consider the whole a separate asset subject to accounting under the
rule of article 2408. Under that article, the spouse whose separate asset
has been augmented by community assets or energies owes the other
spouse half the value which was added to the separate asset. If the
community element exceeded the value of the separate element, then
the commingled mass should be regarded as a community asset and the
rule of article 2408 should be applied by analogy. But a commingled
mass should not be labelled a community thing just because some
community assets were involved.
There is a problem, of course, when community and separate
fungibles or funds have been placed in a single pool or account from
which withdrawals have been made without records over so long a
period as to make a tracing of values impossible. In that case it may be
legitimate to have a presumption in favor of the community character
of the thing, for in this way the most any spouse could lose under the
formula is half of that to which he would have been entitled.
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THE OBLIGATIONS OF SPOUSES TO CONTRIBUTE
TO THE EXPENSES OF THE MARRIAGE

The probability of significant changes in matrimonial regimes
law suggests that the obligations of spouses for the support of the
expenses of the marriage, as between themselves and third‐party
creditors, should be re‐examined.
The Civil Code has considered the question from two different
points of view, one of public order, under the laws of marriage and
those on father and child, and one of private order, under the law of
matrimonial regimes. Under the law of marriage, not subject to the
convention of the spouses, each has been obliged to furnish the other
with basic support and assistance, 76 but the husband has been placed
under the greater obligation of supplying his wife with all the
conveniences of life in accordance with his means and condition. 77
Under the law of father and child, parents are obliged to contribute in
proportion to their means to the basic support and education of their
children, whatever their ages; 78 but as a corollary of their right to enjoy
(use and take the revenues of) the patrimonies of their minor
unemancipated children, they are obliged to support and educate them
“according to their station in life.” 79 These obligations are of public
order. Nothing anyone could provide by marriage contract could
derogate from them. They must be understood, however, to have
application only when the person claiming support does not have
76

LA. CIVIL CODE art. 119 (1870).
Id. art. 120.
78
Id. art. 227. This article obliges fathers and mothers to educate their children
and does not limit their obligation to the children’s minority. Article 230, on the
other hand, reads that alimony for a minor includes what is necessary for his
education. In the author’s opinion, article 230 limits the alimentary obligation
of nonparent obligors toward major children, but not the general obligation of
parents specified by article 227.
79
Id. arts. 223, 224.
77
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sufficient means to provide for himself; for all these obligations are
enforced, when enforced at all, by alimony, and alimony is due only to
the extent the obligee has need and the obligor has the ability to pay. 80
The spouses, nevertheless, may provide by marriage contract
how they are to support the expenses of the marriage, including the
education of the children. Their stipulations, as agreements, control
between them unless the standards set by the imperative laws of public
order would not be met. In that event, the imperative laws always may
be enforced. But subject to that limitation, the spouses may agree that
only one of them shall bear all the expenses of the marriage, or that
they shall share those expenses according to a specified formula. 81 In
the absence of the stipulation of a formula in the marriage contract, the
suppletive matrimonial regimes laws provide one.
As the Civil Code now reads, if the wife has brought a dowry,
then the revenues from the dowry constitute her contribution to the
marriage expenses. 82 She need contribute no more under matrimonial
regimes law. The husband then must bear all expenses beyond the
revenues of the dowry. If the wife has not brought a dowry, then she
must share the marriage expenses with her husband in proportion to
their incomes, with the limitation that she need not contribute more
than half her income even if it exceeds his. 83 If there is a community of
gains, the income therefrom is to be considered the husband’s for this

80

Id. arts. 231, 232.
See, e.g., id. art. 2395.
82
Id. art. 2389.
83
Id. arts. 2389, 2395. Article 2389 mentions only income from the wife’s
paraphernalia, but the article was written when the community of gains was a
necessary part of every Louisiana matrimonial regime. Were the wife to be
allowed earnings as separate property, article 2389 would have to be
construed broadly to include those earnings as income out of which she would
be expected to contribute to the marriage expenses.
81
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purpose. Only after a separation of property does the law expect the
wife to bear all expenses of the marriage if need be. 84
It may be asked whether the suppletive laws on conventional
matrimonial regimes should presume the spouses intend to limit the
wife’s contribution to the expenses of the marriage to one‐half of her
income. The author would be in favor of deleting the limitation so that,
in the absence of stipulation in the marriage contract, the wife and
husband always would be expected to contribute to the expenses of the
marriage in proportion to their respective total incomes from both
separate and community sources. Similarly, the author sees nothing to
warrant the retention of the rule of article 120, which imposes a greater
burden of support on the husband than on the wife. The rights and
obligations of each spouse with regard to support to or from the other
should be equalized at the greater obligation. The wife should be
obliged as much as the husband to contribute to the furnishing of the
conveniences of life in accordance with their condition in society and in
proportion to their respective incomes.
All the rules discussed above are rules between husband and
wife. Should third persons be allowed to hold one spouse liable
personally for obligations incurred by the other spouse for “expenses of
the marriage”? Certainly no creditor of one spouse should be
recognized as having a right against the other spouse by reason of a
provision in a marriage contract. For the sake of an orderly legal science,
the effects of contracts must be kept between the parties. Besides,
“expenses of the marriage” as that term is used in matrimonial regimes
law covers many more than the ordinary family expenses. Included is
the total outlay for the life of the spouses and the rearing of the family
as opposed to outlays for investments and speculations—house,
automobiles, travel, seasonal donations, and entertainment of friends,
84

Id. art. 2435.

COMMUNITY OF GAINS

241

as well as food, clothing, and educational needs. Each spouse should be
considered to obligate both solidarily, as stated before, for the expenses
of the ordinary life of the family; but obligations for other marriage
expenses should be, so far as third persons are concerned, those of the
contracting spouse alone. Only in this way may one spouse be assured
adequate freedom from the other in managing his own patrimony.
Neither spouse should be given cause to feel that the other can obligate
his total income for marriage expenses beyond ordinary family
expenses.

BRINGING AS MANY PERSONS AS POSSIBLE UNDER A NEW LEGAL REGIME
It is to the general public’s advantage to have most persons
under a single matrimonial regime. In this way the greatest security of
transaction and the greatest ease in commerce can be realized. All
matrimonial regimes are contractual in Louisiana, 85 however, and the
attempt to legislate a change in any matrimonial regime already in force
would result in a violation of the constitutional prohibition against the
impairment of the obligations of contract. How, then, to bring most
Louisiana couples under a new legal regime without risking
unconstitutional action? The author suggests the following measures:
(1) The effective date of the new legal regime should be
not less than six months after the promulgation of the
legislation prescribing it.
(2) Couples marrying on or after the effective date of
the new legal regime should be deemed to have
contracted it tacitly unless they modify or reject it by
express marriage contract.
85

See text at notes 5‐18 supra.
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(3) Couples already married on the effective date of the
new legal regime, and who had not entered into an
express marriage contract, should be deemed to have
accepted the new legal regime tacitly as of that day
unless one of them executes and records, before that
time, an authentic act negating his willingness to accept
it.
(4) Couples already married on the effective date of the
new legal regime and who had entered into an express
marriage contract might accept the new legal regime by
executing a marriage contract to that effect before that
day.

The first, second, and fourth provisions certainly pose no
constitutional issues. It does not seem reasonable to believe that the
third might do so, for usually six months is sufficient time to permit a
person to protect his acquired right against change by reform
legislation. Both the third and fourth represent deviations from the
principle that matrimonial regimes should be unalterable by convention.
It is submitted, however, that the extension of the right to make a
change on the enactment of a new legal regime may be warranted if the
period for deliberation and final action is not extended too long.

ULTIMA VERBA
Throughout this article the author has tried to make evaluations
and judgments on the basis of the following considerations, which he
believes accord with general human experience with law:
(1) A matrimonial regime, like any other plan of order among
men, must be one which does not strain their virtue too far. The human
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condition, the culture of the time, and even the ignorance and ill will of
men must be given recognition. The world is a real world of people as
we find them.
(2) The legal matrimonial regime, that which the law will
presume, spouses intended to contract if they fail to provide for
another, must be that which will be acceptable to most spouses in the
various stages of married life.
(3) Whatever the regime, the natural desire of men and women
to control what they acquire through their efforts or by inheritance or
donation should not be defeated. Though sharing in control decisions is
to be considered an ideal to be fostered, it is not one which can be
forced on married persons without endangering the marriage fabric
itself. And in a society of two there cannot be the palliative of majority
rule. The alternatives are giving authority legally to one spouse alone, to
each severally over the whole, to both jointly, or giving each spouse
authority over certain aspects only of their common concerns; but
authority to one or each over the whole may cause a spouse to feel his
patrimony is at the mercy of the other, and authority to both jointly will
cause each to consider his actions hampered by the other.
(4) The sharing of gains by married persons is most appropriate,
for willy‐nilly their lives are as one. But it is better to postpone their
sharing in each other’s gains until dissolution of their life as married
persons. The regular division of gains during the common life may well
come to annoy the acquiring spouse and prove a serious detriment to
family peace. Out of respect for human dignity, nevertheless, the
spouse without revenue must be provided with a minimum, to be under
his sole control, from the income of the other.
(5) Marriage and the marriage regime of the spouses should
have the very least possible effect on the actual and potential
patrimonial relations between the spouses as individual persons and the
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general public. As much as possible, a matrimonial regime should not
change the mode in which the spouses and third persons deal with each
other. The regime, as much as possible, should have its effects only
between the spouses themselves. As to the world, the spouses should
be as if unmarried. Although the author has not departed so far from
tradition in his recommendations, it might be well to consider whether
third persons should ever have to stop to consider the married or single
state of the persons with whom they are dealing, much less their
matrimonial regimes. The matrimonial regime should be a matter of
private order in the strictest sense.
(6) Finally, the laws on the subject should reduce to a minimum
the need for evidence of authority to act, thus providing for speed and
economy in everyday affairs without risking security of transaction.
The author suggests that the proposals he has advanced in this
article incorporate these considerations.

Characterization as an Approach
to the Conflict of Laws 
The conflict of laws, or private international law, has
always been of considerable interest to me. This
comment below, written in 1940 while a graduate
student at LSU, later became the basis of my contacts
with several European‐trained scholars, notably Ernst
Rabel and Rodolfo DeNova, the latter of whom invited
me to give lectures at the University of Pavia in 1952
and 1964. The subject was and is one of particular
concern to jurisdictions limiting law to their own
legislation. Jurisdictions open to equity when the
positive law is silent (e.g. Louisiana, Anglo‐American
states) can do “justice” when there is no applicable
legislation.

Litigation may in a sense be divided into two categories. The
ordinary case involves operative facts and issues which are connected
with only that legislative jurisdiction in which the court sits and the
court simply applies the law of the forum. The second category—the
conflict of laws case—involves operative facts and issues some of which
are connected with legislative jurisdictions other than that of the forum.


Originally published in 2 LA. L. REV. 715 (1940). Reprinted with the permission
of the Louisiana Law Review.
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In this type of case no one system of positive law regulates the entire
situation. The court might either decide arbitrarily without reference to
any system of law, or apply its own law exclusively, or refer the matter
to the system of law with which the case seems to have the closest
association. This last course is the one followed.
It is usual to think of this reference as being accomplished
through the application of a conflicts rule, a rule of the forum by which
the issue as defined is referred to a certain law by means of a
connecting factor or place element. This connecting factor may be a
juridical concept or an extra‐legal fact. Thus, capacity to marry may be
referred to the law of the domicile; succession to an immovable may be
referred to the law of its situs.
In 1891 Kahn 1 in Germany pointed out that the same case might
be decided differently in different states because of the conflicts which
might exist in the conflicts rules of the states concerned. (1) The
conflicts rules themselves might be patently different, as where capacity
to marry is referred by one state to the party’s domiciliary law and by
another state to his national law. (2) The conflicts rules may be
apparently the same, but actually different because different meanings
may be given to the connecting factor in each state, as where domicile
is the connecting factor in each state, but one method of determining
domicile does not correspond to the other. (3) The conflicts rules may
be apparently the same in each state, with the connecting factors the
same in content, but the issue not defined in the same manner in each

1

Kahn, Gesetzeskollisionen: ein Beitrag zur Lehre des internationalen
Privatrechts, 30 JHERING JAHRBÜCHER FÜR DE DOGMATIC DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN UND
DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 1‐143 (1801), and republished in 1 ABHANDLUNGEN ZUM
INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT VON FRANZ KAHN 1‐123 (Otto Lenel and Hans Lewald
eds. 1928), as summarized by Falconbridge, Characterization in the Conflict of
Laws, 53 L. Q. REV. 235, 238 (1937).
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state, as where the necessity of parental consent is legally defined as a
question of capacity in one state and as a question of form in another.
The often cited case of Ogden v. Ogden 2 may be given as an
illustration of the last type of conflict mentioned, namely the difference
in the definition of the issue. A minor Frenchman had married an
Englishwoman in England without previously obtaining the consent of
his parents as required by French law. An English court considered the
French requirement a matter of form and applied the English conflicts
rule that form is governed by the law of the place of celebration
(England). The court found the French law inapplicable and upheld the
validity of the marriage. Shortly before, a French court had to decide on
the validity of the same marriage. Defining the necessity of parental
consent as a question of capacity to marry, the French court applied the
French conflicts rule that such capacity is governed by the party’s
national (French) law, and declared the marriage null. Both England and
France had the same conflicts rules that form is determined by the law
of the place of celebration and capacity by the law of the party’s
domicile (or nationality—here the same), 3 but a difference in the
definition of the issue led to a difference in result. The problem of
defining the issue and the connecting factor is called the problem of
characterization; this has also been called “qualification,” or
“classification.” 4

2

Ogden v. Ogden, 1908 P. 46 (Eng. C.A.).
Actually, there are two conflicting rules of reference on the question of
capacity, but as the Frenchman was domiciled in France by English law, there
would have been no difference in result in this case.
4
“Qualifications” is used almost exclusively on the Continent. For use of the
terms and a survey of the statements of the problem in English see Robertson,
A Survey of the Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 52 HARV. L. REV.
747 (1939). The only other writers in the United States who have given the
problem any serious consideration are: Lorenzen, The Theory of Qualifications
in the Conflict of Laws, 20 COL. L. REV. 247 (1920); and Rheinstein, Comparative
3
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Six years after Kahn’s statement, Bartin 5 concluded that the
problem could not be solved. To Bartin, conflicts rules were as much a
part of the law of the forum as the rules of internal law. As such they
were phrased in terms of the internal law. To give them other
characterizations, such as those of a foreign law, would be to give them
a meaning not intended by the sovereign. Hence all characterizations
must be by the law of the forum. 6 Bartin admitted that the sovereign
may deliberately use a characterization which would fit similar concepts
or institutions in other systems of law, but such a characterization could
not be used outside of its own jurisdiction. In considering this law the
foreign court would have to characterize its terms according to its own
local concepts. 7
It is important to note that the conflicts rule has, according to
Bartin, the same binding force as a rule of internal law and must be
applied in the manner in which the sovereign understands it. It is not
such a law as will dispose of the issue, but a rule of reference, one which

Law and the Conflict of Laws in Germany, 2 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 232, 257 et seq
(1935). 1 BEALE, A TREATISE OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 55, § 7.2 (2d ed. 1938),
dismisses the problem with the statement that in America “all qualifications are
determined by the law of the forum.” STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) and
GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) seem to ignore the problem entirely.
There will be occasion later herein to explain the lack of material on this
subject in the United States.
The question of determining the meaning of concepts in the foreign law to
which reference is made by the conflicts rule is now generally resolved in favor
of definition by the foreign law itself (see infra note 38). It will not be treated in
this paper. The only problem here is that a judge must be careful when using
concepts of a system of law with which he may not be familiar.
5
Bartin, De l’Impossibilité d’Arriver a la Suppression Définitive des Conflits des
Lois, 24 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 225‐255, 466‐495, 720‐728 (Clunet,
1897).
6
Id. at 235‐240.
7
Id. at 241 et seq.
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will refer the issue to a certain law, local or foreign, for determination; 8
an “indicative” rather than a “dispositive” rule. 9 Therefore, the juridical
definition or characterization of the issue must be known before the
conflicts rule can be selected and the law referred to applied. In the
words of Falconbridge, 10 the solution of a conflicts case requires the
characterization of the issue, selection of the law to be applied by
means of the conflicts rule, and application of the law selected. Each
state having its own concepts and institutions which cannot be expected
to be the same in other states, the characterizations of one state will
not necessarily conform to those of another, and therefore it is vain to
expect uniformity of result for similar conflict cases in different courts.
Bartin concluded that there can be no solution to such conflict of
decisions in similar cases; this could be eliminated only by having the
same laws with similar characterizations in every state; such uniformity
cannot be expected. 11
Bartin admitted two exceptions to his rule that characterization
must be made in accordance with the law of the forum. The first was in
determining (preliminary to characterization of the issue) the movable
or immovable nature of a thing, which he considered must always be by
the law of the situs. 12 Bartin reasoned to this exception on the basis of
the security which would be afforded to transactions. There could be no
dispute as to the location of a thing. All courts could seize upon this
material fact and characterize by the law of the place where the thing is
found. 13 The second exception was that the determination of the
applicable law should be left to the will or intention of the parties
8

Id. at 236, 239‐240, 480, 732.
Taintor, Universality in the Conflict of Laws of Contracts, 1 LA. L. REV. 695, 696,
n. 3, 4 (1939).
10
Falconbridge, supra note 1, at 235 et seq.
11
Bartin, supra note 5, at 734.
12
Id. at 246 et seq.
13
Id. at 251‐255.
9
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wherever possible. 14 Bartin, we are told, 15 has come to realize that this
latter point is no exception at all because the forum must first
characterize the issue as one of “contract” before the will or intention
of the parties to act under one of the possibly applicable laws may be
considered. This analysis does not affect the point which we wish to
make here, namely, that sovereignty does not always require that
concepts of the local law be used in the conflicts rule. 16
It must be remembered that Bartin reasoned to the necessity of
characterization by the law of the forum on the ground that to use
foreign concepts in the local rule would deny the intended application
of the local conflicts rule. But if the use of foreign concepts in a local
conflicts rule might result in the misapplication of that rule, the use of
the foreign law in connection with the local characterizations might
result in a misapplication of the foreign law. 17 Therefore, argued
Despagnet, 18 characterization of the issue must be made in terms of the
law to be applied. H. Donnedieu de Vabres 19 admitted that the foreign
law could not be given its intended application with local
14

Id. at 472 et seq.
Rabel, Le Problème de la Qualification, 28 REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE
1, 14, n. 3 (Darras, 1933); and Robertson, supra note 4, at 761, citing 1 RECUEIL
DES COURS 608 (1930).
16
Cf. Robertson, supra note 4, at 759‐760.
17
By extending Bartin’s reasoning we could say that the sovereign creating the
conflicts rule has no intention to apply the foreign law, but only a law of its
own, the content of which is to be found by interpreting the foreign law in
terms of local concepts. That such is not actually the case hardly needs
refutation. The sovereign might as well direct that its internal law be applied to
conflicts cases. The fact that a use of the foreign law is directed would seem to
indicate an intention that it be interpreted and applied as in that foreign state.
18
Despagnet, Des Conflits de Lois Relatifs à la Qualifications des Rapports
Jurisdiques, 25 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 253, 261 (Clunet, 1898).
19
H. Donnedieu de Vabres, De l’Impossibilité d’une Solution Rationelle et
Définitive des Conflits des Lois, 32 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 1231,
1236‐1238 (Clunet, 1905).
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characterizations, but concluded that this result could not be avoided:
how would it be possible to determine what law is applicable before
characterizing the issue? Thus, in his opinion, Despagnet’s views
involved a vicious circle.
Bartin’s view of the approach to the conflict of laws has been
adopted by Arminjon 20 and Niboyet 21 in France, by Cheshire 22 in
England, and by Falconbridge 23 in Canada. In the United States,
Lorenzen takes the same view, 24 and Beale seems to be in accord for he
dismisses the problem with the statement that in America “all
qualifications are determined by the law of the forum.” 25 This is not as
astonishing as it may seem at first, for the process of characterization,
selection, and application gives rise to difficulty only if the concepts and
institutions of the states involved cannot be characterized in the same
manner. Since the laws of most of the states of the Union are based
upon a common tradition of law, the concepts, institutions, and
classification of the internal laws are likely to be the same or so similar
that conflicts will arise but infrequently. Rheinstein has noted that the
use of concepts as a basis of approach to the conflict of laws “is
unobjectionable as long as we have to deal exclusively with conflicts
between various bodies of law inside of one single legal system, e.g.,
20

1 ARMINJON, PRECIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 133‐136 (2d ed. 1927). For
translated selections, see HARPER AND TAINTOR, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON
JUDICIAL TECHNIQUE IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 258 (1937).
21
NIBOYET, NOTIONS SOMMAIRES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 121‐125, n. 197‐202
(3d ed. 1937).
22
CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 24‐45 (2d ed. 1938).
23
Falconbridge, supra note 1. Compare the summary of Falconbridge’s views by
Robertson, supra note 4, at 766‐767. For further discussion of Falconbridge’s
views see infra, page 220 et seq.
24
Lorenzen, supra note 4, at 268. For a summary of Lorenzen’s views see
Robertson, supra note 4, at 747‐751, 758‐762. According to Robertson (at 747,
n. 1), Lorenzen has since considerably modified his views.
25
1 BEALE, supra note 4, at 55, § 7.2. See also RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS, § 7(a); Lorenzen, supra note 4, at 268.
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between various statua of the medieval Italian cities, between various
French coutumes, between various laws of the ancient Dutch provinces,
between various jurisdictions inside the Common Law.” 26 It would seem
that the approach by means of characterization, selection, and
application may be used within certain limits in the conflict of laws.
On the continent of Europe, where there are different traditions
of law, the process of characterizing by the law of the forum would not
lead to satisfactory results. Certain writers, unlike Bartin, Niboyet and
Arminjon, could not reconcile themselves to these results and sought
other methods. These methods may be roughly divided into two groups:
one which sought to characterize on the basis of comparative law, and
another which sought to refer all matters to the law of a place which
could be readily located by a material fact or by a universally accepted
legal concept.
One way of avoiding Bartin’s logic was to deny that the conflicts
rule of the forum was drafted in terms of local concepts and
institutions. The terms used therein were to be understood as terms of
international significance, terms which were intended to include and to
refer to similar concepts and institutions in all systems of law; that is,
concepts and institutions which, though perhaps not similar, were used
for the same function, to protect or to secure similar interests. Thus
“tutorship” in a conflicts rule would include in its meaning not only
tutorship as understood in the forum’s internal law, but guardianship or
any other institution with the same function in other systems of law.
Similarly, “usufruct” in connection with the property rights of the
surviving spouse could include “dower.”
Comparative law could be used to discover the corresponding
concepts and institutions in all systems of law and, with the gradually
extending adoption of the same conflicts rule, uniformity of results
26

Rheinstein, supra note 4, at 263.

CHARACTERIZATION

253

could be obtained. This was the theory announced by Rabel 27 in
Germany and which seems to have been followed by Wigny 28 in France
and Rheinstein 29 in the United States. Meriggi, 30 following a similar
doctrine, declared that the number of conflicts in institutions and
concepts were very few indeed, and that real conflicts would be found
only in what he termed the substrata of various systems of law. As long
as the substrata are the same, that is, as long as the aims of the law are
the same, conflicts would not appear. The institutions and concepts of
the internal law might differ in detail, but as long as they perform the
same function there would be no conflicts for they could be used
interchangeably. 31
From these observations and from observations previously
made regarding the possibility of using characterizations of the lex fori
where different bodies of law in the same system or tradition are
involved, we are led to this conclusion: that the process of
characterization, selection, and application may be used as long as the
issue is characterized in terms of some concept or institution common
to all systems of law involved. If the different bodies of law belong to
the same system or tradition, the common elements may be found in
the institutions and concepts themselves. If the bodies of law are more
27

Rabel, supra note 15, at 17.
Wigny, Remarques sur le Problème des Qualifications, 31 REVUE CRITIQUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 392, 418 (Darras, 1936).
29
Rheinstein, supra note 4, at 264‐268.
30
Meriggi, Les Qualifications en Droit International Privé, 28 REVUE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 201, 205 et seq (Darras, 1933).
31
Beckett, The Question of Classification (“Qualification”) in Private
International Law 15 B.Y.I.L. 46 (1934), as reported by Robertson, supra note 4,
at 754, 762‐766, would seem to advocate characterization of the issue on the
basis of conceptions of analytical jurisprudence as found by a study of
comparative law, but at the same time he practically denies this principle by
the broad exceptions for the characterization of which he would look to the law
of the forum. If Robertson’s report on Beckett is correct, we cannot class him as
an advocate of characterization on the basis of comparative law.
28
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widely separated in tradition, but agree in seeking to perform the same
functions and to protect the same interests, the common elements will
manifest themselves in the function and purposes of the institutions. If
the different bodies of law do not seek to protect the same interests, in
short, if they are not based on the same philosophy of law, conflicts will
appear and they cannot be avoided. Thus the possibility of using the
system of characterization, selection, and application is directly
proportional to the points of similarity in the systems of law involved. It
must be noted that this method presupposes an examination of the
various laws which may be applicable in order to discover the
characterization which will fit them all. This is contrary to Bartin’s
reasoning that the foreign law cannot be reached without the reference
of the conflicts rule. Although the approach through the conflicts rule is
practical, it is artificial, as will be shown below.
Falconbridge 32 maintains that characterization of the issue
should precede selection of the applicable law but is unable to accept
characterization by the law of the forum because of the obviously unfair
results to which it often leads. Likewise, characterization on a strict
comparative law basis is not acceptable to Falconbridge because it
would demand of the judge a vast and complete knowledge of all
systems of law. 33 He therefore sought to provide a via media.
Just what Falconbridge means by this via media is not clear
from his explanation, for he states that characterization of the issue
must precede selection of the connecting factor and then proceeds:
This characterization of the question—which may be
provisional and subject to revision—lays the foundation
for the Court’s consideration of the concrete provisions
of the laws of various countries which are or may be
32
33

Falconbridge, supra note 1, at 241, 245‐246.
Id. at 246.

CHARACTERIZATION

255

applicable in the light of the characterization of the
main question or different aspects of that question. 34
To say that characterization of the issue may be provisional and
subject to revision is inconsistent with the statement that
characterization must precede selection of the connecting factor. Thus
it would seem that Falconbridge contradicts himself.
However, a consideration of what Falconbridge includes in
“characterization of the issue,” and an analysis of his advocated
approach to the problem in the Ogden case seems to indicate that he
has confused—in the application of his principles—characterization of
the issue and application of the law once selected—the first and third
steps to his process. 35 Thus, in discussing the problem of the Ogden
case, 36 Falconbridge remarks that the English court should examine the
laws of England and the laws of France, construing the latter in its
context—that is, according to French characterizations—just as a French
court would do, in order to determine whether all provisions of English
law essential to the formal validity, and all provisions of French law
essential to the substantive validity of the marriage have been complied
with. Finding that the English law does not require parental consent as
essential to the formal validity of a marriage in England, it should
declare the English law inapplicable; but finding that the French law
does require parental consent as essential to the substantive validity of
the marriage in that it considers it essential to the party’s capacity to

34

Id.
Cf. Robertson, supra note 4, at 767. Falconbridge seems to have done this
same thing in most of his examples of characterization of the issue. It should be
noted that what Robertson refers to as “primary” and “secondary”
classification corresponds to Falconbridge’s “characterization of the issue” and
“application of the law selected.” The latter does not present any particular
problem. See supra note 4.
36
See note 2 and text thereto.
35
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marry, it should declare the marriage null. 37 Apparently, “form” and
“capacity” are here his “provisional characterizations.”
What Falconbridge appears to have done is to characterize the
issue as “validity of the marriage” and to apply the conflicts rules that
formal validity of a marriage is determined according to the law of the
place of the celebration, and substantive validity by the law of the
domicile of the parties. Thus, in looking to the English law to determine
what related to form, and to the French law to determine what related
to capacity, Falconbridge was only applying the law selected by the
conflicts rule.
This seems to be the only way to interpret Falconbridge and as
thus interpreted his writings do not show a via media. They do show the
necessity of starting with the issue characterized in terms of a concept
which is understood in the same way by all the systems of law possibly
involved and the necessity of applying the foreign law as it is applied in
the foreign state. The first point is particularly the subject of this paper;
the second is now generally admitted 38 and need not be considered
herein. Since Falconbridge has not given us a via media on the question
of characterizing the issue 39 and since he at least impliedly recognizes
the need for universality on this point, we are forced to return to our
finding that characterization of the issue must be in terms of function,
characterizations to be discovered through the study of comparative
law.

37

Falconbridge, supra note 1, at 254.
Even by Bartin. Robertson, supra note 4, at 761, citing I RECUEIL DES COURS 608.
See also CHESHIRE, supra note 22, at 38.
39
Falconbridge’s lack of a via media seems to be confirmed by his later
statement that, as a general rule, characterization of the issue must be by the
lex fori. Falconbridge, supra note 1, at 542, 643. Cf. Robertson, supra note 4, at
766, 767.
38
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Now whereas the comparative law method would seem to be
satisfactory for the purpose of characterizing the issue in the case, it
could not be used for the purpose of characterizing the connecting
factor. The connecting factor is a place element. Even if the issue is
given a universal characterization, the outcome of the case will depend
upon the system of law to which it is referred. Thus it is imperative that
the system of law referred to be the same regardless of the court in
which the issue arises. Similarity of function in the connecting factor
would not suffice to accomplish this because similarity of function does
not necessarily (and often does not) mean identity of place reference.
For example, “domicile” and “nationality” are place elements used by
different courts for the same issue, but a party’s domicile and
nationality may or may not coincide and so the result of the case may
depend upon the choice of forum. Even the concepts “domicile” and
“nationality” may be determined differently in different states. It would
seem, therefore, that connecting factors must be universally accepted
for the same issues. This universality would probably be best
accomplished through international treaties adopting and defining the
connecting factor. 40
The realization of the importance of universality in the
connecting factor has been, we believe, the reason which prompted
Frankenstein 41 to devise his approach. This noted German international
law lawyer would reduce the characterization of all issues to the
concepts “personal” and “real.” He applies to the first a universally
accepted notion of nationality for a connecting factor, and to the
second the unmistakable law of the situs of the thing. The manner in
which he arrives at his conclusions is ingenious. All laws relate to
persons or to things; the solution of problems of conflict of laws lies,
40

This does not mean, however, that comparative law could not be used to
determine the best place element to be selected.
41
Frankenstein, Une Doctrine Moderne du Droit International Privé, 27 REVUE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 47 (Darras, 1932).
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therefore, in discovering the closest points of contact between persons
and things and the juridical order. Persons are more closely connected
with their nations than with any other idea and hence the national law
should be used in all cases of purely personal relations. Besides, the idea
of nationality recommends itself because of its stability. But where the
relation is between persons with regard to things, Frankenstein
reasoned that a person is related not only to one other person, but to
all persons in the world. As it is impossible to apply all systems of law,
the only thing to do is to choose one upon which all persons can agree
and which can be easily determined; hence no better solution can be
found than to apply the law of the situs of the thing. 42
Frankenstein’s system would be difficult to put into execution.
To say the least, it is doubtful whether the national law of the parties is
always the law most closely connected with an issue, and it would be
difficult at times to determine whether the issue is “real” or “personal.”
But the fact that such a system has been advocated does show the
importance of having connecting factors universally accepted.
We are now in a position to announce what we believe is the
best method to follow in approaching the conflict of laws. The issue
must be characterized on the basis of corresponding concepts and
institutions in all the systems of law which may be involved. For this
purpose comparative law must be the guide. If there is nothing
corresponding in the systems and if they are fundamentally opposed to
each other, it is useless to attempt to reconcile them and the court
should dispose of the case in whatever manner it deems best for the
interest of all concerned. If some corresponding concept can be found,
however, it will be necessary to have all systems of law refer this
concept or institution to the law of the same state. For this purpose the
42

Id. at 50 et seq. Compare the system of Cock, discussed by Delage, Une
Nouvelle Théorie pour Résoudre le Conflit des Lois, 63 JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 1038,1042 et seq (Clunet, 1936).
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aim of the conflict of laws should be to have all states agree on
connecting factors or place elements. This should be possible to a great
extent if not in all cases, for the place element has little to do with the
method by which interests are secured in the internal law, and
international agreements would possibly be the best means. Therefore,
the science of conflict of laws should seek to discover by a study of
comparative law the corresponding concepts and institutions in all
systems of law and seek to have the same connecting factors universally
adopted. 43 Only in this manner will any degree of uniformity be
obtained in the method of solving conflicts cases. 44
This goal may not be susceptible of immediate or even ultimate
complete achievement. But it does seem that once the similarity of
institutions and concepts can be shown by comparative law it should
not be too difficult to reach an agreement on the rules of reference.
Already in the more widely accepted institutions we see near
universality in results because of similarity in effect, though not always
in form, of the conflicts rules used. Barbey 45 has shown that a great deal
of universality of result exists in the conflict of laws in contract matters
in English, French and American law. Taintor has shown that there is
even greater universality in this matter than Barbey found, 46 and has
discovered a similar tendency in marriage cases in the United States. 47
Cock, we are told, has erected his system of approach to the conflict of
laws on the universality of results in conflict cases. 48 And Robertson,
43

It must be noted that universality in conflicts rules would necessarily
dispense with the notion of renvoi.
44
Cf. J, DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, L’EVOLUTION DE LA JURISPRUDENCE FRANÇAISE EN MATIERE
DE CONFLIT DES LOIS DEPUIS LE DEBUT DU XXE SIECLE 765, 766 (1938).
45
BARBEY, LE CONFLIT DES LOIS EN MATIERE DE CONTRATS DANS LE DROIT DES ETATS‐UNIS
D’AMERIQUE ET LE DROIT ANGLAIS COMPARES AU DROIT FRANÇAIS (1938).
46
Taintor, supra note 9, at 712, 734‐736.
47
Taintor, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status of Marriage,
19 B.U. L. REV. 353 (1939).
48
Cock, as reported by Delage, supra note 42, at 1038.
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while discussing the characterization of property, has shown that
considerable uniformity exists regarding the laws to which such matters
are referred. 49
Something must be said of the method of approach through a
conflicts rule or, what is the same thing, through characterization,
selection and application. Bartin concluded that characterization could
be made by the law of the forum alone because he conceived of the
conflicts rules as rules of reference created by the sovereign in the same
manner as an internal rule of law. To say the least, it would be difficult
to imagine a state arbitrarily referring a matter to a foreign law if it did
not consider that the foreign law had more connection with the facts
than its own law. Instead, it appears that the conflicts rule must be a
generalization of what a court has been doing in certain factual
situations. It is true that conflicts rules have been codified and enacted
just as rules of internal law, but this in itself would not deprive the rule
of its character or purpose.
That a conflicts rule is really not a rule of reference is
demonstrated by the fact that it is abandoned in individual cases when
it does not lead to satisfactory results; courts use one connecting factor
or another in order to reach results which they deem desirable. 50 Again,
we find well settled conflicts rules denied application by reason of the
doctrine of public policy, the policy against circumvention of the law,
the doctrine of acquired rights, and the practice of varying the
characterization of the issue itself. 51 Besides, in cases where all the facts
have taken place in one state and there does not appear to be any
49

Robertson, The Characterization of Property in the Conflict of Laws, 28 GEO.
L.J. 739 (1940).
50
Cf. Marvin Safe Co. v. Norton, 48 N.J. Law 410, 7 Atl. 418, 57 Am. Rep. 566
(1886); and Charles T. Dougherty Co., Inc. v. Krimke, 105 N.J. Law 470, 144 Atl.
617 (1929).
51
DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, supra note 44, at 764. NIBOYET, supra note 21, at 120,
134, 141, n. 196, 216, 226.

CHARACTERIZATION

261

connection with another, even a foreign court does not hesitate to
apply the substantive law of that state in its entirety. 52 Rheinstein 53 has
suggested that the approach to the conflicts case is no different from
that used in an ordinary case in which internal law will be applied. In the
latter instance, all the facts are connected with one state alone and so
the court never thinks of applying any other law. In a conflicts case, the
facts seem to have some connection with other states and thus the
problem arises as to which law should be applied. It would seem that a
conflicts case is decided by selecting the law to be applied on the basis
of the greatest connection between the facts and a system of law, in
short, on the basis of what law would seem to have the most valid claim
to be applied. 54
The method of working with conflicts rules is not to be
condemned because of its artificiality. The economy of effort and the
wisdom of following past solutions which have proved satisfactory
would sanction the use of the conflicts rule as a rule of reference, as a
guide. But the nature of the conflicts rule must be kept in mind and its
application should not be allowed to defeat the purposes of the law.
The doctrines of public policy and the policy against circumvention of
the law will preclude undesirable results. By keeping in mind that the
conflicts rule is merely a guide based on past experience we can
understand how the court can examine all the laws which may be
applicable before characterizing the issue. The conflicts rule will also
provide a means of working towards universality of results in cases
where similar interests are involved. Once the similarity of institutions
and concepts is realized through a study of comparative law, the way is

52

Robertson, supra note 4, at 760, n. 20.
Rheinstein, supra note 4, at 261‐262.
54
DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, supra note 44, at 740 et seq., has shown that this is the
conclusion to be drawn from French jurisprudence.
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open to the universal adoption of connecting factors. In this method lies
the future of the conflict of laws. 55

55

As to the necessity of universality in conflicts rules, see Levy‐Ullmann, La
Doctrine Universaliste en Matière de Conflit des Lois, in BARBEY, supra note 45,
at vii‐xix.

The Italian Legal System:
A Book Review 
My review of The Italian Legal System, below, pleased
authors Mario Cappelletti and Joseph M. Perillo. I heard
nothing from John Henry Merryman, whom I knew quite
well, he and I having participated in seminars at the
University of Rome’s Institute of Comparative Law in
1963‐64.

This sophisticated work is the best I know of any introductory
book in English on a foreign legal system. Professors Cappelletti and
Perillo, the Italian and American proceduralists and comparativists who
in 1965 gave us Civil Procedure in Italy, combined their efforts with
Professor Merryman, who only in recent years has turned his
concentrated attention to civil law in general, and to the Italian legal
system in particular, to produce a most readable, lucid and highly
instructive whole. It is a book written for English language readers, not a
translation of a work written for Italians, and its co‐authors have



Book review of M. CAPPELLETTI, J. H. MERRYMAN, J. M., PERILLO, THE ITALIAN LEGAL
SYSTEM—AN INTRODUCTION (Stanford University Press, 1967), originally published
in 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 829 (1967). Reprinted with the permission of the American
Journal of Comparative Law.
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overcome remarkably well the difficulty of describing one legal system
to persons of another.
Each chapter has its special merit. The first, attributed to
Professor Cappelletti with acknowledgments of assistance from Dr.
Lamberto Pansolli, is an extremely rich and sensitive account of the
history of continental law in general and of the Italian law in particular,
one which is filled with evidence of just pride in the role which Italian
jurists have had in both. Of all the chapters it is the most literary in
style, and perhaps it reflects more than any other the traditional
erudition and perspective of the Italian legal scholar. Deserving of
special note are the chapter’s expositions of the nature and position of
the jus commune, the distinction between the mos italicus and the mos
gallicus, the development of canon law and its influence on the civil law,
and the reception of the civil law in Spain. I do not know of any short
treatment of the general subject which expounds these aspects of it
with as much depth of understanding. Equally good are the chapter’s
sections on the multiple influences on the development of Italian law
since the Napoleonic era.
Professor Periilo’s contribution consists of the second and third
chapters, on the structure of the Italian state and on the Italian law
professionals. These are written very clearly and, it appears to me, with
a definite understanding of the problems the average Anglo‐American
would have in coming to know Italian institutions and methods. These
chapters are distinguished by their efforts to communicate both official
structures and actualities in government, legal education and practice.
Supplementing them is an appendix containing an English translation of
the Italian constitution.
The fourth chapter on civil procedure and evidence is Professor
Cappelletti’s. Again great pains have been taken to make the subject
comprehensible to Anglo‐American oriented readers and to describe
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the law in practice as well as in the books. The author is very critical of
Italian procedure in both theory and practice, particularly its rules of
evidence, its toleration of excessive delays, and its failure in fact to
require truth of the parties in the conduct of trials. Professor Cappelletti
shows himself somewhat impatient with Italian procedural doctrine
because of its “excessive emphasis on systematic construction and
dogmatics” and because often “it is divorced from the social, economic,
and ideological bases of the law” and points hopefully to signs and
forces of reform. Supplementing this chapter is an appendix containing
in translation significant portions of the record of a simple civil suit to
recover indemnification for bodily injury and property damage. Its one
hundred and twenty‐four pages give convincing testimony to why it is
many Italian suits are compromised, but one is compelled to wonder
whether the particular suit was typical or especially indicative of the
kinds of abuses which may be found in the trial of civil suits in Italy.
The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters on Italian doctrine, law and
interpretation are in my mind the most important of the book.
Professor Merryman, who authored all three, has shown remarkable
insight and within each he has been meticulous in the attempt to
describe each institution and practice in its Italian context and to avoid
characterizing or appraising it in American legal terms. His exposition is
careful without being pedantic and includes Italian appraisals of their
own legal system as well as his own observations. The documentation is
ample, but selective rather than cumulative. Reading these chapters is a
pleasant experience as well as an informative one. On the whole I do
not hesitate to characterize Professor Merryman’s success as brilliant.
There are, nevertheless, some critical observations which I
believe fair to make. First, the organization of the book as a whole
would have reflected better the dominant and official Italian legal
theory if the chapter on procedure and evidence had been placed last,
after those on doctrine, law and interpretation. The theoretical basis of
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Italian law being legislative positivism, procedure may not be
considered more than the means of maintaining and enforcing the
substantive law presumably completely defined by legislation. Thus to
treat the subject matters in logical sequence, procedure should have
been considered last.
Secondly, and for the same reason for which the chapter on
procedure should have followed those on the substantive law, the
chapter on law (that is, legislation) should have preceded that on
doctrine. In a system founded on legislative positivism, doctrine
(literally, the teaching) performs a number of functions, but none of
them is to provide evidence of a background of unlegislated law against
which the legislation is to be envisaged, and this no matter how much
the practice may seem to be to the contrary. Before the nineteenth
century, when the jus commune formed the basis of Italian law, doctrine
was indeed its best evidence, the container of its pervading notions.
One writing on the Italian system of that time would have been correct
in considering doctrine first. Once legislative positivism became the
official basis of the Italian legal system, however, doctrine of logical
necessity became the servant of the legislation rather than the
institution through which the law was to receive primary formulation.
Doctrine from that time forward could expound the law, point the way
to its extension, criticize it and suggest the mode of its reform, but it
could not legitimately provide a teaching on the existing legal order
which did not have its foundation in the expression of legislative will.
Thus, in my opinion, to give the reader the correct impression of the
structure of the Italian legal system through the book’s organization as
well as through the contents of its chapters, the chapter on law should
have preceded that on doctrine. There is another reason, too, why this
arrangement would have been better. Under the chapter on
interpretation, which then would have followed that on doctrine,
Professor Merryman quite correctly discusses both interpretation by
doctrine and interpretation by the judiciary. The chapter on
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interpretation, therefore, would have been a logical sequel to that on
doctrine. As the book stands, the chapter on law breaks the continuity
of thought which otherwise would have existed.
Professor Merryman’s arrangement of the chapters in question,
and to some extent their contents, suggest to me that in spite of his
most diligent efforts to be absolutely objective in presenting the
subject, his predilection for American realism has manifested itself and
indirectly colored his exposition. On first reading the chapters on
doctrine, law and interpretation it occurred to me that Professor
Merryman might have been delighted to find it possible to label them
“policy science,” “the materials of the law” and “the judicial process.”
He writes approvingly of an emerging doctrine in opposition to the
traditional theory of legislative positivism (which he characterizes, I
think inaccurately, as “folklore” and “cultural agnosticism”) and
criticizes the judiciary for not exercising a primary role in interpretation.
In a sense I share his observations on and his concern for the present
state of Italian interpretation. The enactment of a new Civil Code in
1942 and of a new Code of Civil Procedure in 1940 understandably
resulted in doctrine being directed principally to the work of
expounding the content of the new statements of the law and
neglecting for the time being that of interpretation in the sense of the
adjustment and application of the rules and principles of the legislation
to evolving postwar conditions. Probably it is true also that legal
education on the whole has not paid sufficient attention to the
attunement of law students to the art of interpretation. I agree, too,
that Italian judges should participate more in interpretation than
Professor Merryman says they do, though I would insist they draw their
inspiration from good doctrine if it exists. In my opinion, however,
Italians would lose more than they could gain if they failed to adhere to
the traditional approach and veered toward a “policy science.” Italian
thought today is acutely pluralistic and most often skeptic. In this
environment legislative positivism provides an authoritative
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pseudoconsensus, if not a real one, through which interpretation must
be given and by means of which its limits will be somewhat confined.
Unless this interpretation remains primarily in the hands of the legal
scientists rather than the judges, Italian law will soon become as varied
and uncertain as opinion on American common law. Judicial
interpretation eventually would result in a judicial gloss, much like that
in Louisiana, which probably would be devoid of the expertise, the
consistency and the order which reasonably might be found in doctrinal
writings. By the very nature of their work judges cannot be expected to
see the law as a whole in dealing with particular situations in trial
environment. The doctrinaires at least have more opportunity to do so.
In spite of these defects, however, the book may become
recognized as a classic, and justly so.
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